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To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of
Federal Circuit Court Deference to
District Court Rulings on State Law
Dan T. Coenen*
"[L]awyers know, if others do not, that what may seem technical may
embody a great tradition of justice .... -"
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts of appeals often grant special deference to
district court rulings on matters of state law.2 This practice is
important.3 It is also ill-conceived.
This Article explores this "rule of deference."4 Section I
considers the roots and reach of the rule. Together with the
Appendices to this Article,5 it seeks to detail for practitioners,
commentators, and judges the way the rule operates in the
courts. The remaining sections of this Article consider the wis-
dom of the rule of deference. Section II argues that the rule
lacks a sound rationale and Section III urges that the rule has
bad effects not yet considered by the courts. Section IV sug-
gests that the rule of deference offends Eie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins6 by producing second-rate appellate review of state
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
The author greatly appreciates the comments of Kevin M. Clermont,
Michael L. Wells, and the Honorable Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. on earlier
drafts of this Article. Many thanks also go to Robert D. McCullers, Wayne L.
Durden and Seunhee K. Pike for valuable research assistance.
1. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946).
2. J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE g 0.309[2], at 3127-29 n.28 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTIcE].
3. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text
4. The term is the author's. Courts have not given this practice a short-
hand label. See, ag., Priest v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 409 F.2d 1229,
1234 (9th Cir. 1969) (invoking "the rule that on questions of state law the de-
terminations of a [federal] district court sitting in that state are entitled to
great weight").
5. Appendix I is a circuit-by-circuit review of the rule of deference. Ap-
pendix II discusses the exceptions to the rule.
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law rulings in federal court. Section V observes that there may
be unspoken-and unacceptable-reasons why judges have re-
tained the rule.
A conflict among the circuits now exists on whether there
should be any rule of deference.7 Another intercircuit conflict
exists about how much deference the court should afford if the
rule applies." Intracircuit disagreements concerning the rule of
deference also have emerged.9 Most significantly, in almost
every circuit, different panels have articulated different formu-
lations of the measure of deference applicable under the rule.'0
In this setting, circuit court reevaluation of the rule is both
desirable and predictable." Supreme Court consideration also
may wait in the wings- 2 The thesis of this Article is that the
7. Compare, ag., In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
bane) (holding that circuit no longer will afford deference to district court rul-
ings on state law issues) with Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 825 F.2d 3204, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that circuit
will give substantial weight to district court's determination of state law issue);
see generally infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
8. Compare, e.g., Beard v. J.L Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1098 n-3 (7th Cir.
1987) (affording "great weight" to district court ruling on state law, but refus-
ing to apply "clearly erroneous review") with King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d
1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that state law ruling should be upheld un-
less "clearly erroneous"); see generally infra notes 19-28 and accompanying
text.
9. For example, an intracircuit conflict arguably exists in the Third Cir-
cuit concerning whether any deference is due district court state law rulings.
Compare William B. Tanner Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 1975)
(stating that court may exercise "independent review" of federal trial judge's
determination of mixed state law-fact issue) with Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792
F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the rule [is] that a district court's de-
termination of local law is entitled to a measure of deference").
10. See Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 256 (10th Cir. 1985) (Sey-
mour, J., concurring); see also infra -text accompanying notes 352-62 (Second
Circuit); 395-98 (Fourth Circuit); 420-34 (Fifth Circuit); 486-93 (Sixth Circuit);
524-32 (Seventh Circuit); 608-19 (Eighth Circuit); 676-96 (Tenth Circuit); 744-45
(Eleventh Circuit).
11. See, eg., Carter, 773 F.2d at 256-57 (Seymour, J., concurring) (criticiz-
ing Tenth Circuit's rule of deference and implying that en bane consideration
of new standard is warranted); see also Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and
Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 157, 158 (1985)
(stating that circuit courts may be rethinking various standards of review).
12. See SuP. CT. R 17.1(a) (citing circuit court conflict as factor Court con-
siders in deciding whether to grant certiorari); R. STERN, E. GREssMAN & S.
SnAPmo, SuPREmE COURT PRA=CrcE § 4.4, at 197 (6th ed. 1986) (stating that
Supreme Court usually grants certiorari when circuit courts are in direct con-
flict on same issue of federal law). The Court denied review, however, in
Olympic Sport Prods., Inca v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986), a case in which one question pur-
portedly presented was whether the Ninth Circuit's de novo review standard
RULE OF DEFERENCE
federal courts should abandon the rule of deference. The dis-
cussion that follows seeks to show why.
I. THE RULE AND ITS RATIONALE
A. THE REACH OF THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
In most cases, circuit court review of state law issues dif-
fers from circuit court review of federal law issues.13 This is so
because almost every circuit has held that appeals panels
should afford heightened deference, not appl'cable in federal
law cases, to the state law rulings of district court judges.14
This practice is important because it touches a large portion of
all civil appeals15 and alters results in real cases for real peo-
conflicted with other circuits' standards of review. 54 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Jan.
7, 1986) (No. 85-832). The Court also refused to review Vanterpool v. Hess Oil
V. I. Corp., 766 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986), in
which review was sought as to what standard of review should apply to district
court determinations of territorial law. 54 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1985)
(No. 85-812). To date, the Court may have been willing to tolerate intercircuit
conflict in this area on the ground that the rule of deference relates to the in-
ternal workings of each court of appeals in much the same manner as do each
circuit's procedural rules. This view, however, overlooks the fact that circuit
court rulings on these issues go well beyond procedural niceties; in fact, differ-
ent approaches to the rule of deference create far more meaningful appellate
review in some circuits than in others. Such recurring and basic discrimina-
tion among litigants in the federal judicial system would seem to demand re-
view by the high court. See, e.g., Masri v. United States, 434 U.S. 907, 908
(1977) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (advocating Supreme
Court resolution of conflicts !'where a defendant's rights would be notably dif-
ferent depending upon the [c]ircuit in which he is tried").
13. See Chula Vista City School Dist. v. Bennett, 824 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108.S. Ct. 774 (1988) (stating that on question of federal
law "the appellate court independently determines the proper interpretation
and need not defer to the district court").
14. See generally infra Appendix I (reviewing more than 550 circuit court
cases that cite rule of deference); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507, at 107 n.59 (1982) (reviewing Supreme
Court and circuit court decisions on deference); 1A MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 2, 0.309[2], at 3127-39 n.28 (reviewing circuit court treatment
of deference issue). .
15. The rule applies to virtually all federal diversity cases, which consti-
tuted about 20-25% of the district courts' civil dockets during the last decade.
See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DmsIoN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS A-6
(1985); ADMINIsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR 12 (1986); Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-
Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MTD. L. REV. 766, 772
& n.14 (1983) (stating that in 1982 about one-quarter of new federal civil cases
were diversity cases); ef. J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JU-
DICIAL SYSTEM 35 (1981) (stating that "[o]f the four main sources of civil litiga-
tion in federal courts-U.S. plaintiff, U.S. defendant, federal questions and
1989]
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ple.16 All but two circuits have endorsed the rule of defer-
ence.' 7 Courts have applied the rule in hundreds of decisions.' 8
Appendix I to this Article provides a circuit-by-circuit
treatment of the rule of deference. As that Appendix shows,
different courts have articulated different versions of the
rule.19 Most circuit court panels give "great weight,"2 0 "sub-
diversity jurisdiction-appellate demand was as great or greatest in diversity
[cases)"). Moreover, "state law is frequently quite relevant though the basis of
the jurisdiction is something other than diversity." C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COuRTS § 60, at 396 (4th ed. 1983); see also Note, Unclear State Law
in the Federal Courts: Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REV. 747,
748 & n.5 (1964) (stating that federal courts can apply state law in nondiversity
cases).
16. In a number of cases, panels have stated or strongly suggested that the
rule of deference may affect results. E.g., Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo
Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co., 524 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1975); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett,
221 F.2d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1955); Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir.
1950); see In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (indicat-
ing that panel viewed rule of deference as determinative); see also Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1981) (overturning district
court's judgment as result of deference to another circuit court's interpretation
of state law), cert denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). In many cases, moreover, courts
have stated that the rule of deference requires affirmance of a state law rul-
ing, even though the appeals court may disagree with the substance of the rul-
ing. E.g. Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d 924, 929 (6th Cir. 1960).
As Professor Wright observed in a related setting: "A cynic might say this
is a tempest about mere words.... But I think we can safely assume that ap-
pellate judges do make a conscientious attempt to confine their review to that
authorized by law ... ." Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751, 770 (1957).
17. See infra Appendix L The rule of deference has little or no signifi-
cance in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and has not yet been
considered in that circuit because the circuit rarely reviews state law ques-
tions. Note, supra note 11, at 158 n.10. Among other courts of appeals, only
the Ninth Circuit has rejected the rule. See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403
(9th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
18. The dissenting opinion in In re McLinn, in an appendix, cited 79 cases
decided outside the Ninth Circuit between 1977 and 1983 that endorsed the
rule of deference. 739 F.2d at 1407-12 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). The cases
were taken from WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST 2D, Federal Courts Key
Number 785 (1983 cum. pamphlet). McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1407. A more recent
search, including years prior to 1977 and after 1983, revealed more than 550
reported decisions outside the Ninth Circuit stating some version of the rule of
deference. See in'fra Appendix I, Introduction. In addition, the Ninth Circuit
applied the rule in more than 115 cases before rejecting it in McLinn. See in-
fra notes 649-54 and accompanying text.
19. Judge Seymour's concurring opinion in Carter v. City of Salina, 773
F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985), indicates the wide variation within the Tenth Circuit
alone:
In addition to the "clearly erroneous" standard, see, ag., King v.
Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983), and the "clearly
[Vol. 73:899
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stantial weight,"'2 1 "considerable weight,"2 2 or "great"2 3 or "sub-
stantial"24 deference to district court rulings on state law. At
least two circuits go further. The Tenth Circuit has held that
such rulings carry "extraordinary force"' and should stand un-
less they are "clearly erroneous" 26 or "clearly wrong."27 The
Sixth Circuit has stated that it will not reverse "if a federal dis-
trict court has reached a permissible conclusion upon a question
of local law."28
wrong" standard, see, eg., Mendoza v. K-Mar In., 587 F.2d 1052, 1057(10th Cir. 1978), this circuit has also accorded district court state law
determinations "extraordinary force on appeal", eg., Campbell v.
Joint District 28-J, 704 F.2.d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1983), "extraordinary
weight", Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 816
(10th Cir. 1977), "great weight", e.g., Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d
445, 448 (10th Cir. 1976), "substantial weight", eg., Glenn Justice
Mortgage Co. v. First National Bank, 592 F.2d 567, 571 (10th Cir. 1979),
"great deference", e.g., Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1977), "deference", e.g., Taxpay-
ers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water
Conservancy District, 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984), "some def-
erence", e.g., Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d
1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), "a degree of deference", eg., Obieli v.
Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1980), and "at least a
modicum of deference", Cedar v. Daniel International Corp., No. 82-
2574, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. April 26, 1983).
Carter, 773 F.2d at 257 (Seymour, J., concurring).
20. E.g., Lomartira v. American Auto Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir.
1967); see infra text accompanying notes 357, 420, 492, 524, 612, 689, 744.
21. E.g., Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am., 825 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987); see izfra text accompanying notes 525,
614, 690.
22. E.g., Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1988); see in-
fra text accompanying notes 425, 490.
23. E.g., NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 253 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985); see
infra text accompanying notes 423, 616, 688.
24. E.g., Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 788
n.5 (4th Cir. 1983); see infra text accompanying notes 392, 397, 491, 526, 615.
25. E.g., Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1983).
26. E.g., King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983).
27. E.g., Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1978); see
infra text accompanying notes 676-84.
28. E.g., Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d 924, 929 (6th Cir. 1960);
see infra text accompanying notes 481-86. Other circuits on occasion also have
used similarly sweeping expressions of the rule. See e.g., Lomartira v. Ameri-
can Auto Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1967). The Eighth Circuit often
used both the "clearly erroneous" and "permissible inference" formulations
before the court purported to abandon those approaches in Luke v. American
Family Mut Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019 & n.6 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert de-
nied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). Even after Luke, the Eighth Circuit handed down at
least three rule of deference decisions using the "clearly erroneous" rubric.
See infra notes 594, 610 and accompanying text.
The" Ninth Circuit also consistently employed a "clearly erroneous" or
"clearly wrong" standard of review before abandoning the rule of deference in
19891
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The rule of deference, however it is formulated, applies in
appeals arising in every procedural posture. Appellate courts
have invoked the rule in reviewing rulings on motions to dis-
miss, conclusions of law made after nonjury trials, summary
judgments, directed verdicts, actions on requests for jury in-
structions, and evidentiary rulings.29 Courts even have cited
the rule when the district court has not considered the relevant
state law issue, to support remanding the case rather than ad-
dressing the state law question initially on appeal.30 Courts
have applied the rule of deference in cases concerning contract,
tort, property, corporations, estates, trusts, banking, insurance,
conflicts, debtor-creditor, res judicata, limitations, and commer-
cial law,31 as well as in the "area of intermingled state and fed-
eral law."32 Courts have invoked the rule in cases of both wide
and narrow significance.33 In short, the rule is potentially rele-
vant-both by its terms and in application-in resolving any
and all questions of state law.34
B. THE ROOTS AND RATIONALE OF THE RULE
Adoption of the rule of circuit court deference came close
on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Eie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins.35 The Supreme Court decided Erie in 1938; by 1943,
the Eighth Circuit had embraced the rule of deference.3 6 That
court based its adoption of the rule on an earlier Supreme
Court reference to the expertise of district courts as finders of
local law.37 Other circuits later held that they too should defer
In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). See infra notes
649-50 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 434, 537 and accompanying
text (discussing treatment of "clearly wrong" and "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review in Fifth and Seventh Circuits).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 546-50.
30. See, e.g., Glenn v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 5, 9 (10th
Cir. 1965).
31. See, e.g., notes 332-36, 403-10, 439-63, 498-507, 570-86, 705-24 and accom-
panying text.
32. Graffals Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir. 1977).
33. See, e.g., infra notes 439-40, 724.
34. Cf Beard v. J. I. Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that rule of deference applies to choice of law questions).
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Woodhull v. Minot Clinic, 259 F.2d 676, 678 (8th
Cir. 1958) (stating that rule of deference reflects court practice "ever since
[EDie]").
36. See Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 709, 713 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 319 U.S. 773 (1943).
37. Id. at 713 (citing Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39 (1941)).
[Vol. 73:899
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to state law rulings made by district courts.3 8
No circuit court decision applying the rule of deference has
supplied a detailed justification for it.3 9 Those decisions which
consider at all the rationale supporting the rule say only that it
rests on the expertise of district court judges. It is the duty of
the federal court in a state law case "to choose the rule that it
believes the state court... is likely in the future to adopt."40
District court judges, it is said, have special competence to
tackle this task because they are "familiar with the intricacies
and trends of local law and practice."41 As a result, appellate
judges, who often have practiced in other states and whose judi-
cial work extends to multiple jurisdictions, should trust the
judgments of district court judges concerning their own state's
law.42
Building on this "expertise" rationale, appellate court
panels have suggested that in some cases the rule of deference
38. See generally Note, supra note 15 (stating that many other circuits
adopted Eighth Circuit position).
39. The most significant effort to justify the rule appears to be the dis-
senting opinion in In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403-12 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
40. C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 58, at 375; see Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 209
& n.3 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Cooper v. American Air-
lines, 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945) (defining question as: "What would be
the decision of reasonable intelligent lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest
[state] court, and fully conversant with [that state's] 'jurisprudence'?").
41. Cranford v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8, 10 (10th Cir.
1958) (quoting Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944)); accord Black v.
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 19781.
42. See O'Toole v. New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982)
(affording deference because district court judge is "schooled and skilled in the
law of her state"); Ferran v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 293 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir.
1961) (citing district court judge's "long experience" with state law), cert de-
nied, 368 U.S. 994 (1962); California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647, 654 (9th Cir.
1956) '(affording deference because district judge was "acquainted with the im-
ponderables and implications inherent in the pronouncement of the courts of
the state"); infra notes 331, 401, 418, 497, 540-43, 587-90, 697-98, '743 and accom-
panying text; see generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 58, at 375. Professor
Wright states:
As a general proposition; a federal court judge who sits in a particular
state and has practiced before its courts may be better able to resolve
complex questions about the law of that state than is some other fed-
eral judge who has no such personal acquaintance with the law of the
state. For this reason federal appellate courts have frequently voiced
reluctance to substitute their own view of the state law for that of the
federal judge.
1989]
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may be "especially" applicable,43 Courts have made such com-
ments, for example, when the district court judge formerly sat
on a state court, when a case involves an area of law in which
the district court judge had "long experience" as a practi-
tioner,45 and even when the distict court judge has been a long-
standing member of the state bar.46 The rule of deference also
may carry greater force in cases involving the special complexi-
ties of territorial law47 or of Louisiana civil law.48 In addition,
courts have found the rule particularly applicable when two or
more district court judges have reached the same conclusion as
to the state law issue before the court.49
In other cases, circuit courts have found the rule of defer-
ence especially applicable on grounds unrelated to district court
expertise. One court, for example, deemed the rule "particu-
larly" relevant in reviewing a trial judge's reading of a state
statute "pertaining to such local matters as guard rails on
bridges and traffic control signals."50 Other courts have found
deference "particularly appropriate where.., the [state] inter-
mediate appellate courts are divided ' 51 or when a state "statu-
tory scheme is less than clear and capable of yarying
interpretation."5 2 In a few cases, courts applying the rule have
emphasized that the appellant voluntarily declined to institute
the action in state court.53
These cases which find the rule of deference "especially"
43. E.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1987).
44. See, e.g., Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576
(6th Cir. 1988); see infra text accompanying notes 520-23, 552, 626, 699, 752.
45. Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 1986).
46. See, e.g., Filley v. Kickoff Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1288, 1291 (6th Cir.
1972).
47. See Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 604 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1979);
inzfra notes 324, 662-68 and accompanying text. But see Saludes v. Ramos, 744
F.2d 992, 994 (3d Cir. 1984); inkfra notes 388-89 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Third Circuit rule).
48. See Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1982); infra text accompanying notes 436-37.
49. See Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1980);
infra text accompanying note 435.
50. Aubertin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 588 F.2d 781, 785 (10th Cir.
1978) (citation omitted); see infra note 551.
51. Enis v. Continental li. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39, 40 (7th
Cir. 1986).
52. Golden v. Cox Furniture MAfg. Co., 683 F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir. 1982)
(footnote omitted).
53. See Citizens Ins. Co. v. Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1955);
Diercks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett, 221 F.2d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1955); infra
text accompanying notes 631-32, 703.
[Vol. 73:899
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significant are problematic, particularily insofar as they invite
heightened deference without connecting that result to the
rule's "expertise" rationale. As this Article seeks to demon-
strate, good reason exists to reject the rule of deference alto-
gether. Courts therefore should hesitate in any case to find
that the rule operates with "special" or "particular" force.
C. LIMITS ON THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
Notwithstanding widespread recognition of the rule of def-
erence, courts have not applied it in monolithic fashion. In fact,
many appellate decisions on state law issues do not cite the rule
at all,-4 and some circuits invoke the rule only rarely.5 5
In addition, the manner in which some courts have ex-
pressed the rule suggests that the rule has important limits. In
a number of cases, for example, courts have indicated that they
will defer to the state law findings of an "able" or "exper-
ienced" trial judge.5 6 These formulations imply that those
courts will not defer to judges perceived to be unable or inexpe-
rienced. No appeals court, however, has expressly declined to
defer to a district court's rulings on these grounds. Moreover,
the vast majority of cases state the rule of deference without
qualification, thus suggesting it applies to the decision of any
district judge.5 7
Even while broadly stating the rule, courts have recognized
exceptions to it. Thus, some courts have declined to apply the
rule when the district court's conclusion seems suspect. Ap-
peals cours may not defer, for instance, when a significant
change in state law follows the district court ruling5 8 or when
54. This fact is made clear by a comparison of cases in which circuit courts
do apply the rule of deference. For example, the Eighth Circuit applied the
rule of deference in more than 96 cases from 1980 through June 1988, includ-
ing more than 30 cases decided in 1987 and the first half of 1988 alone. See
infra notes 610-23. Comparable figures from other circuits suggest that those
courts cite the rule far less often. See infra Appendix I. This discrepancy is
telling because all these circuits, except the D.C. Circuit and First Circuit,
have had dockets heavier than or comparable to the Eighth Circuit's docket
during the relevant time frames. ADINSTRATVE OnFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS Table B-i (1981-
85).
55. See infra notes 353 (2d Cir.), 370-91 (3d Cir.), and 392-415 (4th Cir.).
56. E.g., Savings & Loan Co. v. Wood, 323 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir. 1963);
Anthony v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 316 F.2d 858, 863 (8th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
57. See in;fra notes 326-28, 357, 384, 392, 420, 482, 535, 608, 680, 741 and ac-
companying text.
58. See infra notes 563, 676 and accompanying text.
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the district court ruling appears in dictum,59 in a hurried deci-
sion,60 or in an opinion lacking meaningful reasoning.6 1 One
circuit court panel did not apply the rule when different dis-
trict court judges had disagreed on the proper answer to the
legal questions presented,6 2 and another deemed the rule with-
out effect when an "in state" panel member rejected the dis-
trict court judge's view of state law.63 Courts also have declined
to apply the rule when the expertise rationale of the rule ap-
pears lacking-as when the district court judge did not apply
his or her own state's law6 4 or merely applied a general rule.6 5
Finally, one court mitigated the rule's effect on the theory that
the district court judge signaled his own uncertainty on the
legal issue by certifying an interlocutory appeal.66 Because this
Article focuses on the wisdom of the rule of deference, not the
appropriateness of its exceptions, futher treatment of these ex-
ceptions is deferred to Appendix II. Two points about them
nonetheless merit emphasis. First, these exceptions surface in
a sporadic fashion and not all of them are followed in every
court. Second, the growing number and scope of suggested ex-
ceptions to the rule plausibly may reflect a rising judicial hostil-
ity toward the rule itself.
Apart from recognizing exceptions to the rule of deference,
courts also occasionally downplay the rule's significance even
while embracing it. Courts citing the rule, for example, have
stated that an appellant is "entitled to review of the trial
court's determination of state law just as... of any other legal
question,"67 or that the court may affirm a state law ruling
"only if... convinced that it is right.; '68 Vague and occasional
de-emphasis of the rule, however, cannot undo its repeated rec-
itation and application in hundreds of appellate court decisions.
Judged by the entire body of opinions that discuss the proper
level of appellate scrutiny of state law rulings, the rule of def-
erence stands in virtually every circuit as a settled and sturdy
principle of law.
59. See infra notes 565, 734 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 733, 773 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 775 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 763 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 764-66 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 757-58 and accompanying text. But see infra note 760.
65. See infra notes 768-70 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 771 and accompanying text.
67. Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 1976) '(quoting Randolph
v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1385 (6th Cir. 1975)).
68. Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 1963).
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II. JUSTIFYING-AND UNJUSTIFYING-
THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
The rule of deference has few detractors. Few judges have
criticized the rule.69 Scholarly commentary, although sparse,
seems on balance to support the rule.1 0 In 1984, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, rejected
the rule of deference in the watershed case, In re McLinn.7
The opinion in McLinn marshalls arguments of policy and au-
thority against the rule in a well-crafted, lengthy, and thought-
ful discussion. 2 Even so, the McLinn opinion leaves much
unsaid.
This section of this Article seeks to go beyond the court's
69. Cf In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Schroe-
der, J., dissenting) (stating that rule of deference is followed in all other
circuits).
70. See Woods, The Erie Enigma: Appellate Review of Conclusions of
Law, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 755, 755 (1984); Note, supra note 11, at 192; see also C.
WYZANSKI, A TRIAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM & REsPONSIBILrTY 23 (1952) (noting
rule); Comment, Deference to Federal Circuit Court Interpretations of Unset-
tled State Law: Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 1982 DUKE L.J. 704, 710-11
(1982) (stating that rule of deference is based on sound rationale that district
courts have more experience in state law matters). But see Note, supra note
15, at 760-61 (arguing that rule of deference should be applied only at Supreme
Court level); Note, What is the Proper Standard for Reviewing a District
Court's Interpretation of State Substantive Law, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 215, 229-30
(1985) (arguing for de novo review); Note, A Nondeferential Standard for Ap-
pellate Review of State Law Decisions by Federal District Courts, 42 WAsH. &
LEE L. REV. 1311, 1322-23 (1985) (arguing that right of appeal requires appel-
late court review of district court state law findings). Professors Wright,
Miller, and Cooper appear to endorse some version of the rule of deference. 19
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 14, § 4507, at 109-10. They
write that "although the considered decision of a district judge experienced in
the law of a state naturally commands the respect of an appellate court, a
party is entitled to meaningful review of that decision just as he is of any other
legal question in the case, and just as he would have been if the case had been
tried in a state court." Id.; accord C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 58, at 376. They
also find "defensible," however, the "frequently... voiced reluctance" of fed-
eral appeals courts "to substitute their own view of the state law for that of
the district judge." 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 14,
§ 4507, at 106-07; accord C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 58, at 375. Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper identify Luke v. American Family Mut, Ins. Co.,
476 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1972), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 476
F.2d 1023 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), as in accord with their
view. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 14, § 4507, at 109
n.60. In Luke, the court afforded "great weight" to the district court determi-
nations on state law, but rejected the "dearly erroneous" standard of review.
Luke, 476 F.2d at 1019 n.6.
71. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (6-5 decision).
72. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1399-1403; see infra notes 199-201 and accompany-
ing text.
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analysis in McLinn by attacking the rule of deference in a more
detailed and systematic way. The section first demonstrates
that the "rule" of deference is, in fact, the exception to the
rule, because it reflects a dramatic departure from traditional
appellate court practice.73 It then rejects authority-based argu-
ments that seek to rest the rule on Supreme Court pronounce-
ments or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Finally, this
section urges that the rule's stated rationale of district court
"expertise" in finding state law fails to withstand careful scru-
tiny.75 In short, this section argues that the rule of deference is
solely a common-law concoction of the courts of appeals, and
that it is an unjustified common-law rule because it lacks a
sound foundation.
A. THE RULE OF DEFERENCE AS THE- EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
Any look at the rule of deference must begin with basics.
It is generally accepted that "[t]he right of appeal, while never
held to be within the Due Process guaranty of the United
States Constitution, is a fundamental element of procedural
fairness.. . in this country."76 It is also accepted that the cen-
tral task of an appellate court is "to decide questions of law."77
In the paradigm of appellate review, the court identifies de
73. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
74. See intfra notes 90-124 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 125-97 and accompanying text.
76. STAI.,'DARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10 commentary, at
14 (1977); see also Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appelzate Court, 41
BROOKLYN L. REV. 459, 463 (1975) (noting that right to at least one appeal is
"firmly rooted"); Hopkins, The Winds of Change: New Styles in theApzaellate
Process, 3 HoFsTRA L. REV. 648, 648 (1975) (stating right to appeal is "the mod-
em view-buttressed by statutes in both the federal and state systems");
Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448, 459 (1976) (citing
"the tradition of 'one appeal as of right"').
77. Reay v. Butler, 95 Cal. 206, 214, 30 P. 208, 209 (1892); see Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984); see also In-
wood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.15 (1982) (stating
appellate court can correct errors of law); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273, 287 (1982) (asserting that "if a district court's findings rest on an errone-
ous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis"); United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n.9 (1963) (stating appellate court can correct
errors of law); Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 329 (1796) (stating that
facts are determined by court below and law is determined by Supreme
Court); Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 264, 280 P. 970, 973 (1929) (stating
that trial court decides questions of fact and appeals court decides questions of
law); STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11 commentary, at 21-
22; Wright, supra note 16, at 766 (noting the "feeling that the primary function
of appellate courts is to find and declare the law") (citing R. POUND, APPEL-
LATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 300-01 (1941)).
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novo the command of the controlling statute or principle of
common law.78 If the appeals court's conclusion differs from
that of the trial court, then there is error.1 9 This accepted ap-
proach to the appellate process apparently rests on a shared un-
derstanding that law exists, 0 that the "duty" of judges is "to
say what the law is,"81 and that doctrinal coherence and fair-
ness for similarly situated litigants demands consistent applica-
tion of legal rules.8 2 The rule of de novo review, whatever its
78. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505; United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating
Co., 364 U.S. 520, 526 (1961); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201
(9th Cir.) (en bane), cert denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.4, at 600 (1985) (stating that ap-
pellate court decides questions of law "de novo"); Clermont, Procedure's Magi-
cal Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 1115, 1153 (1987) (discussing appellate review of facts and law);
Leavell, Changing Standards of Appellate Review, Wis. B. BULL., May 1987, at
25, 25 (stating that "appellate court may substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court on conclusions of law"); Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision
Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unifled View of
the Scope of Review, The Judge/Jury Question and Procedural Discretion, 64
N.C.L. REv. 993, 993 (1986) (stating that questions of law "ordinarily are re-
viewed freely or independently on appeal"); Stern, Review of Findings of Ad-
ministrators, Judges & Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70,
72 n.7 (1944) (stating that "business of the appellate court is to make up its
own mind on questions of law appealed to it"); Wright, The Federal Courts-a
Century after Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742, 748 (1966) (suggesting, as part of
discussion of federal court reform, that "questions of law [are] decided anew
by the appellate judges").
79. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) ("our power is to correct
wrong judgments"); Eliason v. Henshaw, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 225, 228 (1819)
(stating that trial court's failure to give jury instruction may be reversible as
matter of law); W. REHNQUIST,'THE SUPREZME COURT, How IT WAS, How IT IS
267 (1987) (stating that appellate courts undertake to '"make sure.., that the
[trial] judge correctly applied the law"); Hopkins, supra note 76, at 459 (stating
that appellate court's role is reviewing questions of law); Surrency, The Devel-
opment of the Appellate Function: The Pennsylvania Experience, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 173, 173 (1976) (stating that appellate courts have "jurisdiction to
correct errors of law" made by courts below).
80. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (stating that
the "government of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTiTUTIONAL LAW
§ 3-4, at 37 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that judges "must treat the law as determi-
nate"); Rubin, supra note 76, at 452 (stating that "the foundation of our belief
in the rule of law is the conviction that legal rules cannot only be formulated,
but can also be stated and applied to govern human decisions").
81. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
82. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (stating that
"operation of a double system of conflicting laws in the same State is plainly
hostile to the reign of law"); Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers v. Jewell
Ridge Coal Corp., 4 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 746, 747 (4th Cir. 1944) (holding
that "where the facts of two cases are substantially the same, the law should
not be applied differently because trial judges have looked at them in a differ-
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source, runs deep in our history; independent appellate inquiry
into questions of law has marked our republic's legal system
from its earliest days.8 3
The rule of deference clashes with this historic approach to
the appellate function. Under the rule, as stated by one court,
"[a]n appellate court is not called upon to decide whether the
Trial Court reached the correct conclusion of law, but only
whether it reached a permissible conclusion."8' 4 Thus, courts
recognize-as they must-that the rule produces different re-
sults from those that would be reached on traditional de novo
review.85 Confronted with this reality, six Ninth Circuit judges
concluded that the rule of deference amounts to "an abdication
of our appellate responsibility."8' 6
To say that judges are "abdicating" their duties in applying
the rule may be too harsh. The Ninth Circuit's observation un-
derscores with accuracy, however, the broad breach of accepted
decisional norms inherent in the rule of deference. As the
Supreme Court has said in another context, "[o]ne would ex-
pect, upon an inquiry into the sources of the ... rule, to find a
clear and compelling justification for departure from the result
dictated by elementary principles in the law."87 Close analysis
reveals, however, that the justifications for the rule of defer-
ence are not "clear and compelling"-or even persuasive at all.
ent way"); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUsTIcE ON APPEAL
147 (1976) (identifying uniformity as "one of the imperatives of appellate jus-
tice"); L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 3-4, at 37 (stating that "adjudicatory process
must yield but a single result in any single case"); Carrington, The Power of
District Judges & the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507,
517-18 (1969) (stating that appellate process is adequate if reviewing court
finds lower court decision "is consistent with a valid and applicable general
principle of law"); Vestal, Reported Opinions of the Federal District Courts:
Analysis and Suggestions, 52 IOWA L. REV. 379, 384 (1966) (noting "basic fair-
ness in treating similar litigants similarly").
83. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 410 (1821); Wiscart v.
D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 329-30 (1796); Wright, supra note 16, at 779 (not-
ing that "[firom the earliest times appellate courts have been empowered to
reverse for errors of law, to announce the rules which are to be applied, and to
ensure uniformity in the rules applied by various inferior tribunals"). Some
commentators have suggested that this de novo model of appellate review is an
oversimplification. Clermont, supra note 78, at 1131 & n.71. Even if these ob-
servations are correct, but see note 79, they do not alter the fact that deferen-
tial review in state law cases departs markedly from traditional practice.
84. United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 136 (10th Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added).
85. See supra note 16.
86. In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
87. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 381 (1970).
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B. THE RULE OF DEFERENCE AND THE AUTHORITIES
Whether sound or not, the rule of deference must stand if
controlling law mandates its observance. Commentators have
suggested that such a mandate may lie in either of two separate
sources: Supreme Court case law38 or Rule 52 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.8 9 Neither view is sound.
1. Distinguishing Supreme Court and Circuit Court
Deference
In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,90 the Supreme
Court confronted a case in which a three-judge district court
had interpreted Texas law. The Court skirted the state law is-
sue by ruling that the district court should have abstained from
resolving that issue pending consideration of it by the Texas
state courts.9 1 En route to this holding, however, the high court
issued an influential dictum:
[The lower court's decision] represents the view of an able and exper-
ienced circuit judge of the circuit which includes Texas and of two ca-
pable district judges trained in Texas law. Had we or they no choice
in the matter but to decide what is the law of the state, we should
hesitate long before rejecting their forecast of Texas law.9 2
The Court in Reitz v. Mealey 93 again confronted a state law is-
sue addressed by a three-judge district court. In affirming that
state court's decision, the Supreme Court observed once again
that "we should accord great weight to the District Court's view
of [state] law."94 In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has
followed the same logic in deferring to district court rulings on
state law issues affirmed by three-judge circuit court panels.9 5
88. See in fra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
90. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
91. Id at 499-500.
92. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
93. 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
94. Id at 39.
95. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-46 & n.10 (1976) (collecting ear-
lier authorities); Steele v. General Mills, Inc., 329 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1947) (refus-
ing to reverse district and appellate court application of state law); Township
of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 630 (1946) (finding no error in dis-
trict and circuit court ruling on state law); MacGregor v. State Mut. Life As-
surance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942) (per curiam) (leaving "undisturbed the
interpretation placed upon purely local law by a... federal judge of long expe-
rience and by three circuit judges").
A related case is Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198,
204-05 (1956), in which the Court gave "special weight" to an interpretation of
Vermont law made by the district judge, although the state law ruling was not
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Almost every court of appeals has suggested that these
Supreme Court pronouncements support the rule of defer-
ence.9 6 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit, in first adopting the rule,
relied squarely on the Supreme Court's decision in Reitz. 97 The
rule of circuit court deference, however, does not follow from
the Supreme Court's practice of accepting lower court rulings
on state law.98 It is one thing for the Supreme Court, in ad-
dressinig the handful of state law issues it comes upon, to defer
to determinations made by three-judge courts or district court
rulings that have been affirmed on appeal. It is quite another
for the thirteen federal circuit courts to defer in hundreds of
state law cases to the unreviewed rulings of a single judge.
Resting the rule on Supreme Court practice also ignores the
radically different roles played by the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts in the federal judicial system. The circuit courts
are courts of appeal in the traditional sense, whose central pur-
pose is "error correction."9 9 In contrast, the Supreme Court
carries out the specialized function of providing the last word
on important issues of national law.L00 Because of this unique
considered by the court of appeals, which rested its decision on an alternative
analysis not affected by the state law issue. See id- at 207 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The Court went on to observe, however, that "[w]ere the ques-
tion in doubt or deserving further canvass, we would of course remand to the
Court of Appeals to pass on this question of Vermont law." Id at 205. Bern-
hardt thus does not support the rule of circuit court deference to district court
rulings on state law. The case dealt solely with a Supreme Court decision to
exercise its discretion to dispose of a state law issue rather than return the
case to the circuit court for further appellate proceedings, engendering attend-
ant delay. Such a determination-and reliance on district court expertise in
making it-does not logically require circuit court deference in cases already
lodged in the courts of appeals. Indeed, the Court's specific endorsement of
remand to the circuit court to pass on state law issues whenever they are in
doubt may cut against recognition of a general rule of circuit court deference.
96. See supra note 41; infra notes 329, 361, 544 and accompanying text.
97. See Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 709, 713 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 319 U.S. 773 (1943).
98. See LA MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 0.309[2], at 3127
n.28 (stating that Supreme Court practice "should in no way be construed as a
limitation" on circuit court authority); Note, supra note 15, at 755-56 (same).
99. J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 7-8, 76 (discussing error correction and
stating that the "most basic" function of courts of appeals is "error correc-
tion-supervising the application and interpretation of national and state law
in district courts and agencies and holding them to account") (emphasis in
original).
100. See W. RENQUIST, sura note 79, at 268-69; C. VINSON, WORK OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS, 69 S. Ct. v, vi (address to American Bar Ass'n, Sept. 7, 1949);
Friendly, The 'Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 407
(1972); see also J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that courts of appeals
"were designed to conserve the energies of the Supreme Court for its historic
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mission, the Supreme Court always declines to review cases
that present only state law issues.101 Consistent adherence to
the Court's special role as a national lawmaker explains the
Court's refusal to second-guess those state law rulings dragged
before it as the baggage of federal law disputes.10 2
The Supreme Court on occasion has adverted to the special
competence of district court judges on matters of local law. 03
These comments, however, do not inform the issue at hand. It
is understandable that in the eyes of a Court that virtually
never sees state law issues, federal district courts do appear to
possess expertise on matters of state law. That, however, is be-
side the point. For purposes of the rule of circuit court defer-
ence, the key questions are how much expertise district courts
missions of umpiring intergovernmental disputes and determining legal issues
of national significance").
101. Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) (per curiam). See gener-
ally R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPiRO, supra note 12, §§ 3.25, 4.10. Stern
and Gressman suggest that the Court sometimes has reviewed state law rul-
ings of curcuit courts when such rulings involve "a conflict with, or a refusal
to follow, a decision rendered by the highest court of the state." Id. § 4.10, at
210-11. Properly understood, however, these cases generated review only of
federal law issues, i.e., issues concerning the scope of duty of federal courts, as
a matter offederal law under the Eie rule, to follow either state trial court or
appellate court decisions interpreting state law. See generally C. WRIGHT,
supra note 15, § 58 (discussing federal rules concerning determination of state
law under Erie).
102. In a recent case, the Supreme Court referred to the rule of circuit
court deference. In United States v. Hohri, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987), the issue was
whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, rather than the regional
court of appeals, has jurisdiction over appeals presenting both Little Tucker
Act claims and Federal Tort Claims Act claims. Little Tucker Act claims ordi-
narily are appealable only to the Federal Circuit, while Federal Tort Claims
Act claims normally may be appealed only to the regional courts of appeals.
After considering the legislative history of the two acts, the Court held that
sole jurisdiction rested in the Federal Circuit. Id at 2253. Justice Powell, in a
footnote, stated:
There may have been a concern that Federal Circuit judges
would not be familiar with questions of state tort law. But this prob-
lem is mitigated considerably by the fact that these cases are tried
before local Federal District judges, who are likely to be familiar with
the applicable state law. Indeed, a district judge's determination of a
state law question usually is reviewed with great deference. It is cer-
tainly not clear that a panel of the Federal Circuit would be less com-
petent to review such determinations than a panel of a regional Court
of Appeals.
Id. at 2253 n.6 (citations omitted). This brief footnote addressing a subsidiary
point of legislative intent does not, of course, require circuit courts to adhere
to the rule of deference. It merely notes that there is such a rule and vaguely
suggests that the rule's existence may mean that Federal Circuit panels oper-
ate much like most regional appeals courts in addressing state law questions.
103. Eg., a.
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possess in comparison to the circuit courts, and how significant
that difference is in light of other considerations of policy. 0 4
The Supreme Court has not uttered a word addressing these
key questions. Indeed, Supreme Court authority stands as
much against the rule of deference as for it, because several
high court decisions suggest that appeals courts should review
de novo the state law rulings of district court judges. 105 The
rule of deference thus can gain no impetus from the pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court.
2. The Rule of Deference and Rule 52(a)
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that "[fjlindings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous."''O0 Some circuit courts have used this "clearly erro-
neous" standard to define the degree of deference afforded to
state law rulings, and at least one circuit-the Tenth-has cited
Rule 52 in taking this approach. 0 7 The question thus arises
whether circuit courts must apply "clearly erroneous" review
because the term findings of fact as used in Rule 5"2 embraces
rulings on the meaning of state law.
This proposed construction startles the intuitions. The
very text of Rule 52 distinguishes "findings of fact" from "con-
clusions of law," and it would be strange to say that conclusions
about the meaning of state law are not conclusions of law. 08
Leading commentators have concluded that state law rulings
104. See infra notes 125-97 and accompanying text.
105. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating "defendant is entitled to have the view
of the Court of Appeals on Vermont law and carnot... be foreclosed by the
District Court's interpretation"); King v. Order of United Commercial Travel-
ers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1948) (recognizing propriety of circuit court's
"mak[ing] its own determination of what the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina would probably rule in a similar case"); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232, 236 (1944) (stating that both federal appellate court and trial court must
"ascertain and apply the state law"); infra note 199.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
107. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
108. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) provides in pertinent part: "In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .... " Id.; see
also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (specifying that Rule
52(a) "does not apply to conclusions of law"); C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 58,
at 376 (observing that "a party is entitled to review the trial court's determina-
tion of state law"); see generally Louis, supra note 78, at 994 n.3 (arguing that
"[d]eclarations of law are fact-free general principles that are applicable to all,
or at least to many, disputes and not simply to the one sub judice"); Stern,
supra note 78, at 122 (noting that "[gluestions as to what the evidence shows,
Vol. 73:899
RLE OF DEFERENCE
are not properly subject to "clearly erroneous" review,10 9 and
the large majority of circuits embracing the rule of deference
agree.110 Even the Tenth Circuit, which has adhered to clearly
erroneous review, apparently has not felt that Rule 52 man-
dates that approach.mn
The argument may be made that federal court decisions on
state law are "findings of fact" because they entail predicting
how in fact a state court would rule on the issue." Character-
izing this lawfinding task as predictive, however, does not make
the inquiry factual. 1 3 One might well say, for example, that
lower courts considering unresolved issues in federal law must
whether directly or by inference, are factual [while] [gluestions as to the na-
ture of the general rule to be applied are legal").
109. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra. note 14, § 4507, at
109 (stating that "determination of state law ... is a legal question"); 1A
MOoRE!s FEDERAL PRACrIcE, supra note 2, 1 0.309[2], at 3128 n.28 (noting that
some courts "erroneously" apply clearly erroneous standard).
110. See infra notes 361-62, 380-90, 434, 538-39, 608 and accompanying text.
111. Tenth Circuit use of Rule 52 illustrates this proposition. In Carter v.
City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated: 'The challenges
posed on appeal relate to the district court's interpretation and/or application
of controlling state law. We have held that FedR.Civ.P. 52(a) applies under
these circumstances." Id. at 254 (emphasis added). In the immediately preced-
ing sentence, however, the court stated. "The trial court's findings of fact are
not at issue." Id. Moreover, two of the cases cited in Carter as having "held"
that Rule 52(a) "applies," id., merely refer to the Rule while discussing state
law issues. See Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (loth Cir. 1982);
United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 136 (10th Cir. 1975). The earliest decision
cited in Carter to support using the clearly erroneous standard does not cite
Rule 52 at all. See Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank v. Hartmeister, 411 F.2d 173, 176
(loth Cir. 1969). In short, no decision indicates clearly that the Tenth Circuit
has ever held that state law rulings are findings of fact necessarily subject to
clearly erroneous review under Rule 52. Compare Stafos v. Jarvis, 477 F.2d
369, 372-73 (10th Cir.) (stating that "clearly erroneous rule does not apply on
questions of law" and adding that "in our Circuit ... the views of a Federal
District Judge ... carry extraordinary persuasive force" in state law cases),
cer, denied, 414 U.S. 944 (1973) and Binldey v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 471
F.2d 889, 893 (l0th Cir.) (Lewis, C.J., concurring) (stating that "surely 'clearly
erroneous' [as used in defining proper measure of deference] should not be
confused with the words of art contained in the context of Rule 52[a]"), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973) with Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716
F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983) (vaguely citing Rule 52), cert denied, 466 U.S.
958 (1984).
112. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
113. The Third Circuit rejected this argument in an opinion by Chief Judge
Seitz. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d
369, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1983) (Seitz, C.J., concurring) (distinguishing state court's
holding from district court's "prediction," but finding "nothing in this differ-
ence that affects our standard of review").
1989]
.MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
predict how the Supreme Court would decide the issues.1' 4 To
define the lawfinding function in this way, however, does not
transform an issue of law into an issue of fact. Rather, the is-
sue remains one of law precisely because it involves a predic-
tion of proper ZegaZ doctrine.1 5
One commentator has cited the legislative history of Rule
52 to support the "issue of fact" characterization.3 6 Clearly-er-
roneous review, he notes, applies not only to findings resolving
credibility disputes, but also to credibility-free fact determina-
tions based on documents or established subsidiary facis.- 7 In
redrafting Rule 52, the Advisory Committee justified this result
by observing that "[t]o permit courts of appeals to share more
actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine
the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, mul-
tiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual is-
sues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority."''n 8 These
same "functional" considerations, the commentater argues,
require characterizing state law rulings as "findings of fact"
because state law rulings resemble credibility-free fact
determinations." 9
This argument is not persuasive because the case against
"needlessly reallocat[ing] judicial authority" to makefact deter-
minations simply does not carry over to decisions about state
law. Courts of appeals, for example, have no special capacity to
assess the factual import of documents received in evidence. 20
114. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 209 & n.3
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
115. Difficult questions of statutory interpretation fit this mold as well. In
those cases, surrogate judgment is also the question-predicting how the legis-
lature would have decided the issue if the legislature had focused squarely
upon it. See, eg., Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1480 (1987) (noting
that court inquires, in determining severability of unconstitutional provision,
whether Congress would have enacted statute without offensive provision).
Courts readily could characterize this issue as "factual" because it focuses on
the traditionally factual issue of intent. Yet such inquiries entail legal deter-
minations because, as with state law issues, they involve discerning principles
that are based on far more than the trial evidence and that have relevance be-
yond the immediate dispute. See Stern, supra note 78, at 108 (explaining that
judicial determination of legislative intent involves a question of "law").
116. See Note, supra note 11, at 180-86.
117. Id) at 171, 181; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee's note accom-
panying 1985 Amendments.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee's note accompanying 1985
amendments.
119. See Note, supra note 11, at 186-92.
120. See Note, supra note 15, at 757 (observing that "finder of fact.., is in
at least as good a position as an appellate body to draw inferences").
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Indeed, district courts may well perform this function better
than circuit courts because district courts routinely draw fac-
tual inferences from evidence.121 This reality helps explain the
decision of Rule 52's drafters to avoid extensive appellate court
participation in traditional factfinding; it does not relate, how-
ever, to rulings on state law. In addition, courts do not decide
state law issues solely on the basis of the limited body of evi-
dence introduced in a single case, even though district court
factual findings necessarily rest exclusively on that evidence.
Moreover, circuit cotii are far better equipped to collect and
dissect the often expansive body of materials that do count in
resolving legal issues.1 2 2 Finally, c6nsiderations of policy sel-
dom touch factual issues, whether or not their resolution
hinges on credibility determinations. In contrast, rulings on
law, including state law, often call for delicate policy judg-
ments, thus heightening the value of collaborative judicial deci-
sionmaking.m In short, state law determinations, unlike
credibility-free fact determinations, implicate the many institu-
tional advantages of circuit courts that in general justify de
novo review of legal questions.12 4
These considerations suffice to answer the argument that
the purposes and history of Rule 52 dictate its application to
rulings on state law. Most importantly, however, the language
121. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11 commentary,
at 23 (1977) (observing that "trial judge, unlike the appellate court, is regularly
engaged in resolving issues of fact and is primarily responsible for doing so");
Clermont, supra note 78, at 1153-54; cf. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 289 (1960) (citing "fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings
of human conduct").
122. See, ag., A. DERSHOWrZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 69 (1981) (maintaining
that law "is within the special province of the appellate courts; it comes from
the pages of books rather than the mouths of witnesses"); Thompson &
Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate Courts: How Funny
Things Happen on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1,12 (sug-
gesting that proper law finding "is not necessarily confined to the trial court
record, and may require detailed analysis of statutory history and precedent,
recourse to scholarly authority, and consideration of the literature of various
disciplines"); see also Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71 (1944)
(suggesting that even the "conclusiveness of a 'finding of fact' depends on the
nature of the materials on which the finding is based"); see generally infra
notes 135, 137-41, 160 and accompanying text (discussing institutional advan-
tages of appellate courts).
123. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
124. See generally infra notes 129-64 and accompanying text (comparing
advantages of trial and appellate courts). In addition, although credibility de-
terminations play no part in resolving certain fact issues, these cases are unu-
sual and may be difficult to distinguish from the bulk of cases, in which
credibility does play some role.
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of the "clearly erroneous" rule-limiting its application specifi-
cally to "findings of fact"--provides the surest signal that the
rule's drafters intended neither in fact nor in spirit to construct
a standard of review for state law determinations.
C. THE RULE OF DEFERENCE AND THE EXPERTISE RATIONALE
Mandated by neither Supreme Court command nor the
Federal Rules, the rule of deference is a common-law creation
of the courts of appeals based on the view that district court
judges have special expertise in matters of local law. In order
to evaluate this traditional rationale it is necessary to define
precisely what district court expertise means and to consider
why it matters.
The circuit courts have not begun to address these ques-
tions. Close reflection suggests, however, that appeals courts
which allude vaguely to district court expertise probably sub-
scribe to at least one of three distinct rationales. This Article
will label these rationales as: (1) the "superior decisionmaker"
rationale,125 (2) the "collaborative review" rationale, 2 6 and (3)
the "cost-benefit" rationale. 2 7 Careful examination 'suggests
that none of these justifications packs persuasive punch.
1. The "Superior Decisionmaker" Rationale
The first elaboration of the "expertise" rationale is the
most straightforward. It posits that district courts are, in gen-
eral, more expert than circuit courts in deciding issues involving
their own state's law. The rule of deference follows easily from
this premise. Absent a sure sign of error, the rule will stop a
less capable decisionmaker from substituting its judgment for
that of a more capable decisionmaker. The result is that, in the
run of state law cases, more litigants will get more correct
decisions.12B
This rationale suggests two critical points about district
court expertise. First, the relevant question cannot be whether
district courts are "expert" in some abstract sense. Instead, at-
125. See infra notes 128-64 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 165-67, 169-86 and accompanying text.
128. Of course, this observation does not mean that all legal questions have
an identifiably "right" answer. See W. REHNQUIST, supra note 79, at 291 (stat-
ing that "[tihere is simply no demonstrably right answer to the question in-
volved in many of our difficult cases"). Nonetheless, our society properly
believes that one legal outcome in actual cases is as a rule superior to others.
If this were not true, courts could resolve legal disputes by coin flip.
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tention must focus on whether district courts render expert de-
cisions. This point is important because, although heightened
familiarity with state law will aid decisionmaking, other fac-
tors-such as time constraints and quality of advocacy-also af-
fect decisional quality. All these factors matter in determining
whether district courts are "expert" state law decisionmakers.
Second, circuit court panels must judge the "expertness" of dis-
trict courts as decisionmakers in relative, rather than absolute,
terms. Deciding that district court judges are expert state law
decisiormnakers does not end the discussion. The inquiry in-
stead must focus on how much decisionmaking "expertise" dis-
trict courts have in comparison to the circuit courts. If district
courts are not more expert decisionmakers than circuit courts,
defenders of the rule cannot argue that deference keeps a less
capable decisionmaker from disturbing a more capable deci-
sionmaker's judgment.
Viewed through these lenses, the "superior decisionmaker"
rationale for the rule of deference may lose some intuitive
luster. The realities of modem judging confirm that the "supe-
rior decisionmaker" justification is dubious indeed.
a. The limits on district court expertise.
State law is now tremendously complex. State judicial de-
cisions and statutory enactments in recent decades have multi-
plied exponentially. 2 9 Because the most capable attorney can
assimilate only so much, more and more lawyers specialize, in-
cluding those lawyers who ascend to the federal bench. 30 Con-
129. See Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 16, 56. As one commenta-
tor has written:
[Cjonsequences flow from the sheer bulk of American precedent. The
costs of litigation are increased, not only in terms of the expense of
reports, digests, indexes, and texts, but also in terms of the time spent
by lawyers and judges in poring over them .... There is also the
grave danger that even competent and conscientious judges and law-
yers may overlook important cases in the welter of reports, already so
numerous as to be almost unmanageable. Despite restatements of the
law, and despite even the development of electronic data-retrieval ma-
chines, fie difficulty of separating the wheat from the chaff grows
constantly more critical.
D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 155
(1963).
130. Commenting on this trend, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina
Supreme Court recently noted that "[i]ncreased specialization is a legitimate
response to the 'law explosion."' J. Exum, The Legal Profession-How Do We
See Ourselves, Address to Mecldenburg County Bar (Apr. 29, 1988), reprinted
in 1 N.C. Law. Weekly, May 9, 1988, at 0136, 0137, col. 4. He further observed
that: "Today there are a multitude of specialties and specialists, ranging from
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stant growth and change in both state and federal law tax even
these specialists' efforts to remain current in their chosen
fields.131 In short, no one possesses expertise in an entire body
of state law.
District court judges are like most conscientious lawyers.
Pressed by busy schedules and competing demands, they strive
with only modest success to stay abreast of intricacies and
trends in state law.132 District court judges, through exposure
to state law cases in practice and on the bench, will gain famili-
arity with some particulars of their own states' law. It strains
credulity, however, to leap from that proposition to the conclu-
sion that district court judges possess a meaningful expertise in
a substantial portion of all state law.
The rule of deference attributes to district court judges
more than a general grasp on state law. The rule assumes a
sufficient depth and breadth of understanding that it often will
aid resolution of those focused legal issues that generate appel-
late review. At least in the modern era, that basic supposition
seems most doubtful.
b. The institutional disadvantages of district courts.
Given the difficulties of maintaining a detailed knowledge
of an entire body of state law, the institutional ability of courts
to find law in particular cases takes on paramount importance.
On this institutional front, circuit court judges possess massive
advantages over their district court counterparts. District court
judges must act quickly; they must frame jury instructions at
mid-trial, dispose of evidentiary objections instantly, and often
rule from the bench on motions to dismiss or for directed ver-
dict.'3 3 Indeed, district court judges sometimes comfort them-
selves with the thought that appellate review will correct
errors made in this hurried process. 34
lawyers who will not come to the office unless there is a corporate takeover
waiting, to those who are versed only in first amendment law, or fourth
amendment law, to those who represent only second basemen or point
guards." Id. at 0136, col. 4.
131. See Leventhal, App ellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork and Man-
aged Flexibility, 23 UCLA L. REV. 432, 436 (1976) (predicting that "[i]ssues of
increasing difficulty and subtlety... will tax the courts increasingly even if
filings level off").
132. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 135, 141 and accompanying text.
134. See J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 132 (quoting former district judge);
W. REHNQUIST, supra note 79, at 309. This tendency is hardly a recent devel-
opment. See Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 928 (Q.B. 1853) (stat-
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The fast pace of trial court proceedings also limits the
amount of useful information that trial judges receive. Law-
yers at trial must focus on logistics, witness preparation, jury
selection, jury argument, presentation of evidence, cross-exami-
nation of adverse witnesses, and numerous, often unanticipated,
questions of law. Burdened by these tasks, counsel often focus
only limited attention on important legal issues. Consequently,
the district court judge must rule on those issues with neither
extended reflection nor extensive information. 3 5 These in-
tensely practical limitations have no less impact on decisions of
state law than on federal law determinations.
c. The institutional advantages of ap lellate courts.
The consideration of legal issues unfolds in a fundamen-
tally different way in the federal circuit courts. The facts of
the case, for all practical purposes, are settled on appeal. L3 6
The parties single out for review only a few focused issues of
law.137 The courts of appeals benefit from written briefs that
target only these issues 13 and that often break new ground not
plowed in the court below.'3 9 Unlike district courts, courts of
ing "[i]t gives us great satisfaction to reflect that, the question being on the
record, our opinion may be reviewed in a Court of Error").
135. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11 commentary,
at 21 (1977) (observing that "trial is an interchange whose incidents cannot be
charted in advance" and that "the trial judge must make decisions rapidly and
frequently, often without the benefit of carefully prepared argument by coun-
sel"); C. WYZANSIm, supra note 70, at 20 (suggesting that trial judges deciding
issues of law face difficulties because "the pace is quicker, the troublesome is-
sues have not been sorted from those which go by rote, the briefs of counsel
have not reached their ultimate perfection"); Godbold, Fact Finding by Appel-
late Courts-An Available and Appropriate Power, 12 CUmB. L. REv. 365, 372
(1982) (relating that district judge may act "without the luxury of time off the
bench to reflect,... may have no briefs from counsel, and his findings can be
made orally from the bench"); Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 11
(stating that "argument in the trial court is not likely to be as fully informa-
tive as appellate argument"); see also Summers, Two Types of Substantive Rea-
sons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 CoRNELL L. REV.
707, 710 (1978) (noting that judge's reasoning may be faulty because "[H]e
might have to hurry, and counsel might provide little help").
136. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(2) (requiring appellant's brief to state "issues
presented for review").
138. See FED. R. APP. P. 28; see also Godbold, supra note 135, at 372 (noting
that appellate courts "have the benefit of briefs from counsel who have had
the opportunity to search and assay the record").
139. See, ag., Anderson v. Sanderson & Porter, 146 F.2d 58, 62 (8th Cir.
1945) (relying on new information not presented to trial court).
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appeals have access to the full printed trial record. 140 Appeals
courts, although busy, do not face the day-to-day time con-
straints that confront district court judges.141
Circuit courts employ multi-judge panels,14 which by de-
sign create numerous institutional advantages.143 Assigning
several judges to a problem reduces the risk that important
lines of analysis will escape attention.'4" Each judge benefits
from the others' insights, including their questions of counsel at
oral argument.145 The panel system creates a deliberative pro-
cess in which critical thinkers of diverse backgrounds and expe-
rience may test, reflect on, and refine their colleagues'
observations. 14 In short, a multi-judge court produces a mar-
140. See Godbold, supra note 135, at 372 (finding it significant that "the ap-
pellate tribunal will have available to it a full and verbatim written record").
141. See Carrington, supra note 82, at 527 (observing that "the tempo of the
work of appellate courts allows for reflection and instruction that is not avail-
able to trial judges"); Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L.
REV. 722, 722 (1983) (concluding that appellate "decisional process is less hur-
ried"); Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 11 (stating that "[a]ppellate de-
cision proceeds at a slower pace and, generally, with a richer basis of
information than decision in the trial court"); see also J. HOWARD, supra note
15, at 134-35 (concluding from survey of judges that "main functional distinc-
tion drawn between trial and circuit courts was pacing-that is, instant versus
reflective judgments"); Godbold, supra note 135, at 372 (noting that appellate
judges exchange views "with both the time and the means to reexamine and
refine these views").
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982).
143. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE CouRTS § 3.10 commentary,
at 15 (1977) (concluding that "thoughtful consideration of the merits of the
case by at least three judges" is basic element of "an appeal of right"); P. CAR.
RINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 82, at 8 (describing multi-
partite nature of appellate review as a "process imperative").
144. See Leflar, supra note 141, at 722 (observing that "[all relevant con-
siderations are more surely recognized and taken into account when more
than one person is charged with identifying and bringing them forward");
Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 11 (arguing that multiple "judges on
an intermediate appellate court... are more likely to have explored the alter-
natives in greater depth").
145. See W. REHNQUIST, supra note 79, at 277 (suggesting that "judges'
questions, although nominally directed to the attorney arguing the case, may
in fact be for the benefit of their colleagues"); Leflar, supra note 141, at 723-24
(arguing that because "practically all courts in this country expect their judges
to read the briefs in advance of submission, and nearly all judges consistently
do so ... there is reasonable opportunity for intelligent participation by every
judge in the hearing and discussion of each case").
146. See, ag., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE CouRTs § 3.01 commen-
tary, at 9 (1977) (observing that "[tihe basic concept of an appeal is that it sub-
mits the questions involved to collective judicial judgment"); Godbold, supra
note 135, at 372 (emphasizing that an "appellate tribunal ... acts through mul-
tiple judges who draw from each other's perceptions and experience, critique
each other's views and decide by at least a majority"); Leonard, The Correct-
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ketplace of ideas designed to increase the likelihood that the
truth will emerge.
Appeals courts, unlike district courts, also routinely craft
written opinions. The discipline of committing reasons to writ-
ing aids accurate decisionmaking, 147 especially when the judge
undertakes the work from the outset, as appellate judges do. In
contrast, many district courts' written opinions rely on pro-
posed conclusions of law that self-interested parties submit.148
The interaction. of opinion writing and multi-judge decision-
ness Function of Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation in an Era of
Fragmentation, 17 LOy. L.A.L. REv. 299, 299-300 (1984) (noting that "appellate
courts are multi-judge bodies staffed by people from different backgrounds
and possessing different legal philosophies"); Leventhal, supra note 131, at
44041 (relating that appellate judges often "hold quite divergent views ...
[and such] interchange enhances analysis and understanding"); Meador, Appel-
late Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REv. 255, 281 (1975)
(stating that appellate procedure "contemplates that a broader perspective and
a more contemplative wisdom than a single judge can provide will be brought
to bear on the issues"); Stern, supra note 78, at 82 (arguing that because "a
group of' men is more representative than a single person, the appellate court
resembles the jury more than does the trial court ... [a]nd the decisions of the
appellate courts have the advantage of the collaboration and interchange of
ideas of three or more men"); cf J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 190, 207 (docu-
menting that "collegiality ... imposes informal expectations of open-minded-
ness or give and take in reaching joint decisions"); compare Dick v; New York
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that
a "fruitful interchange of minds ... is indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried
decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions") with
Godbold, supra note 135, at 372 (noting that a trial "judge acts alone and with-
out the benefit of other minds that might examine, supplement and even disa-
gree with his views").
147. See Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 831, 832 (1961) (stating that one function of an appellate opin-
ion is to make judges think); Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial
Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 810 (1961) [hereinafter Leflar, Observations]
(stating that "preparing a formal opinion assures some measure of thoughtful
review of the facts in a case and of the law's bearing upon them"); Leflar,
Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 319, 319 (1971) [hereinafter Le-
flar, Sources] (observing that "the writing of an opinion compels a court to en-
gage in a thoughtful process of reasoning and analysis"); McCree,
Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777, 790-91 (1981)
(discussing how "desirability of opinions" stems from process of writing down
ideas); Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts,
24 U. Cm. L. REv. 211, 218 (1957) (finding no "better test for the solution of a
case than its articulation in writing, which is thinking at its hardest").
148. See Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir.
1983) (reviewing district court adoption of plaintiff's counsel's lengthy pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984);
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 640 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting trial
court adopted, almost word for word, conclusions of law drafted by prevailing
party), rev'd sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
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making-which always produces careful scrutiny by peers and
may produce focused criticism and separate dissents or concur-
rences-also contributes to decisional accuracy.149
Courts of appeals are largely insulated from political, per-
sonal, and other extraneous pressures, a fact that helps explain
why appellate courts exist.150 District courts are more subject
to these influences because they are "local" courts. Litigants
may be prominent local citizens; cases may stir strong local
feeling; counsel may be on friendly terms with the resident dis-
trict court judge. Although district court judges seek to over-
come these influences, the effects of such influences can be
subtle.151 Review by a multi-member appeals panel reduces the
risk that such factors will affect the final decision. Indeed, this
consideration provides ammunition for the argument that de
novo review is of the greatest importance in the very state law
cases to which the rule of deference applies. Congress, after all,
assigned diversity cases to the federal courts precisely because
such cases present a heightened danger of "the influence of lo-
cal opinion.' 52
These institutional differences suggest that circuit courts
possess far greater "expertise" than district courts in deciding
state law issues.'53 One other institutional difference, however,
149. See D. KARLEN, supra note 129, at 54 (stating that judge's colleagues
"offer suggestions freely, either in person, by telephone, or by written notes, in
an effort to reach agreement"); Godbold, supra note 135, at 372 (noting that
"appellate court's findings will be recorded in a written opinion that must sur-
mount the barrier of at least majority assent"); see also Jones, Cogitations on
Appellate Decision-Making, 52 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 189, 217-22 (1980) (analyzing
value of concurring and dissenting opinions).
150. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 453 (1963) (observing that "possibilities
of error, oversight, arbitrariness and even venality in any human institution
are such that subjecting decisions to review of some kind answers a felt
need").
151. See A. DERsHowTiz, supra note 122, at 317 (noting that judges "read
the same newspapers, watch the same TV programs, and listen to the same lo-
cal gossip as other citizens"); Vestal, supra note 82, at 380 (stating that judges
have been "dishonest[,] [motivated by] narrow personal interests[,] ... arro-
gant, angry, unhappy, sympathetic, humble").
152. Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 478 (1915) (Pitney, J.,
dissenting); accord Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (noting
that "[d]iversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to nonresident litigants of
courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias."); see also Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49,
83 (1923) (stating that diversity jurisdiction seeks to afford to citizens of an-
other state "law administered free from... local prejudices or passions").
153. Moreover, other institutional differences are not difficult to identify.
For example, the ability to review an earlier decision by another judge aids the
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does even more to dispel the notion of district court superiority.
d. The cultivation of law-finding expertise.
District court judges, according to some circuit courts, pos-
sess greater expertise in a particular state's law because they
work more intimately with that body of law. 5 4 This argument,
however, ignores a more basic point: deciding issues of law "ex-
pertly" is not the primary role of district court judges. District
court judges spend much, if not most, of their working time de-
ciding issues of fact or judgment or policing jury resolution of
fact issues.1 55 In addition to conducting jury trials, district
court judges often sit as factfinders, who must sift through con-
flicting evidence and then reduce factual findings to writing s
In both the criminal and civil spheres, district court judges ad-
minister busy courts.'5 7 District court judges must hold calen-
dar calls, conduct or oversee jury voir dires, and contend with
routine interruptions by lawyers seeking continuances, expe-
dited hearings, and other scheduling orders. District court
judges also spend many hours addressing discovery disputes, de-
ciding motions concerning transfers, stays, and sentencing, and
attending to other discretionary matters that seldom surface on
appeal.'5 8 Although discharging these many duties provides
valuable on-the-job training for any district court judge, none of
them relates to the resolution of purely legal questions.
In contrast, deciding issues of law expertly is the primary
role of appellate judges. By design they spend the majority of
court of appeals in decisionmaking. In addition, "larger circuits employ cen-
tral staff attorneys to help separate the wheat from the chaff in litigation." J.
HOWARD, supra note 15, at 7. "Courts of Appeals... rotate panel member-
ships randomly to ensure impartial decisions." Id at 9. Moreover, "[i]nasmuch
as the appellate courts occupy a superior position in the judicial hierarchy, the
appellate judges are certainly likely to be no less expert and able than the trial
judges." Stern, supra note 78, at 82.
154. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
155. See Leonard, supra note 146, at 301 (observing that "[trial courts are
at the front lines of fact-finding... [and] therefore, do not exist for the pur-
pose of making law").
156. PED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides: "In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury... the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon...."
157. See J. HowARD, supra note 15, at 135 (stating that district court judges
are customarily referred to as "workhorses of the federal judiciary").
158. See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE CouRTS § 3.11
commentary, at 24 (1977) (discussing different functions of trial and appellate
courts); Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Cour4 Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 665 (1971) (discussing power and responsibil-
ity thrust on trial judges who use review-limiting discretion on many issues).
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their working hours inquiring into, reflecting upon, and writing
about those "pure" legal issues that the rule of deference con-
cerns. 59 This narrowed job description ensures that appellate
judges have more time to ponder the law.160 More fundamen-
tally, however, this focus of function serves to ensure, as an in-
stitutional matter, that appeals judges become specialists in
untangling knotty legal problems. If it is true that the duties of
district court judges alert them to intricacies and trends in a
particular state's law,'61 it is also true that the work mix of ap-
peals judges alerts them to intricacies and trends in the law
generally. In addition, immersion in the lawfinding function af-
fords appellate judges greater and steadier training in the com-
plex arts of construing statutes, reconciling lines of authority,
and distilling broader governing principles from a large body of
decisions.'6 2 Discerning state law, no less than discerning fed-
eral law, requires the use of these skills.
e. Rejecting the 'superior decisionmaker" rationale.
All these considerations point to a single conclusion: dis-
trict courts are not superior to circuit courts in deciding state
law issues that are sufficiently controversial to generate ap-
peals. This conclusion does not mean that district court judges
lack analytical sophistication. Indeed, such a contention would
be outrageous. The point is rather that appeals court panels
possess important institutional advantages unavailable to dis-
trict court judges in deciding issues of both federal and state
law. This conclusion is hardly startling, because the courts of
appeals are courts of review, created for the very purpose of
providing legal conclusions more sure-footed than those
reached by the district courts whose work is being scruti-
nized. 63 In short, some heightened expertise of district court
159. See J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 130-31 (reporting thai Third Circuit
time study shows that preparing and clearing opinions conumes more circuit
judge time than all other functions combined).
160. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
162. See Stern, supra note 78, at 90 (suggesting that courts of appeals are
"composed of specialists... in the technique of deciding cases on appeal"); see
also Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 64 (arguing that collegiality con-
tributes to the "growth of... judges ... [and] the growth adds credence to the
.process of appellate review").
163. See Stern, supra note 78, at 113 (stating that "the creation of appellate
courts with full power to review in itself reflects a strong policy that litigants
should not be bound by the ruling of the subordinate tribunal ... [because] the
decision made by the appellate court is more likely to be 'correct' ").
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judges on some state law matters does not outweigh the many
built-in law-finding advantages circuit courts possess in all
cases. Moreover, however expertise is defined, the expertise of
three judges must compare favorably with the expertise of only
one.I 6
2. The "Collaborative Review" and "Cost-Benefit" Rationales
The very implausibility of viewing district courts as supe-
rior to appellate courts in finding state law suggests that a more
subtle version of the "district court expertise" rationale under-
lies the rule of deference. Such a rationale must rest on a
premise that is less ambitious than viewing district courts as su-
perior decisionmakers in matters of state law. In fact, two sep-
arate alternative rationales are available.
The first of these rationales posits that even if district
courts are not better state law decisionmakers than appeals
courts, their added expertise in state law cases may justify a
sort of "collaborative review." Under this line of reasoning, the
rule of deference serves to blend the district court's special in-
sights on state law with the appellate panel's institutional ad-
vantages. According to the theory, this collaborative approach
produces in general more accurate results in state law appeals
than does traditional de novo review.
Alternatively, the rule of deference may rest on a "cost-
benefit" rationale. Unlike both the superior decisionmaker and
collaborative review rationales, the cost-benefit theory does not
claim that the rule of deference produces more accurate results
ii state law appeals. Like the collaborative review theory, how-
ever, this cost-benefit approach assumes that the gap between
circuit court and district court capabilities is substantially more
narrow in state law cases than in federal law cases. Given this
narrowed gap, the argument goes, it makes sense to shift lim-
ited appellate court resources from state law cases to federal
law cases, in which the use of such resources is much more
likely to improve results. In other words, the cost of accepting
some additional errors in state law cases is more than offset by
the benefit of redirecting limited resources to federal law cases,
in which those added resources will be put to better use.
The common thread linking the collaborative review and
164. See Carrington, supra note 82, at 527 (noting that "three heads are
better than one"); Leflar, supra note 141, at 722-23 (noting advantages of group
decisionmaking); Note, supra note 15, at 759 (arguing that "collective opinion"
is superior).
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cost-benefit rationales is apparent. Each rationale posits that
there is good reason to treat state law and federal law cases dif-
ferently. That reason is the supposition that a narrowed gap
between district court and circuit court expertise makes full-
scale appellate review to some meaningful extent less valuable
in achieving accurate decisions in state law appeals than in fed-
eral law appeals. Because this supposition is key to both the
"collaborative review" and "cost benefit" rationales, it calls for
close scrutiny.
a. The difficulty of finding a substantially narrowed
expertise gap.
The premise that the "expertise gap" between district and
appellate courts differs significantly in state law and federal
law cases is of dubious accuracy. The institutional considera-
tions detailed above reveal a wide gap between circuit court and
district court lawfinding expertise in all cases. Significantly,
the proposition that the circuit courts enjoy greater lawfinding
expertise rests on myriad and incontrovertible institutional ad-
vantages such as collaborative decisionmaking, greater time,
more focused attention, and greater cultivation of lawfinding
expertise.165 It is implausible to suggest that a balance of insti-
tutional expertise based on these many important factors will
shift significantly through the introduction of the single addi-
tional consideration that district court judges supposedly enjoy
some "special expertise" in state law cases. This is especially
true in light of the growth of legal specialization and the
proliferation of legal materials, which suggest that any sup-
posed "special expertise" is severely limited, if not entirely il-
lusory366 Indeed, deference may be less justified in state law
cases than in federal law cases because state law cases pose a
greater risk of improper local influence.167
To justify the rule of deference, special considerations of
expertise must warrant greater appellate court restraint in
state law than in federal law cases. Considering all factors,
however, no meaningful difference appears between state law
and federal law cases. This basic deficiency in both the collabo-
rative review and cost-benefit theories is not, moreover, the
only difficulty marring these rationales.
165. See supra notes 133-49, 154-62 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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b. Additional difficulties with the "collaborative review"
rationale.
The collaborative review rationale also is problematic be-
cause it rests on speculation. The theory presupposes not only
that district courts have additional expertise in state law cases,
but also that the rule of deference properly gauges that added
degree of expertise, so that circuit courts will reach accurate re-
sults in state law cases more often with the rule than without
it. The only possible support for this proposition, however, is
intuition.
In addition, the collaborative review rationale conflicts
with accepted notions about good collaborative decisionmakdng.
According to this rationale, a district court judge's function is
analogous to serving as a fourth member of an appellate court
panel, even though the district judge does not hear the same ar-
guments as the appellate court panel, conduct the same study
as the appellate court panel, or deliberate with the panel. In
light of these difficulties, it is not surprising that rule of defer-
ence proponents do not rely heavily on the "collaborative re-
view" rationale. Instead, they justify the rule with a cost-
benefit analysis encompassing more than the rule's effect on
the accuracy of results in state law cases.16 8
c. Additional difficulties with the cost-benefit rationale.
Characterized most unsympathetically, the cost-benefit ra-
tionale balances the benefits of affording de novo review in
state law cases against the fiscal costs of affording that review.
In substance, this version of the cost-benefit theory justifies the
rule of deference because the rule reduces costly appeals, rever-
sals, and resulting new trials in state law cases while only mar-
ginally reducing decisional accuracy.169 This money-changing
168. See Note, supra note 11, at 182-83; see also In re McLinn, 739 F.2d
1395, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (arguing that re-
jection of rule of deference "will encourage unsuccessful counsel to appeal on
the assumption that reversals will become more frequent" and appellate
caseload will increase greatly); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 574-75 (1985) (suggesting that efficiency concerns help justify "clearly er-
roneous" review of fact findings); STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
COURTS § 3.11 commentary, at 20 (1977) (stating that deference on factual is-
sues "reflects considerations of economy").
169. One writer, for example, states:
If the de novo standard of review confers only marginal benefits
in certain circumstances . . . these benefits may be insufficient to
counterbalance the costs inherent in the consumption of resources
that accompanies the broader standard. These costs include not only
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mode of cost-benefit analysis, however, raises a fundamental
problem. For analysts grounded in the rule of law, it is dis-
tasteful to discourage appeal rights and to tolerate incorrect re-
sults solely to save money. Some advocates therefore might
favor a more humane statement of the cost-benefit analysis 70
According to this alternate formulation of the cost-benefit
rationale, the reality of limited resources should induce appel-
late courts to look at the totality of their work. In state law
cases, the argument goes, the gap in expertise between circuit
courts and district courts is usually narrower than in the gen-
eral run of cases. As a result, appellate review in state law
cases will result in fewer corrections of legal error. It therefore
should follow that in state law cases the courts of appeals can
lower their guard. This cost-benefit approach recognizes that
diluted appellate review will leave in place more incorrect re-
sults in state law cases than would de novo review, but finds
that price worth paying to preserve appellate resources for fed-
eral law cases, in which appellate efforts are likely to do more
good.171 This version of the cost-benefit theory may be particu-
larly appealing in the present day because appeals courts "over
the last three decades have been forced to adopt efficiency de-
vices to cope with bloated caseloads."1 12
This "overall results" variation on the cost-benefit ration-
ale stands in marked contrast to the superior decisionmaker
and collaborative review rationales. According to the cost-
benefit analysis, the rule of deference does not produce more
results that are correct in the run of state law cases, but rather
more results that are correct in the run of all cases through re-
direction of resources to those cases most likely to benefit from
probing appellate review. To bolster this cost-benefit analysis,
proponents assert that circuit court decisions in state law cases
also do not advance the ordinary appellate goals of uniformity
the additional time involved in plenary review of a given case, but also
the resources consumed in the remand and retrial of actions reversed
under the broader standard, as well as the time required to hear addi-
tional appeals that will not succeed even under an eased standard of
review.
Note, supra note 11, at 183; see also i&L at 186-89 (suggesting that judicial econ-
omy and allocation of judicial authority favor application of "clearly errone-
ous" rule).
170. Cf Summers, supra note 135, at 785-86 (distinguishing between "right-
ness-minded" and "goal-minded" judges).
171. See Note, supra note 11, at 183.
172. Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 4.
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and predictability in the lawY;3 Uniformity is not achieved be-
cause circuit court decisions do not bind state courts; 74 predict-
ability is not enhanced because "[c]itizens cannot rely on the
state law decisions of federal courts in ordering their own af-
fairs."'-75 Advocates of cost-benefit analysis cite these supposed
reductions in the "benefits" of full-scale circuit court review to
reinforce the case for the purportedly more efficient rule of
deference.176
This cost-benefit rationale is flawed not only because it
rests on the faulty premise that there exists some meaningful
difference between the "expertise gap" in state law and federal
law cases1 7 7 Most importantly, the cost-benefit rationale also
assumes that the rule of deference streamlines resolution of
state law questions so as to free up appellate court time for
more careful review of federal law issues. This premise, how-
ever, is empirically questionable. As the majority stated in In
re McLinn, the appellate court "must undertake the same full
and careful review of the pertinent legal authorities whether or
not deference is to be accorded."'17 In addition, the very need
to define and apply the rule of deference may generate addi-
tional appellate work not required if all cases were subject to
de novo review. 7 9
Finally, this cost-benefit argument exaggerates the failure
of full scale review to achieve uniformity and predictability of
state law. In fact, circuit-court review in all cases serves these
goals only in a limit6d fashion. For example, federal court rul-
ings on federal law do not bind state courts any more than fed-
eral court rulings on state law. 0 It hardly follows, however,
that federal appeals courts should defer to district court rulings
on federal law because de novo review does little to increase
173. See Note, supra note 11, at 184-85, 189-90.
174. Id. at 190.
175. Id.; see, eg., Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174,1177 (8th Cir. 1969)
(stating that "federal court decisions in diversity cases have no precedential
value as state law and only determine the issues between the parties").
176. Note, supra note 11, at 191.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
178. 739 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane). Judge Wald, discussing
judicial review of agency proceedings, made the same point- "[Ejven if our
scope of review were narrowed by Supreme Court interpretation of existing
law, it would be unlikely to result in any real appellate economies. Judicial
review would likely still be invoked as frequently and consume as much court
effort regardless of the formula used." Wald, sura note 15, at 773.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 241-42.
180. See, Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 510 (1954).
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uniformity and predictability. Moreover, circuit court pro-
nouncements on state law do contribute to stability and predict-
ability in the law. Fully reasoned decisions bind at least all
subordinate federal district courts, and enhance the quality and
predictability of state court litigation by illuminating analyses
state courts may use in later litigation.' 8 '
The overall results rationale fails, however, wholly apart
from these empirical shortcomings. The rationale has a more
fundamental flaw. It ignores the time-honored function of our
appellate courts: to afford individual justice in individual
cases.
182
Any analysis of a rule of law, whether or not called a cost-
benefit analysis, must seek to preserve the fundamental values
underlying our legal system. "[T]he basic concept of our system
[is] that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individ-
ual responsibility or wrongdoing."'1 3 The overall results ver-
sion of cost-benefit analysis violates this principle by diluting
the individual rights of appellants in state law cases without
any regard to their individual circumstances. Many, if not
most, litigants pressing state law appeals receive no more "ex-
pert" a treatment from the district court than appellants rais-
ing federal law issues. The rule of deference, however,
mandates substandard appeals for these state law litigants by
lumping them together with those parties involved in state law
cases about which the sitting district court judges possibly pos-
sess some genuine expertise. Our government and courts lose
legitimacy, authority, and acceptance when they treat individu-
als not as individuals, but as part of a group whose claims must
be processed. 8 4
181. See Leventhal, supra note 131, at 435 (stating that "institutional func-
tion" of circuit courts. . . "consists of developing and declaring law" and that
"intermediate courts contribute to this function by promoting judicial dia-
logue"); see also Note, supra note 15, at 759-60 (observing that "many state
courts often do look to federal decisions, and they should be able to rely on the
courts of appeals' decisions as embodying the best approach").
182. Professor Howard, who interviewed many circuit court judges about
the central function of their courts, reports that "these judges emphasized the
law and justice of discrete cases." J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 128 (emphasis
added). As one judge observed. "There is no substitute for deciding the imme-
diate case with justice for the parties." Id.; see STANDARDS RELATING TO AP-
PELLATE CouRTs § 3.00 commentary, at 4 (1977) (stating that "intermediate
appellate court has primary responsibility for review of individual cases"); see
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1804) (stating that "[t]he
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals").
183. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
184. See, ag., L. TAMIE, supra note 80, at 667. Commentators such as Pro-
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The cost-benefit approach to the rule of deference also
clashes with basic traditions in our law. Its logic dictates, for
example, that courts of appeals should lower the standard of re-
view in all cases-including federal cases-decided by seasoned
district court judges because circuit panels can expect such
judges on the whole to perform their functions more effectively
than their colleagues of limited experience. Our law, however,
has never endorsed this type of refocusing from individual
rights to aggregate results. In a similar vein, empirical studies
might show that district court judges are less likely on the
whole to err in police brutality cases. It would hardly follow
from this fact, however, that courts of appeals should apply the
"clearly erroneous" standard in reviewing substantive law rul-
ings in all police brutality cases. Such an approach would disre-
gard our society's commitment to individual rights, to the
special role of the courts as the guardian of those rights, and to
the belief that different litigants in the same court should have
the same law applied to their cases.'8 5 These same concerns
undermine the "cost-benefit" justification for the rule of
deference.
As Professor Corbin stated: "The poor litigating parties
should not be forgotten. In each case alike they are entitled to
a day in a court of justice, operating according to our judicial
system, making use of all those sources of wisdom by which jus-
tice is determined."'8 6 When state law litigants exercise appeal
rights, our judiciary should not refuse to treat them "alike" or
Lessor Meador emphasize the value of "differentiated procedures" for different
cases on appeal. "The premise is that while every case should receive full and
fair consideration it should receive no more consideration and take no more
time than is necessary for the appellate judicial function." Meador, supra note
146, at 273. Professor Meador goes on to define one aspect of the appellate
function as ensuring "that the law and the facts in every case are considered
by each of the judges sufficient to assure his independently reasoned conclu-
sions." Id at 272 (emphasis added). Contrary to Professor Meador's concept of
appellate efficiency, the cost-benefit justification for the rule of deference ad-justs the standard of review for the very purpose of diluting the role of "inde-
pendently reasoned conclusions."
185. "he courts must not improve efficiency in ways that endanger jus-
tice, the appearance of justice, principled decision making, or the evolution of
doctrines that are responsive to the needs of society." Leventhal, supr note
131, at 436.
186. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 772 (1941);
see also Leflar, supra note 141, at 723 (observing that multi-judge courts "could
dispose of more cases if single judges took complete responsibility for cases as-
signed to them, but quick disposal of appeals, though having a certain value, is
far from the principal value served by the appellate process").
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to deny them "all those sources of wisdom" normally brought
to bear on appellate review.
d. Rationales based on redefining the rue.
Proponents of the rule of deference might distill three ad-
ditional defenses from the vaguely stated rationale of district
court expertise. These defenses, unlike the justifications con-
sidered earlier, do not offer support for the rule as typically ar-
ticulated. Instead, they in effect recharacterize the rule in
more diluted and therefore less objectionable terms. None of
these "justifications," however, persuasively explains the rule.
First, one circuit court panel has suggested that the exper-
tise rationale supports using the rule of deference as a "tie-
breaker."'' 8 7 If taken literally, however, this approach renders
the rule of deference meaningless. This is so because circuit
courts, even without the rule, in general will not reverse if the
arguments on both sides of a legal issue are equally
persuasive. L8 8
Under the second of these theories, the rule of deference is
defensible because it provides only a "slight bump" in favor of
affirming state law rulings. In other words, a modest amount
of deference, but only a modest amount, is justifiable in state
law cases based on the "special expertise" of district court
judges. As with the tie-breaker rationale, the courts' actual for-
mulations of the rule-typically framed in terms of "great
weight," "substantial weight," or "clear error"' 8 9 -do not
square with this theory. In any event, even a "modest defer-
ence" rule mandates at least some special deference in state
law cases and therefore is subject to the same criticisms leveled
at the rule of deference both above and below. 9 0
Finally, defenders of the rule of deference might assert
that the rule is acceptable because it operates in practice only
in cases where deference is peculiarly appropriate. For exam-
ple, one asserting this justification might claim that appeals
courts actually apply the rule only to nonrecurring legal issues
disposed of in the court below by an especially competent dis-
trict court judge.'L9 In such cases, the individualized determi-
187. See In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
188. See A. HORNSTmN, APPELLATE ADVOCAcY IN A NUTSHELL § 3-2, at 35
(1984).
189. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 76-186, infra notes 198-247 and accompanying text.
191. See Louis, sup~ra note 78, at 1016 & n.160 (suggesting that appellate
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nation of competence greatly strengthens the rule's expertise
rationale and the rule's restriction to rarefied issues bolsters
the rule's cost-benefit justification. 9 2 This revisionist theory of
the rule of deference, however, runs against both its standard
formulation 93 and its actual application. i 4 Moreover, even if
such de facto limits on the rule exist, many basic objections to
the rule remain applicable. The rule still compromises appel-
late protection of individual rights, 95 subverts the "legitimating
purpose" of appellate review, 196 and subordinates-on the basis
of doubtful assumptions-the profound institutional advantages
of circuit courts. 197
Most importantly, this proposed "justification" for the rule
of deference does not support that rule at all. Instead it sup-
ports a different and far more limited rule not yet articulated
by the courts. If, in fact, deference is warranted or actually af-
forded only in such a narrow class of cases, courts should aban-
don explicitly the broad existing rule and candidly adopt a new,
limited rule in its place.
III. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE
RULE OF DEFERENCE
The preceding inquiry into the expertise rationale for the
rule of deference suggests flaws that go beyond the failure of
the stated justification. That examination indicates that the
rule is a bad one. If the "superior decisionmaker" and "collabo-
rative review" rationales lack foundation, then abandoning the
rule of deference should produce more correct results in state
law cases. If the protection of individual rights is more than a
hollow promise, courts should reject the rule of deference de-
spite the cost-benefit justification.
Full inquiry into the merits of the rule of deference, how-
ever, must range beyond evaluation of its "expertise" rationale.
Precisely because the rule is rooted in the common law, a
broader look at its policy implications is necessary. Such a look
is sobering, for the rule raises myriad problems that courts em-
bracing.the rule have not yet addressed.
courts often review more aggressively decisions that they perceive to be impor-
tant or that they believe flow from less capable or trustworthy judges).
192. See supra notes 41-42, 169-76 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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The rule of deference, for example, prevents state courts
from hearing the considered views of federal appellate courts
on state law issues. 98 It weakens the moorings of the Supreme
Court's practice of accepting state law rulings already affirmed
on appeal.'9 9 The rule of deference may create, particularly in
multi-district states, conflicting decisions on the same issue by
the same court of appeals.200 The rule produces circuit court
decisions that serve, as a practical matter, as precedents, even
though the holding of the panel is not an independent appellate
construction of state law.2 01 Moreover, formulations requiring
"substantial" or "great" deference are vague and invite uncer-
198. See Note, supra note 15, at 754 (observing that when "the federal
courts are denied the right to participate creatively in the development of the
law... the litigants and the law itself are doomed to suffer"); see also Hart,
supra note 180, at 510 (stating that "healthy development of law is paralyzed
without the creative participation of courts").
199. See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
Note, supra note 15, at 756 & n.47; supra text accompanying notes 90-95. In-
deed, language in some Supreme Court cases deferring to lower court rulings
suggests that the Court understood that the courts of appeals had indepen-
dently considered the state law issues. See, ag., United States v. Durham
Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1960) (stating that "the Court of Appeals is
much closer to North Carolina law than we are [and] ... we cannot say that
the court's characterization ... under that law is clearly erroneous") (empha-
sis added); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) (noting that Court
ordinarily accepts "considered determination of questions of state law by the
intermediate federal appellate courts") (emphasis added). If Supreme Court
practice presupposes independent review by circuit courts, it seems a small
step to say that such review is dictated by Supreme Court pronouncement. In
addition, the rule of deference parallels the "two-court rule" that the Supreme
Court applied to fact findings in equity prior to adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, the Court did not scrutinize factual find-
ings upheld by a court of appeals, eg., Baker v. Schofield, 243 U.S. 114, 118
(1917), notwithttanding the traditional view that "in equity, matters of fact as
well as of law are reviewable," Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 675
(1926). In commenting on this rule of deference, Justice Jackson observed
that: "Such a rule would have no support in reason if the second court could
not make its findings as a result of its own judgment." District of Columbia v.
Pace, 320 U.S. 698, 702 (1944) (emphasis added).
200. See McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1402 n.3. This result creates a tension with
Supreme Court case law because, if "the fortuitous circumstance of residence
out of a State of one of the parties to a litigation ought not to give rise to a
discrimination," Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945), then it
seems to follow that the division or district of the federal court in which the
litigant lives and brings suit ought not create different results when two liti-
gants appeal an issue of law to the same circuit court.
201. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1402 n.3; see also A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTicE,
supra note 2, II 0.309[2], at 3124 & n. 23 (stating that when "a higher federal
court has expounded the law of the state on the particular point, a lower court
will follow that decision, in the absence of an authoritative state decision").
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tai and uneven appellate review.20 2
Even more fundamental problems, however, infect the rule
of deference. First, the rule erodes the "psychological" or "le-
gitimating" function of appellate review. 203 Second, the rule ig-
nores the teachings of modern jurisprudence.2 4 Third, the rule
needlessly compels courts in some cases to choose between
anomalous results and distasteful "judge-rating."2 5 These
problems give rise to additional arguments against the rule of
deference.
A. THE RuLE OF DEFERENCE AND THE LEGITIMATING
FUNCTION OF APPELLATE REVIEW
It often is said that the purposes of appellate review are to
correct errors and to create and clarify a body of law.205 Appel-
late review, however, serves a distinct and important additional
purpose that often is overlooked. It serves what may be called
a "psychological" or "legitimating" function. 20 7
For litigants, judicial disputes-and trials in particular-are
dramatically personal and emotional events. The trial judge is
the center of attention in these proceedings. The litigant per-
ceives that judge as the single individual holding power over
the litigant's fate. Litigants who lose at trial focus their antipa-
thy on the trial judge. With or without justification, losing liti-
gants often view that judge as inept, biased, or corrupt. These
feelings run deep. They create anxiety for litigants and under-
mine confidence in the judicial system. One vital function of
any system of appeal is to neutralize these hostilities.
20
202. See Clermont, supra note 78, at 1151 (arguing for rejection of highly
vague standards of review); see also id. at 1155 (complaining that courts exer-
cising "abuse of discretion" review "in fact... are left fairly free to exercise
whatever review they wish"); cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1981)
(stating that "[a]nnounced degrees of 'deference' to legislative judgments ...
may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result").
203. See infra text accompanying notes 206-13.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 214-30.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 231-47.
206. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00 commen-
tary, at 4 (1977); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 82,
at 2-3; Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a
Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974); Leonard, supra note 146, at 299.
207. The term 'psychological' or 'legitimating'function is the author's.
208. See P. CAnRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 82, at V,
1 (observing that "appellate justice can be the last best effort of our govern-
ment and our law to gain the respect and acceptance of the people" and argu-
ing that appellate courts should "resolve disputes . . . in a manner which
inspires public confidence"); Meador, supra note 146, at 278 (noting impor-
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Our appellate system serves to defuse antagonism directed
at the trial judge by affording a fair hearing, both in fact and in
appearance, to litigants who believe that judge has wronged
them. By thus legitimizing lower court proceedings, the appel-
late process fulfills a central aim of the law2 09-to "preserve
both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feel-
ing, so important to a popular government, that justice has
been done.' "210 As one appellate judge observed: "Quite apart
from providing a body of precedent and determining litigants'
rights, the appellate process should give the litigant and the
public at large the feeling that justice has been served .... It is
just as important to reinforce that confidence as to efficiently
produce judicial decisions." 211
The rule of deference undermines this "legitimating" func-
tance "of affording the litigants a sense of justice's being done"); see also Le-
flar, supra note 141, at 723 (emphasizing need for "public confidence" in
appellate courts).
The reality of personal involvement and untrusting reactions of losers at
trial should not surprise observers of human nature; it is perfectly predictable
that persons will become aggressively and emotionally involved in confronta-
tional situations and blame adverse results on "the system" and the person in
charge. History confirms these observations:
Indeed, at the outset an appeal was in effect an attack on the judge
who had rendered the adverse decision; the proceeding took the form
of a semi-criminal action against him, so much so that in the event the
judgment were annulled, the erring judge was open to the payment of
damages to the prevailing party.
Hopkins, Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 551, 553 (1972).
209. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (citing need to pro-
tect "integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system"); 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 390 (stating that
"next to doing right, the great object in the administration of public justice
should be to give public satisfaction"); Leflar, Observations, supra note 147, at
812 (stating that a "major function of any system of law is to assure its own
acceptance in the society it governs").
210. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added).
211. Jacobson, The Arizona Appellate Project" An Experiment in Simpli-
fied Appeals, 23 UCLA L. REV. 480, 482 (1976); see also STANDARDS RELATING
TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.30 commentary, at 46 (1977) (stating that "authority
of an appellate court and its enjoyment of public confidence depend chiefly on
the fairness with which it is perceived to act"). As others have stated:
While appellate justice has impact on the realities of situations, it also
affects the appearances and symbols which pervade the government.
An appellate system which is unduly preoccupied with one of these
functions to the neglect of the other, is inadequate to advance the pur-
poses which appellate courts should serve.
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 82, at 3.
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tion of appellate review. Despite the appellant's belief that the
district court has made a mockery of fair play, the district court
decision gains the stamp of appellate approval simply because it
has been issued by the district court judge. The appellant,
moreover, learns of this reasoning through a written appeals
court opinion that is probably the appellant's only point of con-
tact with the appellate court.212 An aggrieved party may find
such logic callous, if not conspiratorial. Rather than providing
solace, the appellate opinion may inspire the appellant's conclu-
sion that the deck was stacked on appeal as well as at trial.
The rule of deference thus undermines the important "legiti-
mating" purpose of appellate review. That fact speaks force-
fully against the rule.2 1 3
B. THE RULE OF DEFERENCE AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
The judicial function is clear in "easy" cases. Judges in
such cases follow clear statutory or case law pronouncements.
The nature of the judicial function is more difficult to describe,
however, in those many "hard" cases not readily resolved by
pre-existing rules or precedent. Jurisprudential theorists have
asserted two main theories in the last century to explain how
judges decide hard cases. These theories, moreover, shed light
on the wisdom of the rule of deference.214
The "rights" theory of law, recently championed by Ronald
Dworkin, posits that judges should and do decide hard cases
based on transcendent principles rooted in law and tradition,
rather than on personal policy preferences.215 This vision of
212. See STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE CouRTs § 3.30 commentary,
at 47 (1977) (noting that "essential functions of an appellate court are ... be-
yond the reach of effective outside scrutiny [and, therefore], it is important
that the visible manifestations of an appellate court's decisional process indi-
cate it is being properly performed").
213. Appellate courts sometimes follow abbreviated review procedures in
particular classes of cases. Application of the rule of deference in state law
civil cases is arguably a proper variation on this theme. The classes of cases in
which courts often dispense with the trappings of full review, however, are so-
cial security and habeas corpus claims. In these cases, litigants' claims already
will have passed through multiple levels of governmental review. Such prior
review provides both a structural check on accuracy of result and a substantial
legitimization of the initial governmental decision. These factors simply are
not present in the typical federal diversity case.
214. This "jurisprudential" discussion is intentionally brief, because this
Article concerns the rule of deference rather than legal philosophy. Even so,
this discussion helps demonstrate that jurisprudential observations can shed
light on practical legal questions.
215. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1975).
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proper judging clashes with the rule of deference. Indeed, it
seems difficult to identify a rule less hospitable to transcendent
"principle" than one which relies solely on how a particular
lower court judge chooses to rule. The Dworkin approach also
deems the value of "treating like cases alike as fundamen-
tal."2 16 It seems apparent, however, that courts embracing the
rule of deference, at least in its broadest forms, are "willing to
allow like cases to come out differently even in the very same
court. Defenders of the rule might respond that such "like"
cases, although otherwise identical, are in fact different cases
for the very reason that the lower courts reached different re-
sults in them. To draw this distinction, however, is to say only
that the cases are different because the litigants drew different
trial judges. Such a view travels far from the usual conception
of distinguishable cases and clearly seems to clash with Dwor-
kin's own definition of the "like cases" principle.21 7
Alternatively, according to the "lawmaking" theory of the
judicial function, advocated by "realists" and "positivists,"
judges "legislate" or "make law" when confronted with hard
cases.218 Under this theory, judges often make decisions based
on their own view of fairness and sound policy219 because the
216. Id. at 1090.
217. For example, Dworkin notes that the "like cases" principle "requires
government... to extend to everyone the same substantive standards of jus-
tice and fairness it uses for some." R. DWORKIN, LAw's Ei1PME 165 (1986) (em-
phasis added).
218. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (stating that "judges do and must legislate"); B. CARDOzo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDIcAL. PRocEss 112-13 (1921) (stating that judges legislate
"only between gaps"); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCEs OF THE LAW, ch. X
(2d ed. 1921) (recognizing that judges make law); D. KARLEN, supra note 129,
at 67 (arguing that Supreme Court frankly recognizes its law making func-
tion); A. MASON, HApi-aw FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 470 n.* (1956)
(stating that "the problem is not whether the judges make the law, but when
and how and how much" (quoting memorandum from Justice Felix Frank-
furter to Justice Hugo Black)); Corbin, supra note 186, at 773 (noting that
"[mlost judges have, in the past, strenuously denied that they made the law...
[but] they and most critical jurists have now abandoned this denial"); Fox,
Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. Ruv. 545, 548 (1899) (observing that "judicial legis-
lation .. . is inherent in the strict performance of judicial duty"); Leflar,
Sources, supra note 147, at 323 (stating that courts "have made most of the law
that we have"); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge; The
HartDworkin Dispute, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 473, 476 (1977) (noting that "the view
that judges only 'find' and do not 'make' the law" is not often argued).
The literature exploring this terrain is, of course, expansive. It is associ-
ated with legal positivists, legal realists and, most recently, proponents of the
critical legal studies movement.
219. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 82, at 3
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language of preexisting authorities is imprecise,22 0 because the
legal materials incompletely identify and prioritize applicable
moral and social values,22 ' and because the law has many cross-
currents. 22 The lawmaking process, as interpreted by propo-
(recognizing "creative and political aspects" of judicial decisionmaking); J.
HOWARD, supra note 15, at 166-67 (noting that "[w]hen judges are free to
choose, personalities, predilections, and group relations perforce fill the void");
Carrington, supra note 82, at 518 (stating that judicial lawmaking requires a
"varied mix of value judgments about conflicting social policies and procedural
practices"); Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37
BROOKLYN L. REV. 323, 332 (1971) (discussing way in which judges determine
public opinion); Kaplan, Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Have a Lawmaking
Function?, 70 MASS. L. REV. 10, 12 (1985) (stating that making law involves
deciding "by analogy, by historical or philosophic reflection, by intuition");
Schaefer, The Appellate Court, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. REC. 1, 13 (Issue 2,1953) (stat-
ing that "cases are decided.., in that area of policy and in the considerations
out of which the black-letter rules evolve"); Traynor, supra note 147, at 219
(stating that when "courts must revise old rules or formulate new ones,...
policy is often an appropriate and even a basic consideration"); Vestal, supra
note 82, at 385 (stating that "[d]ecided cases[;] [t]he relevant factual situation;
the personal predilections of the judge; the impact of society;, and other seen
and unseen factors play a part" in decisions).
220. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946) (observing that
"[t]he discrimination [the statute] requires is one of judgment transcending
confinement by formula or precise rule"); A. DERsHOWITz, supra note 122, at
41 n.* (stating that "[c]ourts love to use imprecise metaphors such as 'taint'
and 'fruit' because of their inherent ability to expand or contract with the con-
text, which accords the judges broad discretion in applying them to specific sit-
uations"); J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 15 (arguing that "much discretion may
be veiled behind legal categories that appear to routinize decisions").
221. B. CARDozo, supra note 218, at 17, 21 (observing that in "vacant
spaces" in which "there is no decisive precedent, ... the serious business of the
judge begins"); J. HOWARD, supra note 15, at 10 (stating that federal judges
"have become surrogate lawmakers in the vacuums of public choice"); W.
REHNQUIST, supra note 79, at 291 (calling law "an inexact science"); Hart,
supra note 180, at 505 (noting that "the wisest of judges would differ upon
such questions"); Kaplan, supra note 219, at 10 (describing broad "indetermi-
nacy" that proponents of legal realism and critical legal studies perceive in
law); Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the In-
dividual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1960) (observing that com-
plexities of modem life make impossible "reduction to rules of everything
with which the regime of justice according to law must deal"); Traynor, Law
and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232 (1956)
(observing that "in those cases where there is no stare decisis to cast its light
or shadow, the courts must hammer out new rules").
222. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 12 (1960) (citing
"large numbers of mutually inconsistent major premises available"); Corbin,
supra note 186, at 776 (arguing that "conflicts between judges on a single
bench in the same case, or between a court and its predecessors on the same
court... [are] an inevitable part of our judicial process, or of any other").
In addition, judges may "legislate" because law and tradition give them
substantial freedom to alter preexisting rules. Fox states: "The assumption
too that the courts have any special mission to 'declare the law' is contradicted
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nents of this view, is confined somewhat in federal diversity
cases because federal judges are duty-bound to follow state law
rules whether or not they believe them sound.223 Nevertheless,
diversity cases often arise in which preexisting rules do not
point clearly to the correct result.224 It follows, according to
this lawmaking vision of judging, that resort to value judg-
ments is inevitable and appropriate in hard state law cases.225
in every volume of our reports. The courts are constantly enlarging, cutting
down or denying altogether rules, which have been stated in earlier cases, and
they do it with entire freedom." Fox, supra note 218, at 548; see also Traynor,
supra note 221, at 232 (stating that courts must be creative "when they find
that a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformu-
lated to meet new conditions.").
223. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941) (stat-
ing that "the proper function of the ... federal court is to ascertain what the
state law is, not what it ought to be"); 19 C. WRIGn'T, A. MfILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 14, § 4507, at 103 (discussing federal court application of state law);
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661
(3d Cir.) (noting that there are "few instances in which the highest state court
has recently spoken to the precise question"), cert denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980);
19 C. WRIGHT, A. M ILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 14, § 4507, at 89 & n.30
(stating "the federal court must determine issues of state law as it believes the
highest court of the state would determine them, not necessarily... as they
have been decided by other state courts in the past"); Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE
L.J. 267, 293 (1946). The causes of indeterminacy in law apply to state law as
well as to federal law. Moreover, judges and courts can disagree subjectively
over how much play to give earlier judicial pronouncements.
225. See, e.g., McKenna, 622 F.2d at 662 (recognizing that federal courts
should act "with an eye toward the broad policies that informed" earlier state
decisions); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th
Cir.) (stating that in case of first impression, court is "left to review the ques-
tion in the light of practical and policy considerations ... and certain moral
presuppositions"), cert denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d
199, 203 n.16 (5th Cir. 1970) (declaring that if all else fails, "court may assume
that the state courts would adopt the rule which, in its view, is supported by
the thrust of logic and authority"); Stool v. J.C. Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 563
(5th Cir. 1968) (same); Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228, 229 (7th Cir.
1962) (finding state statute "not against good morals or natural justice"); Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith, 297 F.2d 265, 266 (7th Cir. 1962) (applying public
policy rather than contrary state law); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 219 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir. 1955) (asserting that court's task entails
"weighing the comparative reasoning of learned authors and conflicting judi-
cial decisions for their intrinsic soundness"); Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177
(7th Cir. 1945) (stating that court is "free to take the course which sound judg-
ment demands"). Professor Corbin states:
Our judicial process is not mere syllogistic deduction, except at its
worst. At its best, it is the wise and experienced use of many sources
in combination-statutes, judicial opinions, treatises, prevailing mores,
custom, business practices; it is history and economics and sociology,
and logic, both inductive and deductive. Shall a litigant, by the acci-
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The lawmaking vision of law, like the rights-based vision,
affects significantly the evaluation of the rule of deference be-
cause a central function of multi-judge review is to control judi-
cial subjectivity 2 26  Multi-judge decisionmaking mitigates
idiosyncrasy and individual policy preference through such in-
stitutional mechanisms as consultation and majority vote.2 n A
multi-judge appellate process, although subjective, is at least
carefully subjective. Multi-judge decisionmaking thus provides
a valuable double check against the unwise exercise of judicial
discretion that positivists and realists deem inevitable.22 1
In short, because judges operate with broad discretion, judi-
cial structures should minimize the dangers of judicial subjec-
tivity.229 The rule of deference, however, fosters acceptance of
dent of diversity of citizenship, be deprived of the advantages of this
judicial process?
Corbin, supra note 186, at 775; see also; New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 118 F.2d 414, 420 (4th Cir.) (citing goal "of reaching the decision
which reason dictates" in light of state's common law), cert denied, 314 U.S.
629 (1941); Comment, The Problem Facing Federal Courts Where State Prece-
dents are Lacking, 24 TEx. L. REv. 361, 365 (1946) (arguing that federal courts
should combine "the elements of justice, policy, and expediency").
Indeed, the Erie doctrine may require federal courts freely to consider
policy, just as a state court would, because a federal court in a diversity case is
"in effect, only another court of the State." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 108 (1945). Thus,
[the] court must determine the applicable law by recourse to all the
juristic data that are available to the state court. If the federal judge
is required to disregard some of those available data, the litigant is not
getting the same justice that he would get if the forum were a court of
the state.
Corbin, supra note 186, at 774.
226. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
227. See id.
228. See Louis, supra note 78, at 1014 (arguing that "[w]ithout voting col-
leagues to provide checks and balances, even the best trial judges will some-
times make aberrational decisions that only free review can unfailingly
correct"). In the United States the right to appeal long has been broader than
in England; one observer explains this phenomenon "perhaps as a result of a
distaste for the exercise of power by a single authority." Hopkins, supra note
208, at 553. Another observer, defending the rule of deference, argues that dis-
trict court judges should have a better "feel" or "intuition" about state judicial
processes "than appeals courts who bring the cold objectivity of ignorance to
the task." Woods, supra note 70, at 759. Woods contends that a "'fourth di-
mension' of legal reasoning, which involves the relationship of transcendental
values such as truth and justice to traditional legal relationships" supports the
rule. d. at 756. The precise meaning of this argument is elusive. It recog-
nizes, however, the importance of "feel," "truth," and "justice" in state law
decisionmaling. The need for the safeguards of multi-judge review seems
most acute in this context.
229. See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (stating
that deference to lower courts is not appropriate "where a decision here for
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a single judge's point of view. As a result, the rule clashes with
a central message of modern legal scholarship.P °
C. THE RULE OF DEFERENCE AND RESULTING ANOMALIES
The rule of deference also creates the risk of anomalous re-
sults. For example, although the Second Circuit covers the
states of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont,23l the large ma-
jority of state law cases that the circuit court decides present
questions of New York law.23 Even in these circumstances,
however, the rule of deference treats federal district court
judges in New York, but not Second Circuit judges, as experts
in New York law. Under this rigid analysis, the rule of defer-
ence would apply even if one,2 3 two,23 4 or all three235 mem-
bers of the Second Circuit panel were experienced New York
lawyers. The rule would apply even if the New York lawyers
on the panel were experienced state court litigators, while the
district court judge had practiced only as an antitrust specialist.
The rule would apply even if a panel member previously served
as a federal district court judge sitting in New York,2 36 as a
review cannot escape broadly social judgments"); see generally Cohen, The
Process of Judicial Legislation, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 112,128 (1933)
(arguing that substantive law evolves from procedures).
230. Even with Dworkd's approach, judges seeking to discern governing
principles must make "judgments about complex issues" that "will inevitably
differ from those other judges would make." Dworkin, supra note 215, at
1095. Indeed, the "impact of... judgments will be pervasive," id, and such
judgments will reflect the judge's "own intellectual and philosophical convic-
tions," id at 1096; see also id. at 1101 (observing that decisions about legal
rights depend upon judgments of political theory that might be made differ-
ently by different judges). It follows that the basic point made here-that cir-
cuit courts should monitor the substantial discretion exercised by district court
judges deciding legal questions-applies to the rights model as well as the law-
making model of judicial decisionmaking.
231. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (2D Cm..) SECOND CIRcurr REPORT
1987 vii.
232. See id at 16 (of 19,375 civil cases filed in Second Circuit district courts
in 1987, fewer than 2800 were filed in Connecticut and Vermont districts).
233. See, e.g., Thurston v. Mack Co., 716 F.2d 255, 255 (4th Cir. 1985); Rob-
ertshaw Controls Co. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Co., 669 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir.
1982); Cole v. Elliott Equip. Corp., 653 F.2d 1031, 1054 (5th Cir. 1981).
234. See, ag., Bagwell v. Canal Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 1981)
(applying rule of deference in Tennessee case even though Judges Brown and
Phillips both practiced in Tennessee).
235. See, eg., O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 847 (2d Cir.
1984) (citing rule of deference in New York case even though Judges Mans-
field, Pratt, and Tenny all rose to the bench after practicing in New York).
236. See, e.g., Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir.) (cit-
ing rule of deference in South Carolina case even though Judge Russell spent
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New York state trial judge,a37 or as a judge on New York's
highest court. 238 Finally, the rule would apply even if the panel
member had served in that capacity for ten years and the dis-
trict court judge had ascended just recently to the federal
bench.2 9 These hypotheticals are not far-fetched; indeed, for
all practical purposes, they are not hypotheticals at all. 240
Application of the rule of deference seems illogical in most
of these situations. In fact, the circuit courts sometime have
avoided such anomalous results by recognizing exceptions to
the rule.241 Addressing these problems by creating exceptions
to the rule, however, merely flips the circuit court from the fry-
ing pan into the fire. An exception-based solution, for example,
calls for unseemly "judge-rating"--that is, an examination
whether specific judges, based on experience or specialization
of practice, deserve the usual measure of deference. It also
requires careful identification and application of proper excep-
tions, a process likely to take up the very appellate court time
that the rule of deference is designed to preserve. Most funda-
mentally, an exception-based approach focuses attention on
such matters as the district court judge's background, thus di-
verting attention from the actual merits of the case. For all
these reasons, an exception-based "cure" for the problem of
anomalous results seems even worse than the disease.
Of course, some rules that breed odd results persist because
five years as district court judge in South Carolina), cert denied, 439 U.S. 866
(1978).
237. See, e.g., Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th
Cir. 1986) (applying rule even though Judge Bauer served as trial court judge
in Illinois); Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1385
(6th Cir. 1975) (citing rule even though Judge Peck previously served as Ohio
Common Pleas Court judge on state supreme court).
238. See, e.g., Smith v. Mobil Corp., 719 F.2d 1313, 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying rule although Judge Tate was nine-year veteran of Louisiana Supreme
Court and also spent 16 years on Louisiana appellate court); Randolph, 526
F.2d at 1385; Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967)
(applying rule although Judge Coleman previously was member of Mississippi
Supreme Court).
239. See, ag., Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1983) (apply-
ing rule even though Judge Tate, who participated in previous similar case,
was member of panel reviewing decision of district court judge with only three
years on federal bench).
240. See supra notes 233-39.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66; infra text accompanying
notes 757-78.
242. Cf. In re Big River Grain, Inc., 718 F.2d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1983) (declin-
ing to defer to district judge's conclusions where bankruptcy judge reached op-
posite decision on issue concerning state debtor-creditor law).
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no appealing alternatives exist.243 This is not true in the case of
the rule of deference. In In re McLinn, the Ninth Circuit ma-
jority noted that "[t]here is a very real distinction between de-
ferring to the conclusions of the district judge, as opposed to
considering the reasoning of the district judge with the respect
that is certainly due."2 4 The court observed that a circuit
court's "determination should not be based upon some unde-
fined special knowledge or feeling for the state law that the dis-
trict judge may be presumed to have, but that cannot be
articulated by the judge, argued by the parties or reviewed by
the appellate court."24 5 Rather, the proper focal point for "def-
erence" is the "reasoning and persuasiveness of the judge's de-
cision, which is always entitled to careful consideration."2 46
Stated more simply, if the district court decision reveals
expertise in the relevant area of state law, circuit court "defer-
ence" is appropriate. If the district court's decision does not ev-
idence such expertise, then a circuit court may infer that the
district court has no special expertise. Critics cannot attack
such a "proof-in-the-pudding" orientation as unworkable, be-
cause it is precisely the approach that appeals courts use in
every other kind of case. This approach, moreover, would en-
courage careful district court opinions by focusing attention on
quality of analysis.2 4 7 Most importantly, this approach would
measure genuine district court expertise in a rational fashion,
while removing the anomalous results that a generalized rule
of deference creates.
D. PRECEDENT AND THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
Perhaps the rule of deference should survive "because it is
there." Defending the rule of deference on stare decisis
grounds, however, is difficult. First, the full body of precedent,
especially in some circuits, stands at least as much against the
rule of deference as for it.2 48 Even if precedent firmly sup-
243. See, e-g., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-7,
at 285-86 (3d ed. 1988) (considering unappealing alternatives to Uniform Com-
mercial Code treatment of damage recovery in anticipatory repudiation cases).
244. 739 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
245. Id- at 1400.
246. Id-
247. See id at 1403.
248. The rule frequently is not cited in circuit court decisions on state law.
For example, a comprehensive look at the rule of deference has revealed only
five cases citing the rule of deference in the Second Circuit, see infra text ac-
companying note 353, even though that court has decided dozens of cases in-
volving state law in just the past few years, see supra note 54. Moreover, even
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ported the rule, however, courts would be fully justified in
reexamining its propriety.
The basic justification for stare decisis is "the desirability
that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals,
to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against un-
toward surprise. 249 In particular, courts are concerned that
ready rejection of precedent will disrupt "primary activity" and
"the settlement of disputes without resort to the courts."2a 0
In addition, many of the policies cutting against presump-
tive deference-such as maintaining public confidence in the ju-
diciary,2 51  achieving individual justice, 25 and avoiding
anomalous and inconsistent resultssa-counsel openness to re-
considering the rule's propriety. As the Supreme Court ob-
served: "a judicious reconsideration of precedent cannot be as
threatening to public faith in the judiciary as continued adher-
ence to a rule unjustified in reason, which produces different
results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differ-
entiated in policy. ' 254 It is unlikely that anyone would be
prejudiced unfairly if the courts abandoned the rule. Moreover,
settled law requires courts to reconsider judicial rules that are
based upon outdated factual predicates,2 55 and there is reason
to believe that the rule's basic premise of superior district court
expertise has eroded in recent decades. 256
In sum, the rule of deference is a judicial creation that
those circuits that apply the rule more often neglect to cite the rule in many
cases. See id
249. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
250. Id.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 206-13.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 182-86.
253. See supra text accompanying note 185.
254. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970).
255. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933) ("questioning whether
it is not the duty of the court, if it possess the power, to decide in accordance
with present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than in accordance
with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past"); see also Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980) (quoting Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333
U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hen precedent and
precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to support a court-fash-
ioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it")).
256. The information explosion and occupational specialization that mark
law practice today did not exist in 1943, when the rule of deference first found
acceptance. In that era, for example, many judges and lawyers plausibly could
review all the advance sheets generated by their state's appellate courts. Such
an effort may have produced the sort of background expertise that the rule of
deference attributes to district court judges. It is an extraordinary lawyer,
however, who undertakes such an effort today.
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courts of appeals may and should reexamine. The above con-
siderations provide ample reason for rejecting the rule as an
unwise and unacceptable principle of the common law.
IV. ERIE AND THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
The attack mounted on the rule of deference in sections II
and III of this Article proceed from the assumption, apparently
shared by those courts that have endorsed deferential review,
that assessing the rule is properly a question of federal common
law. The case against the rule of deference, however; goes be-
yond conventional common-law analysis. The rule faces a doc-
trinal, and even constitutional, challenge based on the
landmark case of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.s 7
A. THE ERIE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
Before Erie, federal courts applied federal common law,
rather than state law, when deciding diversity cases. 258 The
federal common-law approach, however, created serious
problems. It vested federal courts with broad powers to regu-
late in-state conduct,259 it subjected state residents to inconsis-
tent governmental regulation and unequal justice in the event
of the "accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant,"260 and it
facilitated forum shopping when the plaintiff and defendant re-
sided in different states.2 In Erie, the Supreme Court dealt
with these problems by holding that state "substantive" law
governs in federal diversity cases.M2
Early post-Eie decisions suggested that state law was "sub-
stantive" whenever it could "substantially affect the enforce-
257. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Commentators have debated vigorously whether
Erie states a rule of constitutional law. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 56, at
360-62 & nn.15-16 (collecting contesting literature). As Professor Wright
notes, howeven. "The fact is that the Court made a considered statement that
it would not overrule Swift v. Tyson if only a question of statutory construc-
tion were involved, and that it was overruling that decision only because it was
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States." I& at 363.
258. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
259. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi-
cab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
260. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
261. See Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 521.
262. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Of course, careless use of the labels substance
and procedure may result in misguided Eie analysis. See Guaranty Trust, 326
U.S. at 108-10; C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 59, at 378. Nevertheless, this short-
hand distinction remains "widely used," id. at 377, even by the United States
Supreme Court, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
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ment of the right as given by the Stat'e."2 63 More recent cases
have adopted a subtler, multi-factored approach for deciding
whether to characterize legal rules as "substantive" or "proce-
dural."26 Under either approach, however, an ErIe question
arises *henever a federal court in a state law case is invited to
apply a rule not applied in state court.
The Erie problem presented by the rule of deference is not
mysterious. The state appellate courts do not afford special
ileference to trial court rulings on state law; state appellate re-
view ordinarily proceeds de novo.265 Federal appeals courts ap-
plying the rule of deference, however, depart from traditional
de novo review by affording special weight to the trial court's
state law conclusions. Because the rules of decision in the state
and federal systems differ in this significant way, the Ere doc-
trine rears its head.
Adherents to the rule of deference may argue that Ere
does not invalidate the rule. The underlying purpose of Erie,
the argument goes, is to ensure that "the outcome of the litiga-
tion in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far
as legal rules determine the outcome of litigation, as it would
be if tried in a State court.1266 The purpose of the rule of defer-
ence, the argument continues, comports exactly with the pur-
pose of Eie. Courts of appeals, according to the "superior
decisionmaker" and "collaborative review" rationales, afford
deference to district court judges precisely because such defer-
ence produces the most accurate predictions of state law on ap-
peal. 26 7 The rule cannot offend Ere when its raison d'etre is to
achieve the goal of Ere.
This argument, however, simply brings us full circle. As
the analysis above demonstrates, there is good reason to con-
clude that the rule of deference more often reduces the chances
that litigants will obtain the best reading of state law.263 As-
suning this factual premise is correct, then the rule of defer-
ence clashes with the guiding principle of Erie. Because state
263. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-09.
264. See, eg., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467 (requiring "reference to the policies
underlying the Ere rule," rather than "application of any automatic, 'litmus
paper,' criterion"); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538
(1958) (requiring balancing of federal and state interests).
265. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
266. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added).
267. Cf. supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing supposed
state law expertise of district court judges).
268. See supra notes 128-67 and accompanyi.g text.
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appellate courts do not apply the rule, state court litigants have
a greater chance that an appellate court will correct an error of
law than do litigants who find themselves in federal court. It
follows that quality of decisionmaking will differ, both in the
run of cases and in individual cases, based solely on the "acci-
dent of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court in-
stead of in a State court a block away."269
Defenders of the rule of deference -might respond that the
rule is one of "procedure," -and therefore not subject to the
strictures of Erie.2 70 This claim, however, seems unpersuasive.
Modem efforts to draw the line between rules of substance and
rules of procedure for purposes of Eie focus on four considera-
tions: equal administration of law; the state interest underlying
the state rule; the federal" interest in applying the federal rule;
and the rule's effect on forum shopping.271 If, as earlier analy-
sis suggests, the superior decisionmaker and collaborative re-
view rationales are unsound, then the rule of deference stands
on shaky ground when judged according to this four-pronged
analysis.
First, application of the rule of deference discriminates
against appellants in federal court and, in at least some cases,
this discrimination will be outcome-determinative.2 2 Second,
because meaningful multi-judge review is part of the state's de-
sign for deciding appeals involving its citizens and its laws, ap-
plication of the rule frustrates an important state interest.273
Third, the rule advances no legitimate federal goal for Erie
purposes. The only plausible federal interests supporting the
rule are to reduce costs in state law cases and to benefit federal
law litigants by affording them greater appellate court atten-
tion.274 Unlike in other cases in which federal courts upheld
distinctive federal rules against Eie attack, these justifications
269. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
270. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
271. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1958);
see generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 59, at 386 & n.55 (collecting cases
that employ interest-balancing approach).
272. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
273. In addition, as argued earlier, the rule of deference undermines the
"legitimating" function of appellate review wholly apart from whether it al-
ters results in individual cases. It follows that the rule of deference may frus-
trate state policy even if the rule has only a minimal outcome-determinative
effect. This, in turn, frustrates the goal of Erie, because "[t]he essence of di-
versity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State law and State policy."
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191 (1947) (emphasis added).
274. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
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do not serve even to foster a "[u]niformity of procedure among
the federal courts."2 75 Instead, they reflect rank discrimination
against state law cases and litigants,.in contravention of Eie's
fundamental goal of safeguarding "our federalism."2 76 Finally,
while the rule's effect on forum selection is probably minimal,
it may.surface in some cases. 27 7 In any event, the Supreme
Court has recognized that Erie may require adherence to a
state law rule even absent a forum-shopping effect.2 78 In sum,
courts that reject the superior decisionmaker and collaborative
review rationales should reject the rule of deference under Eiie
as well.
Some courts, of course, may hesitate to reject the superior
275. C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 59, at 382; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 472-73 (1965) (quoting Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963), which noted legitimate federal interest in "bring[ing]
about uniformity in the federal courts").
276. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945); see also id at 109
(stating that Erie doctrine "touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial
power between State and federal courts"); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 80 (1938) (holding that "lower courts have invaded rights which in our
opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States"). In addition,
these justifications are, at bottom, based on a lack of federal court resources.
In other contexts, however, federal concern for securing administrative econo-
mies may not override powerful constitutional interests. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 80, § 16-6, at 1453. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Blec- Coop., 356 U.S. 525
(1958), provides a useful counterpoint in assessing the federal interests sup-
porting the rule of deference. There, the Court bowed to "a strong federal pol-
icy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the
federal courts," 356 U.S. at 538, an "essential characteristic" of the federal sys-
tem emanating from "the influence of the Seventh Amendment," id at 539.
No such federal interest underlies the rule of deference. See Note, The Ascer-
tainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity Case, 40 IND. L. J. 541, 552 (1965)
(stating that "Byrd doctrine applies only in the exceptional circumstances
where a state rule that could make some substantial difference in the outcome
of the case is opposed by a strong federal policy").
277. The rule of deference should have little influence on forum selection
because litigants choosing a forum seldom will focus on rules of appellate prac-
tice. This is especially true when, as with the rule of deference, the effect of
the appellate rule depends on the result in the trial court. Nevertheless, the
rule of deference conceivably could affect the choice of forum in some in-
stances. If, for example, a litigant perceived a good chance of securing a sym-
pathetic trial judge in both state and federal court, the rule of deference might
dictate choosing the federal forum. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "litigants often choose a federal fo-
rum ... to try their cases before a supposedly more favorable judge"). Thus,
even defenders of the rule cannot dismiss entirely the forum-shopping effect
of the rule of deference.
278. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980); see also Hart,
supra note 180, at 513 (noting that "the undesirability of affording any incen-
tive for forum-shopping" was in Erie itself "a relatively minor consideration
which Brandeis mentioned only in passing").
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decisionmaker and collaborative review rationales. It is, they
may reason, impossible to say with certainty that deferential re-
view produces less accurate results in state law cases, especially
when a circuit court applies a less aggressive version of the rule
of deference. Supreme Court decisions suggest, however, that
the rule of deference contravenes Erie even if courts do not re-
ject outright the superior decisionmaker and collaborative re-
view rationales. Four distinct lines of Supreme Court authority
support this conclusion.
First, in Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Ban;,2 79 the
Court said that the court of appeals in a diversity case is "sub-
stituted" for the state supreme court, and it therefore must in-
terpret state law as the state's high court "would have declared
and applied it. '280 Thus Wichita Royalty suggests that a fed-
eral appeals court deciding issues of state law should act like
the state's supreme court.28' This conception of the federal
courts of appeals seems consistent with Erie, given the hierar-
chical similarities between the federal and state judicial sys-
tems. It logically follows, under Wichita Royalty, that the
federal appellate courts should apply the same de novo review
applied by state high courts. At a minimum, federal courts
should employ such de novo review absent strong evidence that
the rule of deference would produce more accurate results.
Second, in Palmer v. Hoffman282 and Cities Service Oil Co.
v. Dunlap,283 the Supreme Court held that state law rules gov-
erning presumptions and burdens of proof control in federal di-
versity cases. 28 4 The relevance of these rulings is apparent: if
rules defining the degree of persuasiveness necessary to prevail
at trial aie "substantive," such rules are logically substantive at
the appellate level as well. Certainly, it is as true on appeal as
at trial that "the burden of proof may determine the outcome
279. 306 U.S. 103 (1939).
280. Id at 107.
281. See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)
(holding that "the federal court enforcing i state-created right in a diversity
case is... in substance 'only another court of the State' "); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949) (holding that "the federal court ad-
ministers the state system of law in all except details related to its own con-
duct of business"); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S.
153, 161 (1948) (same holding as Bernhardt).
282. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
283. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
284. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 59, at 377.
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of the case."285 To prevail in court, a plaintiff first must iden-
tify the legal elements of a cognizable cause of action and then
prove facts that establish those elements. Just as increasing
the burden of proof for the facts at trial dilutes the state law
cause of action, making "proof" of the legal elements more dif-
ficult on appeal dilutes the cause of action. In short, when the
rule of deference governs, "there is a different measure of the
cause of action in one court than in the other," so that "the
principle of Erie... is transgressed."286
Third, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,2s7 the
Court focused directly on the rules defining the scope of judi-
cial review. In Bernhardt, the Court held that the federal court
in a diversity case must deny arbitration if the state courts
would refuse to order arbitration of the dispute.288 In so hold-
ing, the Court observed that "judicial review of an [arbitral]
award is more limited than judicial review of a trial.' 28 9 The
clear direction of this reasoning is that rules altering the rigor
of judicial review, as the rule of deference certainly does, are
substantive, rather than procedural. Although the Court's deci-
sion in Bernhardt also rested on other factors, its specific focus
on the intensity of judicial review reinforces the conclusion
that the rule of deference is incompatible with Erie.
Finally, in Hanna v. Plumer,2 90 the Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it
would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation mate-
rially to differ because the suit had been brought in federal
court."291 Even if the rule of deference does not alter the over-
all number of correct federal court decisions, it clearly changes
the "character" of appellate inquiries. The state court litigant,
in both appearance and fact, receives more rigorous appellate
review than the federal court appellant. This discrimination oc-
285. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 758 (Ist Cir. 1940), cert denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1941).
286. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533
(1949). This parallel is imperfect because there is no basis at all for arguing
that departing from state law jury instructions on burdens and presumptions
will, in the broader scheme of things, create a closer fit between state court
and federal court results. Yet, absent proof positive that the rule of deference
creates a greater consistency in outcomes, settled Erie law on burdens and pre-
sumptions points toward viewing the analogous rule of deference as a rule of
substance, rather than procedure.
287. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
288. Id at 203.
289. Id.
290. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
291. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
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curs precisely because of "the fortuitous circumstance of resi-
dence out of a State.' 292 Again, supporters of the rule may
argue that this discrimination in rules serves the aim of Erie by
reducing discrimination in results.293 The discrimination in
rules is apparent, however, while the alleged nondiscrimination
in results is at best speculative. 294 In these circumstances,
Erie's antidiscrimination rationale should militate strongly
against the rule of deference.
B. A CRITIQUE OF THE ERIE ANALYSIS-AND A LINE OF
DEFENSE.
The preceding Erie analysis is not immune from attack.
Indeed, at least three separate criticisms of that analysis seem
possible. In the end, however, none of these criticisms carries
the day.
First, one might argue that Erie applies only when federal
law and state law conflict on the same legal question. From
this viewpoint, the rule of deference presents no Erie problem
because no state court has considered and rejected the appro-
priateness of the rule-or even could consider and reject it-be-
cause the rule of deference is a distinctively federal principle.
The rule was designed to aid only federal appellate courts by
according special weight to federal district court rulings in the
specialized context of the federal judicial system. Stated a dif-
ferent way, there is no "choice between state and federal law
... to be made" in this setting2 95 because no competing state
rule exists.
This argument falters because it ignores the real world. In
fact, appellate review in state law cases often differs signifi-
cantly between state and federal courts because of the rule of
deference. State courts, at least in general, afford traditional de
novo appellate review to conclusions of law. On the other
hand, application of the rule of deference dilutes appellate re-
view in federal court. If, under Erie, the local federal court is
to sit as "only another court of the State,"296 such real world
differences must matter. It is the functional difference be-
tween state courts and federal courts adjudicating state law
292. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 266-67.
294. See supra text accompanying note 268.
295. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
296. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108.
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cases that raises the Erie question, not the technical absence of
a conflicting state rule.
The second challenge to the Erie analysis in section IV(A)
is quite different. According to this line of criticism, an Erie at-
tack on the rule of deference violates a general principle that
federal law must and does control standard of review and re-
lated appellate matters in federal diversity actions. This gen-
eral principle, the argument goes, finds support in the
thousands of federal diversity decisions in which appellate
courts, by not inquiring into or mentioning state standard of re-
view rules, indicate at least implicitly that federal law invaria-
by controls this set of issues.
This argument again is unpersuasive, mainly because the
existing case law is far less clear than the argument suggests.
No cases address broadly whether state or federal law governs
the scope of appellate review in the absence of a governing fed-
eral rule of civil or appellate procedure.2 97 To be sure, a few
cases suggest that federal standard of review law should control
disposition of certain state law issues presented on the appeal
of cases tried in federal court.298 Other cases, however, point in
the opposite direction, suggesting that state law should answer
important questions about the scope of federal appellate review
297. At least no case has come to the author's attention, despite a substan-
tial effort to unearth one. In addition, neither Professor Moore's treatise nor
the Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise appear to identify any such case, de-
spite the efforts of both treatises to catalogue comprehensively the various
Erie issues that courts have explored. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 14, § 4511; 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra note 2,
1 0.310, 0.317.
298. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 57 U.S.L.W. 4985, 4991
(U.S. June 26, 1989) (No. 88-556); Kabatoff v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 627 F.2d
207, 209 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating in dictum that federal standard of review
should apply in reviewing amount of jury damage award on state law cause of
action); Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 663-65 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating
same for amount of damages awarded by judge); see also LaForest v.
Autoridad.de Las Fuentes Fluviales de P.R., 536 F.2d 443, 446-47 (1st Cir. 1976)
(refusing, in review of jury damages award, to follow Puerto Rican appellate
courts' practice of aggressively reviewing judge-made damage awards because
of risk of interference with plaintiff's seventh amendment jury-trial right); in-
fra note 302 (discussing Felder v. United States).
.. In Olympic Sports Prods., Ina v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910
(9th Cir. 1985),.cer denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986), the Ninth Circuit discussed
the standard of review in a diversity case and held that federal law controlled.
It did so, however, in a single three sentence paragraph in a case reviewing a
determination, based on federal Erie law, that state law controlled the issue
presented. Id. at 912-13. Therefore, Olympic Sports sheds no light on the Erie
questionpresented here.
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of district court state law rulings.29 9 . These latter cases, to-
gether with Supreme Court decisions like Wichita Royalty and
Bernhardt,300 suggest that the assertion that federal law must
always control standard of review and related issues is wrong.
Indeed, application of such a sweeping proposition to real world
cases would not square with the present day focus of Erie on
accommodating important state interests.30°
If these points are well taken, then state appellate review
299. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Service Merchandise Co., 827 F.2d 74, 78
(7th Cir. 1987) (citing Illinois law for proposition that "whether a contract is
ambiguous is a conclusion of law and may be reviewed do novo by the court on
appeal"); Gibbs v. Air Canada, 810 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1987) (appearing
to follow Florida law in reviewing district court's contract de novo); Air Line
Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 763 F.2d
875, 878 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing same), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); Bradley
Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 737 F.2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1984) (ap-
plying Wisconsin rule "that, in general, construction of insurance policies is a
question of law, which may be redetermined independently on appeal"); see
also Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Weinstein, 712 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7th
Cir. 1983) (applying state law rule to construction of trust instrument); Infor-
mation Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783 (9th
Cir. 1980) (citing state law for proposition that "determination of whether an
allegedly defamatory statement is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion
is a question of law"). Some state court decisions also hold that the federal
standard of review should apply in state court actions for enforcement of fed-
eral rights. Bowman v. Illinois Central PRR. Co., 11 IMI. 2d 186, 200-02, 142
N.E.2d 104, 114-15 (1957) (holding that federal, not state, standard of review
applies in appeal from jury verdict on Federal Employees Liability Act claim);
accord, e.g., Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d 559, 560,
147 N.E.2d 204, 212 (1957). These "reverse Erie" cases support the view that,
at least sometimes, federal courts should apply state law standards of review in
reviewing claims based on state-created substantive rights. They recognize
that federal interests are sometimes sufficiently dominant to warrant displace-
ment of state standard of review rules in state court. It seems to follow logi-
cally that state interests may sometimes be sufficiently weighty to displace
federal standard of review law in federal court, especially given the focus on
interest balancing in modern Erie analysis. See supra notes 271-78 and accom-
panying text.
300. See supra notes 279-81, 287-89 and accompanying text.
301. Consider, for example, a state statute specifying that no judgment in a
medical malpractice action shall be reversed by any appellate court unless ex-
traordinary error in the trial proceedings is shown. Suppose further that the
legislative history of this statute stated that:
This standard of review-far stricter than de novo or even abuse-of-
discretion review-is proper because of the special need for finality in
this distinct set of cases. Empirical evidence shows that drawing out
the legal process in such cases is in general detrimental to patients, to
doctors, and to the administration of sound medical practice in this
state. Thus this statute permits appellate reversals of judgments in
favor of both doctors and patients only in truly extraordinary
situations.
Surely Erie would require federal courts to honor this state legisldtive judg-
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law may, at least in particular instances, displace a competing
federal rule. The federal rule of deference, a highly specific
and especially unjustifiable rule reflecting a clean break from
ordinary state law practice, is one rule that thus should give
way.30 2
Finally, it might be urged that the Erie argument advanced
here proves too much. According to this line of attack, Parts II
and III of this Article advocate de novo review, while adher-
ence to state law may require federal courts on occasion to ap-
ply state-specific appellate review rules that depart from the de
novo standard.303 This criticism of the Erie analysis, however,
mistakes the intended message of Parts II and III. Those Parts
argue not so much for de novo appellate review as against a
federal common-law rule of deference. Thus, the arguments in
those sections are not incompatible with a federal court's apply-
ing a nontraditional standard of review for reasons, including
Erie reasons, not related to the rule of deference.
In reality, the analysis of Parts 11 and IMI, advocating aban-
donment of the rule of deference as a part of federal common
law, and section IV(A) which advocates application under Erie
of state law not embodying the rule of deference, point to ex-
actly the same result in the broad class of cases this Article
concerns. The hundreds of opinions citing the rule of deference
collected in Appendix I concern without significant exception
"pure" questions of law. In these cases, absent the rule of def-
ment, which rests so clearly on strong state policy, at least absent a contrary
federal statute or properly promulgated rule of procedure.
302. It merits emphasis in this regard that, at least in most circuits, the
rule of deference does not concern a "true" or "pure" standard of review, but
instead simply places an unquantifiable weight on the scale favoring appellate
court affirmance. This fact distinguishes rule of deference cases from other
cases in which federal appellate courts may feel compelled to apply a federal
standard of review rule. In Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.
1976), for example, the court of appeals selected the federal "clearly errone-
ous" standard of review over the competing "unreasonable and outrageous"
state law standard of review in assessing a trial judge's damages award. I& at
664. The appellate court emphasized that "[tfhe calculation of damages ... is a
question of fact," and directly cited the clearly erroneous rule of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a) in support of its holding. I&i at 663, 664. Felder thus
may be viewed as properly applying "(t]he first half of the [Hanna) test, that a
valid Civil rule is to be applied without more." C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 59,
at 383. This line of reasoning, however, falls far short of sheltering the rule of
deference from Erie challenge. The rule of deference simply does not concern
"[flindings of fact... based on oral or documentary evidence," FED. 1M CIV. P.
52(a), and thus-unlike the federal rule applied on Felder-gains no protection
against an Erie attack from Rule 52 and "the first half of the [Hanna] test."
303. See supra note 301.
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erence, traditional de novo review ordinarily would apply to
both state court and federal court. The central message of this
Article is that the rule of deference should be jettisoned in
these cases-either as a matter of sound federal common law or
as an application of Erie. Both roads lead to the same place,
and there is no apparent reason why the Erie route is
unavailable. 304
V. LATENT EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
RULE OF DEFERENCE
A complete inquiry into the purposes of the rule of defer-
ence must go beyond legalistic rationales .like district court ex-
pertise, "collaborative review," or cost-benefit analysis.
Psychological forces-conscious and subconscious-may account
for the continued existence of the rule as much as any previ-
ously articulated rationale. A search for these motivations im-
plies no disrespect for judges; instead it recognizes the
humanity of judges and the complexity of their work. Careful
study has suggested four separate subliminal forces that may
contribute to the continued judicial support for the rule of
deference.
First, federal judges face an impossible task when they
must decide difficult state law cases. Federal law requires fed-
eral judges to decide state law issues as a state court would de-
cide them, but often the judges must act without meaningful
state law guidance.305 It is understandable that judges,
launched on this uncharted sea, would seek a rudder to help
steer their decisional course. The rule of deference may serve
this purpose. Satisfaction of an escape impulse, however, is not
a sound or sufficient justification for an important judicial rule.
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, district court judges faced with
304. In addition, even if an appellate court decided preliminarily that Erie
does not support displacement of the rule of deference, the arguments devel-
oped in section IV(A) remain significant. Thus, whether or not Erie directly
controls, it is entirely appropriate for a federal court, in settling on the proper
federal common-law rule, to consider that rejection of the rule of deference
generally will promote the valid policy concerns underlying Erie, including
the recognized interest in equal administration of the law. Similarly, accept-
ance of the Erie analysis developed in section IV(A) does not render irrelevant
the federal common-law analysis developed in Parts H and I. Indeed, it is
the analysis in Parts II and III that compels the application of state law de
novo review under Erie, both by identifying the strong state interests favoring
application of state law de novo review and by revealing the absence of a valid
federal interest that justifies the rule of deference.
305. See supra text accompanying note 224.
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the task of "finding" state law in general will find that task
even more "impossible" than do circuit court panels.306 The
subjective nature of finding state law also heightens the need
for meaningful multi-judge review.3 07 In short, "[a]lthough
some have characterized this assignment as speculative or crys-
tal-ball gazing, nonetheless it is a task which [the courts of ap-
peals] may not decline."308
Second, the rule of deference may reflect an underlying
hostility toward diversity jurisdiction. Many commentators
have advocated elimination of diversity jurisdiction.30 9 More-
over, some judges-particularly appeals court judges-may
view diversity cases as "second-class" lawsuits because they pro-
duce only tentative rulings that state courts, in effect, can re-
verse.510 Hostility toward diversity jurisdiction, however,
cannot legitimately support the rule of deference. Even if di-
versity cases are in some sense "second-class" cases, the parties
to those suits are not second-class citizens. The people, through
Congress, have entrusted diversity cases to the federal courts;
those courts may not give short shrift to diversity cases because
they involve "only" state law issues.3 "1
Third, "territorial" concerns may undergird the rule of def-
erence. Adoption of the rule gave district court judges greater
power. Undoing the rule will reclaim that power for the courts
of appeals. Thus, district courts might perceive circuit court
abolition of the rule of deference as a slap, a snub, or a power-
grab.312 Circuit court judges considering the propriety of the
rule might anticipate such reactions. This problem is magnified
306. See supra text accompanying note 135.
307. See supra, text accompanying notes 142-46, 224-25.
308. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d
Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980); ef. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 234-35 (1943) (stating that federal courts in diversity cases must decide
state law issues even if "difficult or uncertain"); Bator, supra note 150, at 448
(stating that "fj]ust because a court of appeals cannot assure us that ultimate
justice has been done does not mean that trial court determinations should not
be reviewed"); see generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404
(1821) (observing that, faced with difficult legal questions, the Court must "ex-
ercise our best judgment, and conscientiously... perform our duty"); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (quoting Cohens).
309. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 23, at 128, 130 & n.16 (citing numerous
authorities).
310. See supra text accompanying note 174.
311. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. at 234 (stating that diversity
jurisdiction's "purpose was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in
such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the federal rather than in
the state courts").
312. See Louis, supra note 78, at 997 (stating that "[slcope of review... is
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because circuit court judges must live and work With district
court judges; they are colleagues and often friends who share
an ongoing and sensitive superior/subordinate relationship.31 3
As a result, circuit court judges weighing the rule may find in-
action a natural, and perhaps judicious, solution. Territorial
unselfishness, however, provides no sound justification for the
rule of deference. Judges cannot sacrifice the rights of individ-
ual litigants on an altar of harmonious personal relations.
Finally, circuit court judges may continue to employ the
rule of deference on the theory of "no harm, no foul." Accord-
ing to this view, the rule seldom alters results in actual cases.
In many diversity cases, for example, the courts of appeals do
not cite the rule of deference at all.3 14 In other cases, the
courts cite the rule yet overturn district court rulings.315
Therefore, inertia, lack of perceived need, and political con-
cerns may combine to induce appeals courts to leave the rule
untouched because they view it as more symbolic than
substantive.
This putative rationale for retaining the rule is the most
problematic of all. So long as the rule of deference remains
law, some courts will apply it to some extent in some cases.316
Thus, the rule will produce unequal justice. Appellants will
suffer at the hands of those judges who take the rule at face
value. Judges who view the rule as toothless, on the other
hand, will decide cases as though the rule did not exist at all.
At the very least, our legal system must strive for intellectual
honesty.3 17 If the rule of deference is in fact a fiction, then that
fiction should be debunked.
It is unclear whether these psychological forces in fact
have perpetuated the rule of deference. This Article isolates
them only to ease the task of the good judge. Good judges are
acutely aware of their fallibility and self-consciously strive to
decide issues free of extraneous impulses and concerns. A fo-
cused itemization of possible biases will ease this task. Careful
judges evaluating the rule of deference therefore will inquire
the principal means by which adjudicative decisional power and responsibility
are divided between the trial and appellate levels").
313. See Rubin, sulpra note 76, at 448-49.
314. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 338, 477-78, 609 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 373, 379 (Cir. Ct. Pa.
1797); Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process: A Preliminary Theory of
Decision, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1966); Leonard, supra note 146, at 333.
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first whether any of these forces color their analyses. Only af-
ter driving out these demons, or justifying on a reasoned basis
their appropriate role in analysis, will the good judge decide
whether the rule of deference should persist.
CONCLUSION
There is evidence that the rule of deference is crumbling at
the edges. One circuit has abandoned the rule.3 13 Others have
reined it in.3 19 In some circuits the rule lies rusting with dis-
use.3 20 In others, appellate panels have avoided the rule's effect
by riddling it with exceptions. 321 These signals point in the
right direction.
This Article argues that vague references to district court
expertise cannot justify the rule of deference. Courts should
reexamine the rule with a broader focus. They should consider
the meaning of "district court expertise," explore deficiencies
in that rationale, and consider the ill effects that the rule pro-
duces. Courts should weigh the rule against the principles of
the Erie doctrine and consider whether the rule rests more on
convenience than on the rule of law. Taken together, these
considerations suggest that the rule of deference lacks a sound
foundation.
The rule of deference is ripe for rethinking. Many consid-
erations argue against its continued use. The most potent argu-
ments against the rule, however, are the most straightforward
and simple. Equal treatment of, and full fairness for, state law
litigants in the federal courts of appeals dictate that those
courts should abandon the rule of deference.
APPENDIX I
A CIRCUIT-BY-CIRCUIT REVIEW OF THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
This Appendix identifies and reviews more than 550 cases
that cite the rule of deference. The cases come from every fed-
eral circuit except the Ninth, which rejected the rule of defer-
ence in 1984. The Appendix collects and synthesizes that body
of authority on a circuit-by-circuit basis. The Appendix also de-
scribes the present status of the rule in the Ninth Circuit.
318. See supra text accompanying note 71.
319. See infra notes 354-69, 390 and accompanying text (Third Circuit); in-
fra notes 605-19 and accompanying text (Eighth Circuit).
320. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
321. See infra Appendix I.
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The cases collected here reflect an exhaustive and up-to-
date search of all sources in the West Digest System annotating
decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals: Federal Di-
gest, Modern Federal Practice Digest, West's Federal Practice
Digest 2d, West's Federal Practice Digest 3d, pocket-part sup-
plements to West's Federal Practice Digest 3d for December
1987, February 1988, and April 1988, and the Key Number Di-
gests appearing in volumes 835-40 of the Federal Reporter, Sec-
ond Series, and advance sheet numbers 18-28. In earlier West
digests, rule of deference cases were collected under the key
number Courts 360.2, and to a lesser extent under the key
numbers Courts 359 and 370. In later digests, which include a
separate index for the subject "Federal Courts," most rule of
deference cases are annotated uinder. the key numbers Federal
Courts 781-86. References to the rule of deference also sur-
faced in annotations collected under the Federal Courts key
numbers 372, 383, 390, 391, 755, 776, 800, 850, and 870, as well as
under United States Magistrates key number 5. This study re-
views the annotations collected under all these key numbers.
Researching the rule of deference cases revealed that the
digesters had not, in many cases, separately annotated this
point of law. Accordingly, the search of the West Digest Sys-
tem was supplemented with a number of additional case-identi-
fying approaches: use of Shepard's Federal Citations to find
later authorities citing key cases; a review of all cases cited in
those portions of the Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise and
Moore's Federal Practice dealing with the rule of deference; 322
and the use of various Westlaw searches directed at the
databases for all federal courts of appeals. Some rule of defer-
ence cases undoubtedly slipped through this research net.
Nonetheless, this research effort, which was finished in Febru-
ary 1989, reflects by far the most complete study ever directed
at this subject.
In addition, this Appendix offers two services not available
in other legal materials. First, it provides a focused look at the
status and idiosyncrasies of the rule of deference in each of the
federal circuits. This breakdown of the cases should provide a
useful aid for lawyers practicing before particular courts and
also should give a flavor of how the rule has assumed different
colorations in different courts. Second, this Appendix high-
lights those state law cases in which a court has concluded
322. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 14, § 4507, at 107-12
nn.59-66; 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, % 0.309[2], at 3125 n.28.
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either that -the rule of deference carries added force or that the
rule is subject to an exception and therefore inapplicable. To
date, commentators, and even indexers, have ignored these crit-
ical aspects of the rule. The author hopes the structured identi-
fication of these authorities, together with the more extensive
treatment of exceptions to the rule in Appendix II, will give
particular help to judges and lawyers who must deal with the
rule of deference.
FIRST CIRCUIT
The First Circuit has stated that "we often defer to district
court interpretations of state law."323 Nonetheless, the First
Circuit appears to have used the rule of deference less fre-
quently than most circuits. This study uncovered only eleven
reported decisions in which the court cited some version of the
rule. Seven of those cases, moreover, involvedt application of
Puerto Rican law, whose unusual Spanish-law origins strength-
ens the argument for deference.3 24
In Garcia v. Friesecke,32 5 involving Puerto Rican law, the
court stated broadly that "[m]uch deference is accorded to a dis-
trict court's construction of the law of the locality in which it
sits."326 The court also has cited the rule of deference in state
law, as opposed to territorial law, cases,-3  observing that "we
323. Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 106 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892(1980).
324. See Diaz-Buxo v. Tris Monge, 593 F.2d 153, 156-57 (Ist Cir.) (defer-
ring on question of Puerto Rican law concerning meaning of Spanish phrase,
because it is "an unfamiliar legal system"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); see
also Rodriguez v. Escambron Dev. Corp., 740 F.2d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating
that "[because of our usual deference to the local district judges of Puerto
Rico on matters of Puerto Rican law, we are naturally inclined to affirm");
Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 604 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that
"we give considerable deference to the district judges who are citizens of
Puerto Rico and well versed in the Spanish underpinnings of Puerto Rico
law"); infra notes 662-68 and accompanying text (discussing rule as applied to
territorial law in Ninth Circuit); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de
Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting that Puerto Rican law
"commingles elements of common and civil law").
325. 597 F.2d 284 (lst Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979).
326. Id at 295; see also Marrero Morales v. Bull S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 299, 302
(1st Cir. 1960) (stating that "[t]he conclusion as to local law of a judge who is
from the local bar is entitled to great weight").
327. See New Hampshire Auto. Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
801 F.2d 528, 532 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing rule in case concerning New Hampshire
statute); Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 896 (1st
Cir. 1984) (applying rule to "technical subject matter primarily of state con-
cern" involving Rhode Island law); Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279,
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are reluctant to interfere with a reasonable construction of
state law made by a district judge, sitting in the state, who is
familiar with that state's law and practices."328 In support of
the rule, the court has cited Supreme Court authority329 and
cases from other circuits, 330 and has noted the competence of
local judges.33' The court has applied the rule to questions of
trust,332 limitations,333 workers' compensation, 33 4 and res judi-
cata 35 law, as well as to a question of statutory interpretation
under a New Hampshire statute concerning price discrimina-
tion in motor vehicle sales.33 6 The court was "inclined to give
deference" to the district court's ruling in the "area of inter-
mingled state and federal law" involved in selecting a state stat-
ute of limitations for a federal claim.3 37
The court nonetheless has recognized limits on the rule of
deference. In Garcia, for example, while citing the rule, the
court reversed a summary judgment for one plaintiff on state
law grounds.338  In Rodriguez v. Escambron Development
Corp.,339 the court cited the rule but did not apply it because
281 (lst Cir. 1982) (affirming district court ruling on New Hampshire law);
Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 106 (1st Cir.) (citing rule, but declining to defer
on particular facts presented), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980).
328. Rose, 679 F.2d at 281; accord Dennis, 744 F.2d at 896.
329. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 319
(1st Cir. 1978) (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 181-82 (1976)); Graffals
Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (also
citing Runyon); Marrero Morales, 279 F.2d at 302 (citing Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)); see also New Hampshire Auto. Dealers, 801
F.2d at 532 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)); Dennis, 744 F.2d at 896
(same); Rose, 679 F.2d at 281 (same); Berrios Rivera v. British Ropes, Ltd., 575
F.2d 966, 970 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Bernhardt).
330. See Rose, 679 F.2d at 281 (citing Sixth and Tenth Circuits); Berrios Ri-
vera, 575 F.2d at 970 (citing Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits).
331. See, e.g., Rose, 679 F.2d at 281; Berrios Rivera, 575 F.2d at 970.
332. See Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 896
(1st Cir. 1984).
338. See Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 604 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1979);
Ramirez de Arelkano, 575 F.2d at 319; Marrero Morales v. Bull S.S. Co., 279
F.2d 299, 302 (1st Cir. 1960).
334. See Garcia v. Friesecke, 597 F.2d 284, 295 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 444
U.S. 940 (1979).
335. See Rodriguez v. Baldrich, 628 F.2d 691, 694 (1st Cir. 1980); Berrios Ri-
vera v. British Ropes, Ltd., 575 F.2d 966, 969 (Ist Cir. 1978).
336. See New Hampshire Auto. Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
801 F.2d 528, 532 (Ist Cir. 1986).
337. Graffals Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir. 1977)
(per curiam).
338. Garcia, 597 F.2d at 295.
339. 740 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1984).
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the case actually presented a question of federal law.3 40
In three other cases, the court suggested potentially impor-
tant exceptions to the rule. First, in Burns v. Sultivan,3 41 the
court found deference iriappropriate on the facts because the
district court's central reasoning rested on a misreading of ear-
lier First Circuit cases.3 4 Second, in Ramirez de Arellano v. Al-
verez de Choudens,3 43 the court refused to defer to the district
court's ruling because a legal issue raised "a sharp conflict
among the judges of that district."3 " The panel concluded that
the conflict required "an independent assessment of the ques-
tion by a court of appeals."3 45
Finally, in Rodriguez v. Baldrich,3 46 a case involving res
judicata, the First Circuit declined to defer because the district
court did not provide "an explicit and reasoned ruling" that dis-
cussed the relevant authorities. 347 Indeed, the panel refused
deference even though several cases supported the lower
court's disposition and those cases "were cited to the district
court."3 48 Furthermore, the appeals court did not review the
legal issue de novo despite the inapplicability of the rule of def-
erence.3 49 Instead, as the court explained:
In these circumstances, we think the best course is to remand to
the district court for further consideration. In this way, the district
court can review the status of Puerto Rican law concerning res judi-
cata and its application to this case, and can explain in some detail the
conclusion it reaches about whether the doctrine of res judicata bars
the plaintiffs' federal suit. If the district court thinks the issue is un-
clear, it can consider certifying the question to the Puerto Rican
Supreme Court.... 350
SECOND CIRCUIT
In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,3 51 a Second Circuit
panel wrote: "It has frequently been observed that a court of
appeals should give considerable weight to state law rulings
340. Id. at 96.
341. 619 F.2d 99 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980).
342. Id. at 106.
343. 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1978).
344. Id. at 319.
345. I&
346. 628 F.2d 691 (Ist Cir. 1980).
347. Id. at 694.
348. Id-
349. Id
350. I
351. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
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made by district judges, within the circuit, who possess famili-
arity with the law of the state in which their district is lo-
cated."35 2 This principle, however, has not "frequently been
observed" in the Second Circuit itself. This study uncovered
only five Second Circuit cases specifically endorsing some ver-
sion of the rule of deference.3 53
The leading Second Circuit case appears to be Lomartira v.
American Automobile Insurance Co.354 The issue in Lomartira
was whether "fraud or false swearing which will void a policy
under the standard Connecticut fire insurance policy... does
not encompass fraud or false swearing in the insured's testi-
mony at trial."355 Connecticut law contained no authority on
the question, and courts in other jurisdictions were divided.
Applying the rule of deference, the court of appeals upheld the
district court's adoption of the minority view while noting that
"the question... is a close one, upon which we need not and do
not express a view.' 356 The court found determinative the rule
that:
In a case like this one, where a question of state law must be deter-
mined in a diversity case, great weight should be given the determina-
tion of a district judge sitting in that state. A court of appeals should
not reverse the considered judgment of the district court on the law
of its state unless it believes it to be clearly wrong.
3 57
In support of this proposition, the court cited the Supreme
Court's decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,358
and added in a footnote: "Not infrequently, no member of the
panel of a court of appeals is a member of the bar of the state
whose law is in question. That is the case here."3 59
Post-Lomartira cases have not applied a "clearly wrong"
test. Indeed, no other Second Circuit decision cites the Lomar-
tira "clearly wrong" standard, although the circuit has cited Lo-
martira generally, stating "we accept the reasonable and
carefully considered analysis by the bankruptcy judge, adopted
by the district court, on this unanswered question of New York
law."3 6 In other cases, Second Circuit panels have afforded
352. Id- at 281.
353. See infra notes 354, 361-60 and accompanying text.
354. 371 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1967).
355. IM at 553.
356. Id. at 554.
357. Id- (emphasis added).
358. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
359. 371 F.2d at 554 n.6.
360. In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 592 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1979).
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"special deference,"3 6' and "some deference"3 6 2 to state law rul-
ings of district courts.
Some Second Circuit cases suggest a hesitancy to review
state law rulings deferentially. In Joy v. North3 63 for example,
the majority overturned a district court decision that under the
business judgment rule an independent committee of the board
of directors could refuse to pursue a derivative action. The dis-
sent in Joy complained that "a district judge's interpretation of
the law of the state in which he sits should be accorded sub-
stantial deference."3 64 Similarly, in Ziman v. Employers Fire
Insurance Co.,3 65 the dissent faulted the majority for not defer-
ring because Ziman was "an appropriate case in which to exer-
cise the commendable restraint" defined earlier in
Lomartira.366
Finally, the Second Circuit has recognized a significant ex-
ception to the rule of deference. Prior to 1960, at least one Sec-
ond Circuit case suggested an endorsement of deference to
district courts.367 In the 1961 case, Ryan v. St. Johnsbury & La-
moille County Railroad,3 68 however, the court refused to defer
to the district court's state law ruling. Judge Friendly reasoned
that:
Although, of course, liability is governed by Vermont law, we find
nothing to indicate that the District Judge considered he was applying
any special Vermont rule different from that prevailing elsewhere;
hence the question of the degree of deference due by us to such a rul-
ing.., does not arise.
3 6 9
36L See O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 847 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Bern-
hardt). In ORourke, the court added that: "This [special deference] is espe-
cially persuasive when this court is called upon to wade into New York's
choice-of-law quagmire." 730 F.2d at 847.
362. See Deutsch v. Health Ins. Plan, 751 F.2d 59, 68 (2d Cir. 1984).
363. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
364. 1d. at 900 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
365. 493 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1974).
366. Id. at 204 (Timbers, J., dissenting). Judge Timbers noted that the dis-
trict court judge had served for 35 years at the Vermont bar, as a state trial
judge, and as an associate justice and chief justice of the Vermont Supreme
Court. Id. at 204 n.5.
367. See McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir.
1959) (citing, in connection with acceptance of district court ruling, rule of def-
erence cases from other circuits).
368. 290 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1961).
369. Id. at 352; see also Competex, S.A. v. Labow, 783 F.2d 333, 340 n.16 (2d
Cir. 1986) (reversing because district court acted "uncritically" and panel be-
lieved "the state's highest court would disagree" with district court).
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T1I7RD CIRCUIT
The status of the rule of deference in the Third Circuit is
uncertain. Few cases have considered whether such a rule ap-
plies and what effect it might have.
Several Third Circuit cases suggest that de novo review is
appropriate in state law cases. Thus, in William B. Tanner Co.
v. WTOO, Inc.,370 the court flatly stated that "in determining
whether the facts as found by the district court constitute ap-
parent authority under Pennsylvania law, we may exercise an
'independent review."' 3 7 1 Similarly, in Fassett v. Delta Kappa
Epsilon,3 72 the court stated: "We have plenary review over the
district court's conclusions regarding the applicable Penn-
sylvania law."373 Again, in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Wyman,3 7 4 the court exercised "plenary review" in eval-
uating a district court jury instruction on Connecticut law re-
garding the effect of false statements in insurance
applications.37 5 Recent decisions support the conclusion that
the Third Circuit engages in "plenary review."3 76 Indeed, in
Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Ltd.,377 the court cited the
Ninth Circuit's McLinn decision with seeming approval, stating
that "review is plenary."3 78 In each of these cases, however, the
court did not consider expressly the possibility of deferential
review and did not engage in significant analysis.
In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of
North America,379 Chief Judge Seitz explored at greater length
the proper standard of review in diversity cases. In keeping
with circuit court precedent, he endorsed "a plenary standard
of review."3 8 0 Chief Judge Seitz suggested, however, that some
deference still may be appropriate under this standard:
370. 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975).
371. I& at 266.
372. 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987).
373. Id. at 1157.
374. 718 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1983).
375. Id- at 65.
376. See Hatcher v. Jackson, 853 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that
review is plenary when district court decides whether state law violation oc-
curred on undisputed record), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 815 (1989); Zamboni v.
Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "our review is plenary" on
state and federal claims), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1989); United Coal Cos. v.
Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying "plenary
review").
377. 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988).
378. Id- at 148.
379. 724 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1983).
380. ld. at 371.
[Vol. 73:899
RULE OF DEFERENCE
"Although our review is plenary, this does not mean that in dis-
charging our function we will not take into consideration the
district judge's prediction of the law of the state in which he
sits."3 8 1
Edwards v. Born, Inc.382 provides further evidence that the
Third Circuit accepts some form of the rule of deference. In
Edwards, a Third Circuit panel upheld a Virgin Islands district
court's conclusion that "apparent authority could suffice to
render [a] settlement agreement effective."383 In reaching its
conclusion, the court specifically cited "the rule that a district
court's determination of local law is entitled to a measure of
deference on appeal when there is no clear local authority."3 4
In support of this broadly stated proposition, however, the
court cited only cases in which the Ninth and First Circuits ex-
tended deference to the district courts of Guam and Puerto
Rico.3 s5
The Third Circuit endorsed deferential review for both ter-
ritorial and state law cases in Saludes v. Ramos.386 In Saludes
the court overturned the district court's construction of the Vir-
gin Islands Tort Claims Act after first considering "what stan-
dard of review to apply."38s 7 The court rejected the appellee's
argument that "on a matter of territorial law [the court] should
only reverse if there is 'manifest error.' "388 The court nonethe-
less went on to observe:
The district court's reading of local law should be respected, but we
will not accord it any greater deference than we would in-a diversity
action. In the latter type of action, federal appellate courts have tra-
ditionally recognized that the district judge's prediction of state law is
weighty because of his or her familiarity with the particular
jurisdiction. 38 9
The court concluded, however, that this practice "has not re-
quired a different standard of review" and the court therefore
exercised plenary review in considering the district court's
holding.390
381. Id-
382. 792 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986).
383. Id- at 390.
384. I&
385. I&
386. 744 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1984). But see People v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 510
(9th Cir. 1988) (citing Saludes as requiring "de novo review").
387. 744 F.2d at 993.
388. I&
389. I& at 994 (citing Supreme Court's Bernhardt decision).
390. I&
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Read together, the Third Circuit cases recognize the pro-
priety of some modest measure of special deference in cases
considering issues of state or territorial law that is not applica-
ble in federal law cases. It thus seems wrong to say that the
Third Circuit "has never expressly adopted" the "general rule"
of "deferential review."391 The court's emphasis that such def-
erence does not alter the standard of "plenary review" and the
conspicuous dearth of cases involving affirmances motivated by
such deference suggest, however, that the rule of deference is
not strong in the Third Circuit.
FOURTH CIRCUIT
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that "[i]n determining
state law in diversity cases where there is no clear precedent,
courts of appeals are disposed to accord substantial deference to
the opinion of a federal district judge because of his familiarity
with the state law which must be applied."3 92 This study dis-
closed ten Fourth Circuit cases expressly endorsing this rule.
The earliest Fourth Circuit case applying the rule is Wil-
liams v. Weyerhaeuser Co.393 The panel relied heavily on the
rule in that case, which involved antiquated North Carolina
real estate recording laws. The court stated that "we are enti-
tled to accept the interpretation of the District Judge as one
versed in such local matters .... This is especially true when,
as here, his conclusions are articulated with clarity and no con-
trary precedent of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is at
hand."394
Later cases indicate that Fourth Circuit panels will "de-
fer,"395 or afford "some weight, 396 "substantial deference,"3 97
391. Note, supra note 11, at 158.
392. Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 788 n.5
(4th Cir. 1983).
393. 378 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
394. Id at 8.
395. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 779 F.2d 984, 990 (4th Cir.
1985) (noting that two South Carolina district judges apparently agreed on
state law question); United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882, 884 (4th Cir. 1977)
(noting that district court judge also had served as state court judge), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978).
396. See Thurston v. Macke Co., 716 F.2d 255, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (deferring
in Virginia case despite presence of Virginia judge on panel).
397. See Sokolowski v. Flanzer, 769 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting
that "district court thoughtfully analyzed the applicable principles"); Jaffe-
Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253, 257 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Cor-
rigan v. United States, 815 F.2d 954, 964 (4th Cir.) (Murnahan, J., dissenting)
(complaining that court should remand for further consideration in light of in-
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or "significant weight"39 8 to state law rulings. The court has
applied the rule very recently.3 99 In Sauerloff v. Hearst
Corp.,40 0 the court justified the rule of deference by quoting
with approval Professor Wright:
As a general proposition, a federal court judge who sits in a particular
state and has practiced before its courts may be better able to resolve
complex questions as to the law of that state than is some other fed-
eral judge who has no such personal acquaintance with the law of the
state. For this reason federal appellate courts have frequently voiced
reluctance to substitute their own view of the state law for that of the
federal judge.401
The court went on to observe that: "We see the instant District
Judge possessed of these qualifications."4 0 2 The Fourth Circuit
has cited the rule of deference in cases involving property,403
corporations,4 04 landlord-tenant,4 5 insurance,408 conflicts, 407 li-
bel,408 workers compensation,40 9 and criminal law.410
Two Fourth Circuit cases, however, create significant ex-
ceptions to the rule of deference. In Rabon v. Guardsmark,
Inc.,431 the court stated that "[w]hile we normally accord signif-
icant weight to a district judge's interpretation of the law of the
state in which he sits,"41 2 the court would not defer in the case
before it. The court reasoned:
tervening state decision, rather than deciding issue itself; stating that "substan-
tial deference" rule is "well established"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 290 (1987).
398. See Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1279 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
399. See National Bank v. Pearson, 863 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1988) (apply-
ing "substantial deference" and noting that lower court judge "as an attorney
and district court judge has had considerable experience in dealing with Mary-
land law").
400. 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1976).
401. Id- at 591.
402. Id.; see also id, at 592 (Haynsworth, J., dissenting) (joining "the major-
ity opinion in its statement of deference to the district judge in the interpreta-
tion of Maryland law in this rather quixotic area," but chiding majority for
deferring in "selective" fashion).
403. Williams v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 378 F.2d 7, 7 (4th Cir. 1967).
404. Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 789 (4th
Cir. 1983).
405. Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1984).
406. Nationwide Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 779 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir.
1985).
407. Sokolowski v. Flanzer, 769 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1985).
408. Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588, 590 (4th Cir. 1976).
409. Thurston v. Macke Co., 716 F.2d 255, 255 (4th Cir. 1983).
410. United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882, 884 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978).
411. 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
412. d. at 1279 n.1.
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The district court decided the issue of liability in an oral opinion. It
gives us little aid in deciding this appeal. It contains no citation of au-
thority except a passing reference to a case that can only be identified
by reference to the argument of counsel .... An issue of the novelty,
closeness and importance to the parties which this appeal presents
was deserving of fuller treatment 4 13
The court recognized another exception to the.rule of def-
erence in Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.,414 a
case concerning the right under Maryland law of a corporate
shareholder who holds less than five percent of issued stock to
examine corporate books. After noting the general pile of def-
erence, the court went on to observe:
Here, however, we have a panel on appeal which includes two judges
who also have Maryland antecedents. Their views differ as to the
proper outcome of the cases. In such circumstances deference to the
opinion of the one who disagrees with the district judge should serve
to neutralize any support deriving from merely the exisfence, as dis-
tinct from the contents, of [the district judge's] opinion.4 1 5
These authorities suggest that the rule of deference has
limited vitality in the Fourth Circuit. Few cases have cited the
rule, fewer cases still have relied on it, and the court recognizes
broad exceptions to the rule. In these circumstances, the rule
seems ripe for reconsideration.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
The Fifth Circuit often has recognized and applied the rule
of deference. The court originally based its acceptance of the
rule on the Supreme Court's practice of deferring to district
court rulings,416 while noting, incorrectly at the time, that cir-
cuit court deference reflected "the practice generally followed
in such a situation. 4 1-7 The court also has explained:
This policy is grounded in the rationale that a federal trial judge who
sits in a particular state and has practiced before its courts is "better
able to resolve certain questions about the law of that state than is
some other federal judge who has no such personal acquaintance with
413. Id,
414. 707 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1983).
415. Id at 788 n.5.
416. See, ag., Houston Oil Field Material Co. v. Stuard, 406 F.2d 1052, 1054
n.1 (5th Cir. 1969); Delduca v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 F.2d 204,
205 n.1 (5th Cir. 1966); Ferran v. Illinois Cent. RR., 293 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir.
1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 994 (1962); Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d
259, 263 n.l (5th Cir. 1959); see also Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d
212, 214 (5th Cir.) (affording special weight to district court judge's ruling),
cert denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980); Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters,
582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1978).
417. Sudderth, 272 F.2d at 263.
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the law of the state."418
At least forty-five Fifth Circuit cases have cited the rule. The
court has acknowledged that the traditional standard of de
novo review is "tempered somewhat" in state law cases by the
rule's application.419
In one oft-cited case the court asserted that "[a] federal dis-
trict court judge's determination on the law of his state is, as a
rule, entitled to great weight on review."420 Most other Fifth
Circuit cases also identify "great weight" as the proper degree
of deference.4 2 1 In other cases, the court has used similar ex-
pressions-namely, "substantial deference,"4 2 2 "great defer-
ence,"4 23  "special deference,"4 24  "considerable weight,$42 5
418. Cole v. Elliott Equip. Corp., 653 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.
1981); see also Halpern v. Lexington Ins. Co., 715 F.2d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (stating that appellate court will give great weight to district
judge experienced in law of state); O'Toole v. New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d
913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding appropriate deference to judge "schooled and
skilled in the law of her state"); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d
300, 304 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (noting that district judge sitting in state
who has practiced before state's courts is better able to resolve local law issue).
419. Halpern, 715 F.2d at 192.
420. Avery v. Maremont Corp., 628 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1980).
421. See, ag., Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Southeastern Fire Ins. Co., 854 F.2d
100, 105 (5th Cir. 1988); Foreman v. Exxon Corp., 770 F.2d 490, 496 n.9 (5th Cir.
1985); Tran v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 767 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1985); Galindo
v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v. Farm
Equip. Co., 742 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1984); Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F.2d
524, 525 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Smith v. Mobil Corp., 719 F.2d 1313, 1317
(5th Cir. 1983); Halpern, 715 F.2d at 192; Commonwealth Life Ins., 669 F.2d at
304; Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Co., 669 F.2d 298, 300
(5th Cir. 1982); Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam); Southern Ry. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 477 F.2d
49, 52 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 424 F.2d
764, 766 (5th Cir. 1970); Insurance Co. of N. Am v. English, 395 F.2d 854, 860
(5th Cir. 1968); Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Thielman, 395 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.
1968); City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 383 F.2d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1967) (per
curiam); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967);
Delduca v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 F.2d 204, 205 n.1 (5th Cir.
1966); Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 259, 263 (5th Cir. 1959).
422. See Stephenson v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 839 F.2d 1095,
1101 n.19 (5th Cir.) (citing Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 541
(5th Cir. 1987)), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 310 (1988).
423. See, e.g., NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 253 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985);
Trahan v. First Nat'l Bank, 690 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1982); O'Toole v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982); Black v. Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1978); Devers v. Mobil Chem.
Corp., 488 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974).
424. See, eg., Dean v. Dean, 821 F.2d 279, 283 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987); Golden v.
Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
425. See, e.g., Ferran v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 293 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 994 (1962).
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"special weight, 42 6 and "proper consideration." 42 7 One panel
stated that it normally "would place considerable stock in the
views of a district judge."428 Other panels have said that they
"usually defer,"42 9 or "are reluctant to substitute their view of
state law for that of the district court,"430 or that the court af-
fords "some deference."43 ' In one case, the circuit court af-
firmed because the appellant "cited no Louisiana authority that
would impugn the district judge's judgment and we see no logi-
cal flaw in his reasoning."43 2 Another panel cited the district
court's familiarity with local law as "a factor which weighs" in
the balance.433
It appears that the Fifth Circuit has not committed itself to
upholding state law rulings unless "clearly erroneous." A very
recent Fifth Circuit decision, however, after noting the "great
deference" standard, added that reversal was improper unless
the district court's ruling was "obviously wrong."43 4
In one case, the court noted that its "usual deference" is
"enhanced" when "two different district judges are in full
agreement as to the applicable law."435 The Fifth Circuit also
426. See, ag., Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980); Houston Oil Field Material Co. v. Stuard, 406
F,2d 1052, 1054 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969).
427. See, eg., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1180 n.5 (5th Cir.
1971).
428. Lucas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
429. Jureczki v. City of Seabrook, 760 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986).
430. Petersen v. Klos, 433 F.2d 91, 912 (5th Cir. 1970); (per curiam); accord
Cole v. Elliott Equip. Corp., 653 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981);
Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970;) see Stool v. J. C. Penney Co.,
404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that court is "hesitant to attempt to
second-guess").
431. Schuster v. Martin, 861 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1988) (affording "some def-
erence"); In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 861 F.2d 814, 816 (5th
Cir. 1988) (same).
432. Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Co., 669 F.2d 298,
300 (5th Cir. 1982).
433. Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1972).
434. Balliache v. Fru-Con Constr. Co., 866 F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam). The court added, somewhat curiously, that it generally would not ap-
ply such a large dose of deference in "a case involving a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
based upon .... the inadequacy of the complaint." Id. at 799 n.2; see also Ac-
ree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citing Ninth
Circuit authority in applying "clearly wrong" standard); Trahan v. First Nat'l
Bank, 690 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that state law rulings "will be
overturned if clearly wrong"); Avery v. Maremont Corp., 628 F.2d 441, 446 (5th
Cir. 1980) (same).
435. Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
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has hinted that reliance on district court expertise is especially
applicable in cases involving Louisiana law. The court stated in
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co. v. Neal 43 6 that "[tihe sound-
ness of this rationale is aptly demonstrated in this case, where
we are dealing with a construction of the law of Louisiana, a
civil law jurisdiction where common law principles of contract
have only limited relevance. '437 Finally, in at least two cases,
the Fifth Circuit has suggested that the rule of deference is "es-
pecially" applicable "when 'a statutory scheme is less than clear
and capable of varying interpretation.' 438 The court has not
explained why cases of statutory ambiguity warrant greater
deference than cases of common-law ambiguity.
The Fifth Circuit has cited the rule of deference in cases of
both recurring4 39 and limited440 interest. The circuit has noted
the rule in cases involving trover,' 1 conversion,442 limita-
tions,443 evidence," 4 indemnification,4 45 noncompetition agree-
ments,446  contracts, 447  negligence, 448  partnership,449
436. 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1982).
437. rd- at 304.
438. Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co. 683 F.2d 115,118 (5th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam); accord Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d at 304; Black v.
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwiters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1978).
439. See Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212,214 (5th Cir.), cert; de-
nied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980) (concerning availability of wrongful discharge claim
for employee terminated for seeking workers' compensation); Petersen v.
Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1970) (concerning seat-belt defense); Dia-
mond Crystal Salt Co. v. Thielman, 395 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1968) (concerning
effectiveness of pre-tort release); City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 383 F.2d
341, 342 (5th Cir. 1967) (concerning ability of husband and wife to be ordinary
business partners); Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 259, 263 (5th Cir.
1959) (concerning recoverability of punitive damages in trover actions).
440. See Delduca v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 F.2d 204, 205
(5th Cir. 1966) (concerning "very narrow Florida [statute of limitations]
question").
441. See Sudderth, 272 F.2d at 263.
442. See Trahan v. First Nat'l Bank, 690 F.2d 466, 466 (5th Cir. 1982).
443. See Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 429 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1970), cert
denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971); Delduca, 357 F.2d at 205.
444. See Lucas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495, 496-97 (5th
Cir. 1972); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967).
445. See Foreman v. Exxon Corp., 770 F.2d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 1985); Tran v.
Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 767 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1985).
446. See Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1982).
447. See Dean v. Dean, 821 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Mobil
Corp., 719 F.2d 1313, 1317 (5th Cir. 1983).
448. See Ferran v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 293 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 994 (1962).
449. See City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 383 F.2d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1967).
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insurance,45 0 leases, 45 ' releases,45 2 corporations, 45 3 state organi-
zations,4M interest on damages, 45 5 products liability,45 6 prop-
erty,45 7 workers' compensation,458 choice of law,459 mechanics
liens,4 60  long-arm jurisdiction,46  agency,4 62  and fiduciary
obligations. 46 3
Recognizing the rule, the circuit nevertheless has stated
that "the decision of the local trial judge cannot reasonably be
regarded as conclusive.' '464 Some cases add that "the parties are
entitled to review... of the trial court's determination of state
law just as they are of any other legal question in a case."4 65
Perhaps the leading Fifth Circuit statement of limits on the
rule of deference appears in Stool v. J. C. Penney Co.:466
[W]e are hesitant to attempt to second-guess the district court which
has already ventured intrepidly into the phantom-law wonderland.
Since our view of the state law is probably as much a guess as the dis-
trict court's, the latter cannot be designated categorically as wrong.
450. See Halpern v. Lexington Ins. Co., 715 F.2d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1983);
O'Toole v. New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982); Black v.
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1978); Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. English, 395 F.2d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 1968).
451. See Stool v. J.C. Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1968).
452. See Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Thielman, 395 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.
1968).
453. See Houston Oil Field Material Co. v. Stuard, 406 F.2d 1052, 1054 (5th
Cir. 1969).
454. See C. H. LeaveRl & Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 424 F.2d 764, 766 (5th
Cir. 1970).
455. See Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); Petersen v. RIos, 433 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
456. Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1985);
Cole v. Elliott Equip. Corp., 653 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981);
Avery v. Maremont Corp., 628 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1980); Devers v. Mobil
Chem. Corp., 488 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974);
Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1180 (5th Cir. 1971); Petersen v. Klos,
426 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970).
457. See Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1972).
458. See Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212,214 (5th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).
459. See Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 115, 117-18 (5th Cir.
1982).
460. See Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Co., 669 F.2d
298, 300 (5th Cir. 1982).
461. See Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981).
462. See Armstrong v. Farm Equip. Co., 742 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1984).
463. See NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 1985).
464. Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970).
465. City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 383 F.2d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1967); ac-
cord C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 424 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 1970);
Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967).
466. 404 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 73:899
RULE OF DEFERENCE
Ironically enough, however, the district court can be erroneous. We
cannot accept the premise that one guess is as good as another, for
that would effectively eliminate appellate review in a substantial por-
tion of the cases which come before this court. When a federal court
of appeals is of the opinion, as we are in this case, that the district
court's view of the applicable state law is against the more cogent rea-
soning of the best and most widespread authority, it must reverse the
judgment of the lower court.467
Several cases adopted this analysis, agreeing that reversal is ap-
propriate if the district court's ruling "is against the more co-
gent reasoning of the best and most widespread authority."46 s
The court has recognized other limitations on the rule as
well. For example, reviewing a district court summary judg-
ment issued without a written opinion, the appeals panel noted
that they were "not favored with the views of the district
court" and therefore had to "make the initial determina-
tion."46 9 Applying the opposite of this principle, the court in
Peacock v. Retail Credit Co.47° explained:
Unlike Peterson v. M~os, the District Judge in this case carefully ex-
plained his reasoning. His judgment of where the dimly lit Ere path
leads is as good as ours would be. We therefore give great weight to
the determination of state law by the Trial Judge sitting in the state
and familiar with local law and its trends4 71
One Fifth Circuit panel has stated in a footnote that "when
the state law only offers general guidance, the district court's
decision is not entitled to any deference."472 This exception, on
its face, seems questionable. After all, when state law provides
specific guidance on the state law issue, no rule of deference is
needed. It therefore follows that the the rule's purpose is to aid
decisionmaking when the road to proper resolution of the issue
is "dimly lit,"' 47  or "state decisional law affords no
467. I& at 563.
468. Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981); ac-
cord Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that
"[o]therwise appellate review in a substantial number of diversity cases which
come before this court would be effectively eliminated").
469. Lucas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495, 496-97 (5th Cir.
1972); accord Dean v. Dean, 821 F.2d 279, 283 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that
deference "is also less where the court fails to set out any analysis"); Petersen
v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970) (not deferring because "district court
did not explain the reasoning behind its finding"). But ef Harville, 663 F.2d at
602 (stating that appeals court should reverse only when district court ruling is
"against the more cogent reasoning").
470. 429 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971).
471. Id. at 32 (citation omitted).
472. Dean v. Dean, 821 F.2d at 283 n.4.
473. Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 429 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971); see also Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d
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guidance."474
Finally, the Fifth Circuit has followed the general rule that
deference is inappropriate when a district judge from one state
applies another state's law.4 75 Fifth Circuit decisions evidence
the highly malleable quality of the rule of deference. In some
cases, the rule appears important and even dispositive.47 6 In
those cases, the court cites broad statements of the rule, usually
emphasizing the great weight or great deference accorded dis-
trict court opinions. In other cases, the court affords only lip
service to the rule, noting its existence but analyzing fully the
issues presented.477 In a number of these cases, moreover, the
court rejects the district court's conclusions. 478 In these cases,
the court downplays the rule by noting that the district court's
opinion is "against the more cogent reasoning of the best and
most widespread authority."479
In sum, the Fifth Circuit cases indicate that the rule of def-
erence as supplemented by the rule's exceptions is vague and
flexible. The cases thus support those observers who view law
as highly indeterminate.48 0
1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1985) (deferring to "educated guess" of district court
judge).
474. Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.
1978).
475. See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 861 F.2d 814, 816
(5th Cir. 1988).
476. See Tran v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 767 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1985) (cit-
ing rule twice); Jureczkd v. City of Seabrook, 760 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting briefly that district court's analysis was "thorough and reasonable"),
cert denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986); Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F.2d 524, 525 (5th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (applying rule where opposing views were "supported
by almost equally sound reasons"); Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Pre-Engi-
neered Prods., Co., 669 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming because district
court reasoning was not flawed); Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598,
602 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981) (affirming because district court's ruling was "reason-
able"); Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.
1978) (deferring to district court); Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651, 652
(5th Cir. 1972) (deferring to district court).
477. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Farm Equip. Co., 742 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir.
1984); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967); Fer-
ran v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 293 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
994 (1962).
478. See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir.
1985); Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
449 U.S. 952 (1980); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1180 (5th Cir.
1971); Stool v. J. C. Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1968).
479. See supra note 468 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
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SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Sixth Circuit has cited the rule of deference often.
This study revealed forty cases, more than two-thirds of them
decided during the last decade, that apply the rule. Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit ranks with the Tenth Circuit in affording
state law rulings the widest measure of deference.
The foundation of the Sixth Circuit's rule of broad defer-
ence is Rud-MeZikian, Inc. v. Merritr,481 in which the court
explained:
[T]he rule appears well settled that in diversity cases, where the
local law is uncertain under tate court rulings, if a federal district
judge has reached a permissible conclusion upon a question of local
law, the Court of Appeals should not reverse, even though it may
think the law should be otherwise. As said in a number of the cases,
the Court of Appeals should accept the considered view of the District
Judge.48
2
In adopting this approach the court cited Supreme Court prece-
dent4 3 as well as earlier Sixth Circuit cases. 48 4 Notably, the
Rudd-MeZikian court cited as its principal authorities earlier
decisions that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits subsequently
overruled.485
The Sixth Circuit frequently has used the "permissible
conclusion" test from Rudd, particularly in its most recent deci-
sions.4 6 One of the latest Sixth Circuit cases quotes and ap-
481. 282 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1960).
482. Id. at 929.
483. Id.
484. Id (citing Glassman v. Hertzberg (In re Glassman), 262 F.2d 857, 859
(6th Cir. 1958) and Boyd v. Gray, 261 F.2d 914, 915 (6th Cir. 1958) (remanding
on issue not previously addressed by district court because it was "advisable to
have the views of the District Judge, formerly a practicing lawyer of many
years experience in Kentucky, upon this new aspect of the case")).
485. Rudd-Melikian, 282 F.2d at 929; see aZso infra notes 605-08, 647 and ac-
companying text (discussing Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases).
486. See Thompson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc, 872 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1989)
(table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 881327); Foster v. Livingwell Midwest, Inc.,
865 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1988) (table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 88-5340); Doherty
v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1988); Diggs v.
Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 861 F.2d 914, 927 (6th Cir. 1988); Morgan v.
Stanley Works, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988) (table; text in WESTLAW) (No.
87-1865); United McGill Corp. v. Beneficial Commercial Corp., 842 F.2d 333
(6th Cir. 1988) (table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 87-5612); Burdo v. Ford Motor
Co., 828 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1987); Vaughn v. J.C. Penney Co., 822 F.2d 605,
607 (6th Cir. 1987); Leto v. Southland Corp., 818 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (table;
text in WESTLAW) (No. 85-3574); Hydro-Dyne, Inc. v. Ecodyne Corp., 812 F.2d
1407 (6th Cir. 1987) (table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 85-3574); Agristor Leasing
v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401, 1407 (6th Cir. 1986); Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d 1152,
1155 (6th Cir. 1986); Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d 601, 606-07 (6th Cir.
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plies the Rudd standard. 487 Even more importantly, the court
applied the standard in a recent en banc decision.4 8  In some
cases, the Sixth Circuit has supplemented the Rudd standard
by further stating that state law rulings warrant "considerable
weight."4 9 In other cases the court speaks of affording state
law rulings "considerable weight" without 'referring to the
"permissible conclusion" test.490
In a handful of other cases the court has afforded "substan-
tial deference,"'491 "great weight,"492 or "the deference due such
courts in deciding matters of state law."'493 The.court also has
1985); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 590 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Martin v.
Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 299 (6th Cir. 1985); Louisville & Jefferson
County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 533, 540 (6th Cir.
1985); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1521 n.8 (6th Cir. 1983);
Transamerica Ins. Group v. Beem, 652 F.2d 663, 665 n.3 (6th Cir. 1981); Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 101, 106 n.3 (6th Cir.
1975); Lee Shops, Inc. v. Schatten-Cypress Co., 350 F.2d 12, 17 (6th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966); see also Disner v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
726 F.2d 1106, 1115 (6th Cir. 1984) (Conti, J., dissenting) (stating that "we do
not reverse merely because we might reach a different conclusion upon de
novo consideration"); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Beem, 652 F.2d 663, 668 (6th
Cir. 1981) (Engle, J., dissenting) (stating that court has "consistently followed
the rule").
487. United MeGill, 842 F.2d at 333.
488. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d at 590 (stating that "it is this court's practice
to accept the 'considered view' of a district judge who has reached a 'permissi-
ble conclusion' ").
489. See, e.g., Burdo, 828 F.2d at 382-83; Vaughn, 822"F.2d at 607; Leto, 818
F.2d at 31; Hydro-Dyne, 812 F.2d at 1407; Wright, 794 F.2d at 1155; Martin, 767
F.2d at 299, 304.
490. See, e.g., Home Indemnity Co. v. Shaffer, 860 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir.
1988); Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1988); Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. J.L Case Co., 817 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1987) (table; text in
WESTLAW) (No. 86-3411); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 767 F.2d
921 (6th Cir. 1985) (table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 83-5516); Texaus Inv. Corp.
v. Haendiges, 761 F.2d 252, 258 (6th Cir. 1985); Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v.
Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 978 (6th Cir. 1984); Diminnie v. United States,
728 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984); Bagwell v. Canal
Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 1981); Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount
Center, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1120 n.8 (6th Cir. 1979); Lenoir v. Porters Creek
Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081, 1093 (6th Cir. 1978); Martin v. University of
Louisville, 541 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.7 (6th Cir. 1976); Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d
607, 609 (6th Cir. 1976); Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d
1383, 1385 (6th Cir. 1975); Filley v. Kickoff Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1288, 1291
(6th Cir. 1972); Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 1964).
491. See, e.g., Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 250 (6th Cir. 1988).
492. See, e.g., BMW Stores v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 860 F.2d 212, 214-15
(6th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 300, 303 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 888 (1963).
493. Lyons v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 840 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1988) (table;
text in WESTLAW) (No. 87-5309).
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said it "ordinarily will defer" to state law rulings49 4 and that it
will "accept the district court's tenable view."495
In Rudd Construction Equipment Co. v. Clark Equipment
Co.,496 the court justified the rule in these terms:
The district judge will normally have a knowledge of that state's
law and will have the resources for ascertaining it. In addition, the
district judge will generally be sensitive to the principles and attitudes
which pervade the law in that state. He is therefore in a better posi-
tion to predict how the state's courts would resolve an issue, even
though they may never have addressed it directly 4 97
Following this rationale, the court has afforded deference in
numerous areas of state law, including cases concerning con-
tract,498  guardianship,49 9  corporations, 5 0 0  agency,5 0 ' limita-
tions,5 02 employer-employee,5 0 3 tort,5 0 4 insurance,505 products
liability,s50 and U.C.C. law.907
The Sixth Circuit's own members have criticized the cir-
cuit's broad view of the rule of deference. Thus, in Diggs v.
Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co.,908 Judge Merritt strongly
dissented from the panel majority's affirmance of the district
court's ruling using the permissible conclusion standard, 0 9
Judge Merritt stated:
While I agree that there are occasions in which our Court may accord
494. First Am. Nat'l Bank-Eastern v. FDIC, 782 F.2d 633, 638 (6th Cir.
1986) (reversing based on "firm conviction" that error occurred).
495. Parham v. Hardaway, 555 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1977).
496. 735 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1984).
497. Id. at 978-79; see also Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586
F.2d 1081, 1093 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating that district court judge "would be pos-
sessed of a greater sensitivity to that state's interpretation of its own laws").
498. See Lee Shops, Inc. v. Schatten-Cypress Co., 350 F.2d 12, 17 (6th Cir.
1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966); Rudd-Melildan, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d
924, 929 (6th Cir. 1960).
499. See Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 1964).
500. See Filley v. Kickoff Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1288, 1291 (6th Cir. 1972).
501. See Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1385
(6th Cir. 1975).
502. See Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 1976).
503. See Parham v. Hardaway, 555 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1977); Martin v.
University of Louisville, 541 F.2d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1976).
504. See Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081, 1093 (6th
Cir. 1978).
505. See Bagwell v. Canal Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 1981); Trans-
america Ins. Group v. Beem, 652 F.2d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 1981).
506. See Hydro-Dyne, Inc. v. Ecodyne Corp., 812 F.2d 1407 (6th Cir. 1987)
(table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 85-3574); Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d
1401, 1407 (6th Cir. 1986).
507. See Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 299 (6th Cir. 1985).
508. 861 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1988).
509. See id. at 921-24.
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some deference to the state law expertise of a district judge, I do not
concur that this is one of them. We might defer, for example, to the
greater familiarity a district judge may have with the evolving direc-
tion of that state's highest court in an area of considerable uncer-
tainty. And certainly, to the extent that a district judge writes a
detailed opinion explaining a problem of state law, that opinion is en-
titled to, and receives, deference from our Court. But that would be
true of any learned and detailed opinion from a district court, not just
those on a topic of state law. Well-founded legal analysis is always en-
titled to considerable persuasive value.
What we have in this case, however, is an issue on which the state
intermediate appellate courts have floundered and the state's highest
court, while recently silent on this specific question, has articulated
some general principles. I believe that, if we believe the district judge
erred, it is an abdication of our responsibility as an appellate court to
give the parties less than de novo review of this question.5 -0
Like other circuits, the Sixth Circuit has made it clear that
its broad deference is not boundless. In Randolph v. New Eng-
land Mutual Life Insurance Co.,511 for example, the court
stated:
In the absence of "reported [state] decision[s] on the precise issue in-
volved," this court, like other courts in the absence of "controlling
state precedent," gives "considerable weight" to the district judge's in-
terpretation of state law. Yet appellants "are entitled to review of the
trial court's determination of state law just as they are of any other
legal question."5 ' 2
This "entitled to review" language surfaced in later Sixth Cir-
cuit cases sporadically and only when the court overturned
state law rulings.513
The court suggested a more focused limit on the rule of
deference in Transamerica Insurance Group v. Beem.514 There
the court endorsed the "permissible conclusion" standard of
deference in a case presenting two issues of insurance law.515
510. Id at 929 (Merritt., J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
511. 526 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1975).
512. Id at 1385 (citations omitted). The Randolph court cited the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Luke v. American Family Mut Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015,
1019-20 (8th Cir. 1972), aff'd en banc, 476 F.2d 1023 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 856 (1973), in support of this assertion. Luke specifically endorsed this
"entitled to review" reasoning in rejecting the "permissible conclusion" test
commonly used in the Sixth Circuit both before and after Randolph.
513. See First Am. Nat'I Bank-Eastern v. FDIC, 782 F.2d 633, 638 (6th Cir.
1986) (reversing); Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 1976) (revers-
ing); see also Hydro-Dyne, Inc. v. Ecodyne Corp., 812 F.2d 1407 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Boggs, J., dissenting) (table; text in WESTLAW) (No. 85-3574) (emphasizing
Randolph language in response to majority's use of "permissible conclusion"
test).
514. 652 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1981).
515. See id. at 665.
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Applying the rule, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's
ruling on the first issue "[a]lthough the result is harsh and the
rule applied seems to us unduly inflexible."51s 6 In discussing the
second issue, however, the court downplayed the significance of
the rule of deference:
With regard to the second issue herein... we think the weight of au-
thority is sufficient to overcome this presumption.
It is certainly true, as pointed out in Judge Engels thoughtful dis-
sent, that a federal appellate court should not reverse a district judge
who has reached a permissible conclusion on a question of state law.
In this case, however, the record clearly shows that the trial judge did
not have the benefit of briefs of counsel in deciding the issue of the
sufficiency of the non-waiver agreement. This issue was raised on the
spur of the moment, although appellant sufficiently preserved his ap-
peal on it. Therefore, the trial judge did not have the opportunity to
consider the authorities cited in this opinion.P17
This reasoning comports with the en bane court's opinion that
courts should accord deference to the "'considered view' of a
district judge who has reached a permissible conclusion."518
In applying the rule of deference, the circuit sometimes has
adverted to the district court judge's earlier bench and bar
work.519 The court particularly has noted the judge's service5 20
or "lengthy service"521 as a state trial judge. The court empha-
sized this point most forcefully in Texaus Investment Corp. v.
Haendiges:522
In the instant case, Judge Dowd was particularly well qualified to de-
termine whether the Ohio courts would apply the public duty doc-
trine. Not only is Judge Dowd a district court judge sitting in Ohio,
he served on the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court
prior to being appointed to the federal bench. While recognizing that
we may not rank among the illuminati on Ohio law, we believe that
Judge Dowd's opinion, by virtue of his judicial experience on the Ohio
516. Id-
517. Id- at 665 n.3.
518. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 590 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
519. See, e.g., Filley v. Kickoff Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1288, 1291 (6th Cir.
1972).
520. Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir.
1988) (rule of deference applies "especially when as here that judge served as a
state trial judge before appointment to the federal bench"); Agristor Leasing v.
Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401, 1407 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that district judge "was a
Tennessee circuit judge... and engaged in private practice in Tennessee for
more than 20 years"); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 533, 540 (6th Cir. 1985).
521. Diminnie v. United States, 728 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 842 (1984).
522. 761 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1985).
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appellate courts, should be given considerable weight.5 23
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
At least thirty-five reported cases in the Seventh Circuit
have endorsed the rule of deference in some form. The Sev-
enth Circuit usually affords "great weight,"5 24 "substantial
weight,"'525  "substantial deference,"5 26  "significant defer-
ence,"' 5 27 or "considerable deference" 528 to state law rulings of
district court judges. The court in other cases has said that it
gives such rulings "weight,"5 29 "deference," 530 "some defer-
ence,"'53 ' or "some though of course not complete deference."932
The court has stated that it will "defer to"5 33 or "respect ' 534
523. I& at 258.
524. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir.
1987); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. 701 F.2d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092, 1094 (7th
Cir. 1983); Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1982);
Buehler Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 495 F.2d 1211, 1214 (7th Cir. 1974).
525. See, e.g., Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v. Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am., 825 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987); Beard v. J.I. Case Co., 823 F.2d
1095, 1098 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987); City of Clinton v. Moffitt, 812 F.2d 341, 342 (7th
Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 797 F.2d 1440, 1446 (7th Cir.
1986); Palace Entertainment, Inc. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 793 F.2d 842,
846 (7th Cir. 1986); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 1986); Afram Ex-
port Corp. v. Metallurgikd Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1370 (7th Cir. 1985).
526. See, e.g., Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, 823 F.2d 1193, 1195
(7th Cir. 1987); Evans v. Fluor Distrib. Cos., 799 F.2d 364, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1986);
Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 1986).
527. See Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Country Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d
548, 551 (7th Cir. 1988).
528. See, e.g., Fontano v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 213, 215 (7th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam).
529. See, e.g., St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1180,
1182 (7th Cir. 1983).
530. See Blachowski v. Royal Indem. Co., 526 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1975);
see also Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating policy
of deferring); Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystore Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413,
416-17 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating deference is prudent).
531. See, e.g., Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th
Cir. 1986); see also Instituto Nacional de Commercializacion Agricola v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 858 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1988) (afford-
ing "some, but not total, deference"); Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836
F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1987) (affording "some deference").
532. E.g., Max M. v. New Trier High School Dist. No. 203, 859 F.2d 1297,
1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Small v. Sheba Investors, Inc., 811 F.2d 1163, 1164
(7th Cir. 1987)); Sarnoff v. American Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1080
(7th Cir. 1986) (citing Enis v. Continental Ill. Natl Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d
39, 40 (7th Cir. 1986)).
533. See Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1987).
534. See In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Lake
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state law rulings and that "the considered view of the District
Judge will be accepted as to doubtful questions of local law."535
Thus, the Seventh Circuit considers the rule of deference sig-
nificant, at least in cases of "substantial doubt."536
Although the Seventh Circuit has rejected the "clearly er-
roneous" view of the rule of deference, earlier cases flirted with
such review, citing "the deference given by reviewing courts to
a district judge's interpretation of the law of the state where he
sits unless clearly wrong or unreasonable.-5 37 In Beard v. JI
Case Co.,538 however, the court stated that "we have never held
that the deference due district court decisions construing state
law is so great that such decisions may only be overturned
based on a finding that they are clearly erroneous."93 9
Like other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has justified the
rule of deference on the basis of district court expertise. In
Beard, for example, the court stated: "We give weight to these
decisions because we presume that a district judge is likely to
have a special familiarity with the law of the state in which he
or she sits."' 40 In 'e Erickson,-' 1 however, suggested a more
unorthodox rationale, justifying the rule as a "tie-breaker."542
As Judge Easterbrook stated for the court, "[tihe law has need
of tie-breakers, and if this case be a tie (it comes close), the nod
goes to the district court's construction."5 43 Other Seventh Cir-
cuit cases, particularly early cases, have supported application
River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985) (giving
"respectful consideration" to district court ruling).
535. Wisconsin Screw Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 697, 701 (7th
Cir. 1962); Shackleton v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 279 F.2d 919, 922 (7th Cir.
1960).
536. In re Eirickson, 815 F.2d at 1094; see also White v. United States, 680
F.2d 1156, 1162 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying rule because "this is a close and diffi-
cult question").
537. Cameron v. Law (In re Tillman Produce Co.), 538 F.2d 763, 765 (7th
Cir. 1976); see Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir.
1978); see also Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir.) (stating that court
has "no particular quarrel" with assertion that state law ruling should stand
"unless there is a firm conviction that it was clearly erroneous"), cert denied,
434 U.S. 940 (1977).
538. 823 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
539. Id. at 1098 n.3; accord Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d
1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985); see also White, 680 F.2d at 1162 (stating that "parties
are entitled to a review of the trial court's determination of state law just as
they are of any other legal question in a case").
540. 823 F.2d at 1097.
541. 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987).
542. Id- at 1095.
543. Id
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of the rule of deference by citing Supreme Court authority.5 44
Whatever its rationale, in the Seventh Circuit the rule of
deference applies to all "parts of the law of [the] state,"5 45 and
regardless of the procedural posture of the case. Thus, the cir-
cuit has invoked the rule in reviewing state law determinations
in orders disposing of motions to dismiss, 546 conclusions of law
made after trials to the court,5 47 summary judgments,5 48
directed verdicts,5 49  and rulings on requests for jury
instructions.5 5 0
The court also has suggested that the rule may carry
heightened effect in particular cases. In one case, for example,
the court stated that "where the district court's decision on the
content of state law is the product of a comprehensive, well-
reasoned and carefully-crafted opinion, we should be especially
mindful of this principle."55 ' In another case, the court noted
that "[t]his precept is especially apropos in a case such as this
where the district judge is a former judge of that state's
courts." 55 2 On occasion, the court also has noted the specialized
experience of the trial judge.553 Most notably, in Goldstic v.
544. See, eg., Lamb v. Briggs Mg., 700 F.2d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1983) (cit-
ing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Corp. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1955));
Blachowski v. Royal Indem. Co. 526 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1975) (also citing
Bernhardt).
545. Beard v. J.L Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding rule
applicable to choice-of-law issues).
546. See. e.g., Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v. Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am., 825 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (7th Cir. 1987); Fontano v. City of Chicago,
820 F.2d 213, 213 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
547. See, e.g., Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1987).
548. See, e.g., City of Clinton v. Moffitt, 812 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1987);
Evans v. Fluor Distribution Cos., 799 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1986); Goldstick v.
ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 1986). In Murphy v. White Hen Pantry
Co., 691 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1982), the court, citing the rule of deference in af-
firming the district court's award of summary judgment, distinguished a fed-
eral law case suggesting that "courts must proceed conservatively with
summary judgment where novel or important questions of law are presented."
Id at 354.
549. See, e.g., Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th
Cir. 1986).
550. See, e.g., Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc, 717 F.2d 413,
414 (7th Cir. 1983).
551. Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1987); see
also Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989) (deferring to
district court's determinations of state property law, "particularly those based
on complex and seldom-interpreted provisions of state and local enactments").
552. City of Clinton v. Moffitt, 812 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1987).
553. See Morin Bldg. Prods., 717 F.2d at 417 (noting that district judge was
"an experienced Indiana lawyer"); White v. United States, 680 F.2d 1156, 1162
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ICMRealty,554 a statute of frauds case, the court found the rule
"especially applicable... given Judge Shadur's long experience
in commercial practice in Illinois before his appointment to the
bench."5 55 Finally, the court has said that "[d]eference is par-
ticularly appropriate where the state's supreme court has not
spoken to the issue and the intermediate appellate courts are
divided," without suggesting why such cases differ from other
difficult cases.5 56
The court also has recognized limits on the rule. In one
case the court stated that "[a]lthough we give substantial
weight to the interpretation of state law by a district judge who
sits in that state, we cannot give it controlling weight; the par-
ties are entitled to judicial review."5 57 In a few cases, the court
has added that "we do not merely rubber-stamp the district
judge's determination of state law"595 8 and that the "parties are
entitled to a review of the trial court's determination of state
law just as they are of any other legal question in a case."55 9
The Seventh Circuit also has been a fertile source of spe-
cific exceptions to the rule of deference. The rule, of course,
applies "where state courts have not previously addressed an is-
sue."- 60 The court has said, however, that the rule has limited
(7th Cir. 1982) (giving great weight to trial judge's decision, "particularly in
light of his more than thirty years on the federal bench in Indiana!').
554. 788 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1986).
555. Id at 466.
556. Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39, 40 (7th
Cir. 1986); accord Instituto Nactional de Commercializacion Agricola v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 858 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1987) (afford-
ing "some, but not total, deference... 'especially where the state's supreme
court has not spoken to the issue and the intermediate appellate courts are di-
vided' ") (citing Enis, 795 F.2d at 40). In a similar vein, the court has said that
"'[deference is particularly appropriate where the state's Supreme Court has
not spoken to the issue."' Fontano v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 213, 215 (7th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Enis, 795 F.2d at 40). This statement seems mis-
leading, if not wrong, because the rule does not apply at all if the state's
Supreme Court has spoken to the issue at hand.
557. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 7.72 F.2d 1358, 1370
(7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); accord Palace Entertainment, Inc. v. Bitu-
minous Casualty Corp., 793 F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Afram, 772 F.2d
at 1370).
558. City of Clinton v. Moffitt 812 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1987) (adding that
court must reverse if "in strong disagreement").
559. Buehler Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 495 F.2d 1211, 1214 (7th Cir. 1974); ac-
cord Beard v. J.I. Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1098 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing
Afram); Palace Entertainment, 793 F.2d at 846 (citing.Afram); Afram, 772 F.2d
at 1370 (overturning district court ruling where "fairly plain" that error
occurred).
560. Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1982).
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or no application when:
(1) The local district court judge applies nonlocal
law;56 '
(2) Different resident district court judges have
reached different results on the issue presented;562
or
(3) Other district court judges have rejected the state
law ruling and key state court decisions have come
down after the district court ruled.563
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois,564 the Sev-
enth Circuit stated that "in the circumstances of this case less
than the usual deference may be due because the district court
confessed its own uncertainty when it certified this interlocu-
tory appeal."5 65 Finally, in Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Co.,5 66 the court observed:
[Thts precept has little force in the present case. There are no Illi-
nois cases on point; the district court judge did not discuss such Illi-
nois cases as might bear on the question although not dictate the
answer;, and the parties, in their search for authority, have ranged
over the whole United States.5 6 7
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The Eighth Circuit was the first circuit to adopt the rule of
deference. In 1943, in Magill v. Travelers Insurance Co.,5 68 the
court stated that it would accord "great weight.., to the view
of the trial court" on matters of state law and reverse only if
"convinced of error."-6 9 Since 1943, the Eighth Circuit has pro-
duced many more decisions citing the rule than any other cir-
cuit; this study uncovered more than 280 cases. The Eighth
Circuit has cited the rule in cases involving contract law,570
561. See Beard, 823 F.2d at 1098; see also Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549,
552 (7th Cir.) (stating that despite rule of deference, "we regard the matter of
foreign country law as purely a 'question of law,' ... the resolution of which
we are free to arrive at on the basis of our own independent research and anal-
ysis"), cert denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
562. See Fontano v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 213, 215 (7th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam).
563. See Enis v. Continental 111. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39, 40
(7th Cir. 1986).
564. 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cart denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983).
565. Id. at 1195.
566. 854 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1988).
567. Id at 281.
568. 133 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 319 U.S. 773 (1943).
569. Id. at 713.
570. See, e.g., Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Eng'g Co., 813 F.2d 186, 186
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warranty claims,5 71 banking law,572 bankruptcy,5 73 corporate
law,5 74 and insurance law.5 75 Decisions in tort actions also have
cited the rule, including with respect to products liability,576
wrongful death,577 libel,5 78 intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 579 medical malpractice, 58 0 loss of consortium,58 1 per-
sonal injury,58 2 and guest statutes.58 3 Panels have applied the
(8th Cir. 1987); Gary Braswell & Assocs. v. Piedmont Indus., 773 F.2d 987, 989
(8th Cir. 1985); Gatzemeyer v. Vogel, 544 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1976); Western
Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1957).
571. See, e.g., Gold'n Plump Poultry, Inc. v. Simmons Eng'g Co., 805 F.2d
1312, 1315 (8th Cir. 1986); Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777
F.2d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 1985); Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 F.2d 1108,
1111 (8th Cir. 1984).
572. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Empire Trust Co., 260 F.2d 132,
135 (8th Cir. 1958); see also, e.g., Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that although court gives
great weight to district court, it is not bound by lower court ruling).
573. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Heggen, 705 F.2d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir. 1983); In re
Schwen's, Inc., 693 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1982); Merchants Mut. Bonding Co. v.
Appalachian Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 1977); Michealson v. Elliott,
209 F.2d 625, 626 (8th Cir. 1954).
574. See, e.g., Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir.
1962), cert denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); see also, e.g., Shidler v. All Am. Life &
Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1985) (according great weight to district
court, but refusing to be bound by it).
575. See, e.g., Hilt Truck Lines v. Riggins, 756 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1985);
Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate & Ins., Inc., 755 F.2d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1985);
Glover v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1983); Jump v.
Goldenhersh, 619 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir. 1980); Blevins v. Commercial Standard
Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1976); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1966); Milwaukee Ins. Co. v.
Kogen, 240 F.2d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1957).
576. See, e.g., King v. Nashua Corp., 763 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1985); Sher-
rill v. Royal Indus., 526 F.2d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 1975).
577. See, e.g., Zrust v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 667 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1982);
Koppinger v. Cullen-Schiltz & Assocs., 513 F.2d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 1975);
Halvorsen v. Dunlap, 495 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1974); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Bork, 223 F.2d 652, 657 (8th Cir. 1955).
578. See, e.g., Schuster v. U.S. News and World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850,
854 (8th Cir. 1979); Luster v. Retail Credit Co., 575 F.2d 609, 614 (8th Cir. 1978);
Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 1974).
579. See, e.g., Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1981).
580. See, e.g., Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978); Owens
v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1973); Linke v. Soren-
son, 276 F.2d 151, 155 (8th Cir. 1960).
581. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 610 F.2d 545, 546 (8th Cir. 1979); Mc-
Pherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc., 594 F.2d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 1979).
582. See, e.g., McPherson, 594 F.2d at 714; W. Hodgman & Sons v. Motis, 268
F.2d 82, 86 (8th Cir. 1959); Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1958);
Northern Liquid Gas Co. v. Hildreth, 180 F.2d 330, 336 (8th Cir. 1950).
583. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Flores, 549 F.2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 1977); Sloan v.
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rule in property,58 4 estate,5 8 5 and estate tax5 86 cases as well.
The Eighth Circuit has justified the rule of deference with
the traditional expertise rationale. For example, in Bookwalter
v. Phelps,587 the court stated that "an able and experienced fed-
eral trial judge, residing in the state, by reason of his close asso-
ciation with the development of the law of the state is
ordinarily in a better position to predict the course the appel-
late courts of his state will follow."' 588 Speaking of the rule of
deference in Kasper v. Kellar,589 the court expanded on this
theme, stating that "factors of evaluation and judgment on un-
settled questions will naturally be present at the local level,
which are not available to us, such as unreported trial-court de-
cisions, percolating judicial trends, accepted legal climate, and
familiarity with prevailing professional thought and temper."5 90
From 1943 until the court reconsidered the rule in Luke v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co.s5' in 1973, Eighth Cir-
cuit panels expressed the rule in a wide variety of ways. Most
often, the court stated broadly that appellate panels would not
alter any "permissible conclusion" of state law reached by the
district courts.592 In some cases, the court added that if the con-
Tarlton, 285 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1961); Ortman v. Smith, 198 F.2d 123, 127
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952).
584. See, e.g., Kimble v. Willey, 204 F.2d 238, 239 (8th Cir. 1953); National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342
U.S. 933 (1952); see also Hockett v. Larson, 742 F.2d 1123, 1125 (8th Cir. 1984)
(deferring customarily to district court views, but refusing to be bound by
them).
585. See, e.g., Bassler v. Arrowood, 500 F.2d 138, 142 n.7 (8th Cir. 1974), cert,
denied, 419 U.S. 1116 (1975); Cousin v. Cousin, 192 F.2d 377, 387 (8th Cir. 1951).
586. See, eg., Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 1958); Kasper v. Kellar,
217 F.2d 744, 747 (8th Cir. 1954).
587. 325 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1963).
588. Id- at 188.
589. 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954).
590. Id at 747-48.
591. 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1972), aff'd en banc, 476 F.2d 1023 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
592. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Zimmer, 374 F.2d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 1967); H.K.
Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp. of Am., 367 F.2d 653, 662 (8th Cir. 1966); Car-
man v. Harrison, 362 F.2d 694, 701 (8th Cir. 1966); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yarbrough, 360 F.2d 562, 568 (8th Cir. 1966); Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d
32, 38 (8th Cir. 1966); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Steele, 352 F.2d 822, 826 (8th
Cir. 1965); Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924, 932-33 (8th
Cir. 1965); Baker v. United States, 343 F.2d 222, 224 (8th Cir. 1965); Greif Bros.
Cooperage Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 341 F.2d 167, 171 (8th Cir. 1965);
Weir v. United States, 339 F.2d 82, 86-87 (8th Cir. 1964); Solomon v. Northwest-
ern State Bank, 327 F.2d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 1964); Figge Auto Co. v. Taylor, 325
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clusion was permissible, the court would not reverse even if it
thought the law was different.593 Eighth Circuit panels often
said that they would not overturn lower court determinations
unless convinced that the holding was erroneous or in error.594
F.2d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 324
F.2d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1963); Cox v. City of Freeman, 321 F.2d 887, 893 (8th Cir.
1963); Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 70 (8th Cir. 1963); Weisser v. Ot-
ter Tail Power Co., 318 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1963); Western Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Herman, 318 F.2d 50, 53 (8th Cir. 1963); Campbell v. Village of Silver
Bay, 315 F.2d 568, 575 (8th Cir. 1963); Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 314 F.2d
657, 664 (8th Cir. 1963); Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 709, 711 (8th
Cir. 1962); State Sec. Co. v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co.,
308 F.2d 452, 452 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Reid v. Miles Constr. Corp., 307
F.2d 214, 219 (8th Cir. 1962); Krone v. Lacy, 305 F.2d 245, 248 (8th Cir. 1962);
St. Paul Hosp. & Casualty Co. v. Helsby, 304 F.2d 758, 759 (8th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp., 302 F.2d 443, 449
(8th Cir. 1962); Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir.
1962); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Daniels, 299 F.2d 154, 156 (8th Cir. 1962);
Wolters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 296 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1961); Trans-
port Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 295 F.2d 223, 227 (8th Cir.
1961); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Paull, 293 F.2d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 1961);
Kern v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 293 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1961), cert de-
nied, 368 U.S. 969 (1962); Travelers Indem. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 292 F.2d
214, 220 n.3 (8th Cir. 1961); Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d
284, 288 (8th Cir. 1961); Taube v. Ingraham, 290 F.2d 288, 295 (8th Cir. 1961);
State Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co., 289 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1961); Glawe
v. Rulon, 284 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir. 1960); Texaco-Cities Serv. Pipe Line Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 283 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1960); Linke v. Soren-
son, 276 F.2d 151, 155 (8th Cir. 1960); W. Hodgman & Sons v. Motis, 268 F.2d
82, 86 (8th Cir. 1959); Webb v. John Deere Plow Co., 260 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.
1958); Commekcial Credit Corp. v. Empire Trust Co., 260 F.2d 132, 135 (8th Cir.
1958); Homolla v. Gluck, 248 F.2d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 1957); Wood v. Gas Serv.
Co., 245 F.2d 653, 657 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 885 (1957); Milwaukee
Ins. Co. v. Kogen, 240 F.2d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1957); Bostian v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 238 F.2d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 1956); Wallace v. Knapp-Monarch Co.,
234 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 1956); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett, 221
F.2d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Nance, 212 F.2d 4, 8
(8th Cir. 1954); Ford v. Luria Steel & Trading Corp., 192 F.2d 880, 883 (8th Cir.
1951); National Bells Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1951), cert
denied, 342 U.S. 933 (1952); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Munn, 188 F.2d
1, 4 (8th Cir. 1951); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Coleman, 186 F.2d 40, 43
(8th Cir. 1951).
593. See, eg., Krone v. Lacy, 305 F.2d at 248; National Bellas Hess, 191 F.2d
at 741; Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Coleman, 186 F.2d at 43.
594. See, e.g., Wessel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 361 F.2d 571, 574 (8th
Cir. 1966); Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962), cert
denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Wray M. Scott Co. v. Daigle, 309 F.2d 105, 109 (8th
Cir. 1962); Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larkin, 299 F.2d 142, 153 (8th Cir.
1962); Greene v. Werven, 275 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1960); Community Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. General Casualty Co. of Am., 274 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir.
1960); Weiby v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1960);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Stufflebean, 270 F.2d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 1959); Woodhull v.
Minot Clinic, 259 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1958); Grundeen v. United States Fi-
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On several occasions, the court employed the "clearly errone-
ous" standard595 Pre-Luke opinions sometimes said that state
law rulings should stand unless it was clear that the court had
"misconceived" or "misapplied" the law of the state.596 In
other cases the appeals court stated that it would "accept" the
delity & Guar. Co., 238 F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 1956); Warner v. First Nat'l
Bank, 236 F.2d 853, 860 (8th Cir.), cer denied, 352 US. 927 (1956); Frank B.
Connet Lumber Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 236 F.2d 117, 125 (8th
Cir. 1956); Wallace v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 234 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 1956);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bork, 223 F.2d 652, 657 (8th Cir. 1955); American Nat'l
Bank v. National Indem. Co., 222 F.2d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 1955); Lanza v. Car-
roll, 216 F.2d 808, 814 (8th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 408
(1955); Bryant v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 216 F.2d 727, 734 (8th Cir. 1954);
Clarke Hybrid Corn Co. v. Stratton Grain Co., 214 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1954);
Kansas City Public Serv. Co. v. Taylor, 210 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1954); Barnard v.
Wabash R.R., 208 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1953); Illinois Terminal R.R. v. Creek,
207 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1953); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Hubbard, 203 F.2d
859, 861 (8th Cir. 1953); Audiss v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 190 F.2d 238, 241 (8th
Cir. 1951); Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir. 1950); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc., 185 F.2d 142, 146 (8th Cir. 1950); Fargo
Nat'l Bank v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 676, 683 (8th Cir. 1950); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Dalton Coal & Material Co., 184 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1950);
Nolley v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 183 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 913 (1951); see also Lowes v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 355
F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1966) (using "demonstrably wrong" standard); United
States v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 1958) (same).
595. See, eg., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 873
(8th Cir. 1966); Hogue v. Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co., 353 F.2d 772, 776
(8th Cir. 1965); Trans World Airlines v. Travelers Indem. Co., 262 F.2d 321, 327
(8th Cir. 1959); see also Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 645 (8th
Cir. 1957) (using "clearly persuaded" of error standard); State Mut. Life As-
surance Co. v. Wittenberg, 239 F.2d 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1956) (using "clear error"
standard); Madison County Farmers Ass'n v. American Employers' Ins. Co.,
209 F.2d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 1954) (using "clearly convinced" of error standard);
Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 189 F.2d 130, 134 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951) (same).
596. See, ag., Harris v. Hercules, Inc., 455 F.2d 267, 269 (8th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam); Walker Transp. Co. v. Neylon, 396 F.2d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 1968); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484, 490 (8th Cir. 1965); Book-
walter v. Phelps, 325 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1963); Southern Farm Bureau Cas-
ualty Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485, 496 (8th Cir. 1963); Billings v.
Investment Trust, 309 F.2d 681, 685 (8th Cir. 1962); Phoenix Assurance Co. v.
City of Buckner, 305 F.2d 54, 57 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962);
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Mann, 304 F.2d 166, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); Burkhardt v. Bates, 296 F.2d 315, 316 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam);
Sloan v. Tarlton, 285 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1961); Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384,
391 (8th Cir. 1960); Knight v. Cameron Joyce & Co., 252 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir.
1958); Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 1958); Citizens Ins. Co. v.
Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1955); Riteway Carriers, Inc. v. Stuyve-
sant Ins. Co., 213 F.2d 576, 578 (8th Cir. 1954); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Sul-
livan, 210 F.2d 36, 43 (8th Cir. 1954); Ortman v. Smith, 198 F.2d 123, 127 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Cole-
man, 186 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1951).
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conclusions of the lower court on doubtful questions597 or that
it would not try to "outpredict, outforecast or outguess" the dis-
trict court. 98 At least two decisions added that the appellate
court would not overrule the district court "except for cogent
and convincing reasons."5 99
In a handful of pre-Luke cases, the court used terms more
common in other circuits, speaking of affording "great
weight"60 0 or "great deference," 601 or stating that the court
would "defer" 602 to lower court rulings. Panels also stated that
they would "heavily rely upon the considered appraisal" of the
lower court judge60 3 or act with a "hesitancy to reverse" the
district judge's rulings.60 4
597. See, e.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Graham, 301 F.2d 439,
441 (8th Cir. 1962); Central Elec. & Gas Co. v. City of Stromsburg, 289 F.2d
217, 220 (8th Cir. 1961); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167, 170
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 217
F.2d 10, 13 (8th Cir. 1954); Guyer v. Elger, 216 F.2d 537, 540 (8th Cir. 1954),
cert denied, 348 U.S. 929 (1955); Michealson v. Elliott, 209 F.2d 625, 626 (8th
Cir. 1954); Kimble v. Willey, 204 F.2d 238, 243 (8th Cir. 1953); Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232, 241 (8th Cir.), cert denied,
343 U.S. 965 (1952); Stoll v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 185 F.2d 96, 99 (8th Cir.
1950); Nelson v. Westland Oil Co., 181 F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1950); Pender-
grass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 141 (8th Cir. 1950); Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 177 F.2d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 1949).
598. See, e.g., Miller v. Concordia Teachers College, 296 F.2d 100, 106-07
(8th Cir. 1961); Textron, Inc. v. Homes Beautiful, Inc., 261 F.2d 646, 651 (8th
Cir. 1958); Stockdale v. Olson, 261 F.2d 191, 196-97 (8th Cir. 1958); United
States v. R.D. Wilmans & Sons, 251 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir. 1958); Homolla v.
Gluck, 248 F.2d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 1957); see also, eg., MacDonald Eng'g Co. v.
Hover, 290 F.2d 301, 307 (8th Cir. 1961) (using "outpredict or outforecast"
language).
599. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pioneer Valley Say. Bank, 343 F.2d
634, 644 (8th Cir. 1965); Mast v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 176 F.2d 157, 163 (8th Cir.
1949).
600. See, eg., Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 1967); S
& L Co. v. Wood, 323 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir. 1963); Anthony v. Louisiana &
Ark. Ry., 316 F.2d 858, 863 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963); Mac-
Donald Eng'g Co. v. Hover, 290 F.2d 301, 307 (8th Cir. 1961); Scullen v.
Braunberger, 225 F.2d 10, 14 (8th Cir. 1955); Franck v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.,
203 F.2d 473, 477 (8th Cir. 1953); Northern Liquid Gas Co. v. Hildreth, 180 F.2d
330, 336 (8th Cir. 1950).
601. See, eg., Cousin v. Cousin, 192 F.2d 377, 387 (8th Cir. 1951).
602. See, eg., Nordin v. May, 208 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1953); Standard
Brands, Inc. v. Bateman, 184 F.2d 1002, 1111 (8th Cir. 1950), cerL denied, 340
U.S. 942 (1951).
603. Hope Flooring & Lumber Co. v. BQulden, 227 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir.
1955); Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744, 747 (8th Cir. 1954).
604. United States v. Fahrenkamp, 312 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1963).
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In its 1973 Luke decision,60 5 however, the Eighth Circuit
struck out in a new direction.606 The court held that an appel-
late panel "cannot be irrevocably bound by a district judge's
choice of... rules to follow in a diversity case. To hold other-
wise would be to abdicate our appellate responsibility. '60 7 In a
lengthy footnote, the court denounced the "permissible conclu-
sion" standard and sought to clarify how the Eighth Circuit
should approach the rule of deference in the future:
We feel future adherence to the principle set forth by the Fifth Cir-
cuit more adequately reflects a court of appeals' proper course of re-
view: "We give great weight to the view of the state law taken by the
district judge experienced in the law of that state, although of course
the parties are entitled to review by us of the trial court's determina-
tion of state law just as they are of any other legal question in a
case."
608
Since Luke, the court's expressions of the rule of deference
have changed, generally suggesting that the court now affords
less deference to district court rulings. The result of this
changed approach is predictable. Since Luke, rule of deference
reversals in state law cases appear to have increased substan-
tially.609 The "permissible conclusion" language no longer ap-
pears in the cases, and only aberrational decisions speak of
"clear error" as the governing standard.610 After Luke, the
"great weight" standard taken from the Luke footnote611 is the
language the courts most often use.6 12 In other cases, the court
605. Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1972),
aff'd en banc, 476 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
606. See Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082,
1083 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that in Luke "the rule was changed").
607. Luke, 476 F.2d at 1019-20.
608. Id at 1019 n.6 (quoting Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459,
466 (5th Cir. 1967)).
609. A rough, but plausible, estimate, based solely on the cases identified in
this study, is that the cases in which a circuit panel overturned a state law rul-
ing have tripled, from approximately six percent of the cases prior to Luke to
approximately 20% after Luke.
610. See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel,
Inc., 767 F.2d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1985); Crocker Nat'l Bank, Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696, 700 (8th Cir. 1984); Rodeway
Inns of Am., Inc. v. Frank, 541 F.2d 759, 767 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 945 (1977).
611. Luke, 476 F.2d at 1019 n.6.
612. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 860 F.2d
847, 853 n.13 (8th Cir. 1988); Thompkins v. Stuttgart School Dist. No. 22, 858
F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988); id. at 1324 (Heaney, J., dissenting); Frensley v.
National Fire Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 1199, 1202 (8th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Sun Carri-
ers, Inc., 856 F.2d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1988); McMichael v. United States, 856
F.2d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1988); Gleason v. Avon Prods., Inc., 850 F.2d 413, 416
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notes merely that the district court's state law rulings are enti-
tled to "deference." 613 Other Eighth Circuit cases contain vari-
(8th Cir. 1988); Freeze v. American Home Prods. Corp., 839 F.2d 415, 417 (8th
Cir. 1988); Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Eng'g Co., 813 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir.
1987); Camp v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 787 F.2d 1258,1260-61 (8th
Cir. 1986); Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 413
(8th Cir. 1985); Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 920 (8th Cir.
1985); Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc., 773 F.2d 960, 972 (8th
Cir. 1985); Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.
1985); Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 757 F.2d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267
(8th Cir. 1984); Nenmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1197 (8th Cir.
1983); O'Brien v. Heggen, 705 F.2d 1001, 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); R. W. Murray Co.
v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1983); Bergstrom v.
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 687 F.2d 1250, 1255 (8th Cir. 1982); Sperry Corp. v.
City of Minneapolis, 680 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir. 1982); Zrust v. Spencer
Foods, Inc., 667 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1982); Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288,
1290 (8th Cir. 1981); Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518,
523 (8th Cir. 1980); Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1980);
Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1299 (8th Cir. 1980); Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Sheppard, 610 F.2d 551, 554 (8th Cir. 1979); Wyatt v. United States, 610
F.2d 545, 546 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life
Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); American Motorists Ins.
Co. v. Samson, 596 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1979); McPherson. v. Sunset Speed-
way, Inc., 594 F.2d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 1979); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City
Gravel Co., 592 F.2d 455, 458 n.3 (8th Cir. 1979); Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577
F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978); Luster v. Retail Credit Co., 575 F.2d 609, 614 (8th
Cir. 1978); Green v. American Broadcasting Cos., 572 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.
1978); Lide v. Carothers, 570 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir. 1978); Merchants Mut.
Bonding Co. v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 1977); James-
town Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285, 1294 (8th Cir.
1977); Aguilar v. Flores, 549 F.2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 1977); Lincoln Carpet
Mills, Inc. v. Singer Co., 549 F.2d 80, 82 (8th Cir. 1977); Northwestern Nat'l
Bank v. American Beef Packers Inc. (In re American Beef Packers, Inc.), 548
F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1977); Gatzmeyer v. Vogel, 544 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir.
1976); Lienemann v. State Farm Mut. Auto Fire & Casualty Co., 540 F.2d 333,
342 (8th Cir. 1976); Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507, 510 (8th Cir.
1975); Koppinger v. Cullen-Schiltz & Assocs., 513 F.2d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 1975);
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1083 (8th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Halvorsen v. Dunlap, 495 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1974);
Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192, 194 (8th
Cir. 1974); Continental Grain Co. v. Fegles Constr. Co., 480 F.2d 793, 796 (8th
Cir. 1973).
613. See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817, 823 (8th Cir.
1988); Bridgman v. Cornwell Quality Tools Co., 831 F.2d 174, 175 (8th Cir.
1987) (per curiam); Prestidge v. Prestidge, 810 F.2d 159, 161 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987);
King v. Nashua Corp., 763 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1985); Leslie v. Bolen, 762
F.2d 663, 664 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 272 (8th Cir. 1985); Hilt Truck Lines v. Riggins, 756
F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1985); W.B. Farms v. Fremont Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
756 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Speco, Inc., 750 F.2d 51, 53 (8th Cir.
1984); Slaaten v. Cliff's Drilling Co., 748 F.2d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam); Hockett v. Larson, 742 F.2d 1123, 1125 (8th Cir. 1984); Hickman v.
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ous phrases of similar import: "substantial weight;"6 14
"substantial deference;" 6 15 "great deference;" 616 "considerable
deference;"6 17 or "special weight,"618 a term used in the body of
Electronic Keyboarding, Inc., 741 F.2d 230, 232 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 739 F.2d 340, 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Tharason v.
Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 F.2d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 1984); Executive Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Garrison, 722 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Hollman v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1983); Stratioti v. Bick, 704 F.2d
1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1983); Glover v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 947,
949 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); In re Schwen's, Inc., 693 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir.
1982) (per curiam); Ancom, Inc. v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d 650, 654
(8th Cir. 1981); Jump v. Goldenhersh, 619 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir. 1980); Schuster
v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1979); Dakota
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 554 F.2d 345, 354 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1979); Riske v. Truck Ins. Exch., 541 F.2d 768,
771 (8th Cir. 1976); Bassler v. Arrowwood, 500 F.2d 138, 142 n.7 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert denied, 419 U.S. 1116 (1975).
614. See Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1987); Gold'n
Plump Poultry, Inc. v. Simmons Eng'g Co., 805 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1986);
Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate & Ins., Inc., 755 F.2d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1985);
Grenz Super Valu v. Fix, 566 F.2d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
615. See Deupree v. Ilif, 860 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1988); Besta v. Beneficial
Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532, 533-34 (8th Cir. 1988); Imperial Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated
Crude Oil Co., 851 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir. 1988); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers
Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988); LaRo Corp. v. Big D Oil Co.,
824 F.2d 689, 690 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Nelson v. Platte Valley State
Bank & Trust Co., 805 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1986); Wild v. Farrell (In re
Wild), 795 F.2d 666, 668 (8th Cir. 1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Rock-Tenn Co., 787 F.2d 340, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); Union Nat'l Bank v. Farmers
Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1986); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d
1325, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985); Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d 494,
499 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985); Mason v. Ford Motor Co., 755
F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1985); Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d
1490, 1496 (8th Cir. 1984); Nelson v. Missouri Div. of Family Servs., 706 F.2d
276, 278 (8th Cir. 1983); Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir.
1982).
616. See Scott v. Jones, 862 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1988); Hendrickson v.
Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988); Rheuport v. Ferguson, 819 F.2d
1459, 1469 (8th Cir. 1987); Sterling v. Forney, 813 F.2d 191, 192 (8th Cir. 1987);
Stoetzel v. Continental Textile Corp. of Am., 768 F.2d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 1985);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 741 F.2d 1142, 1145
(8th Cir. 1984); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 707 F.2d
1002, 1003 (8th Cir. 1983); Kotval v. Gridley, 698 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1983);
Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Fin. Corp., 696 F.2d 66, 69 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982);
Howard v. Green, 555 F.2d 178, 182 (8th Cir. 1977); Blevins v. Commercial
Standard Ins. Cos., 544 F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1976); Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv.
Co., 534 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1976); Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 529
F.2d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 1976).
617. See Zenco Dev. Corp. v. City of Overland, 843 F.2d 1117, 1119 (8th Cir.
1988); Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986); Gary Bras-
well & Assocs., v. Piedmont Indus., 773 F.2d 987, 989 n.3 (8th Ci, 1985); Crew
v. Dorthy (In re O'Neill's Shannon Village), 750 F.2d 679, 681 (8th Cir. 1984).
618. See Anderson v. Employers Ins., 826 F.2d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1987); Ha-
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the Luke opinion.61 9
Despite Luke, the rule of deference continues to enjoy con-
siderable vigor in the Eighth Circuit. In particular, 1987 and
1988 cases suggest an aggressive application of the rule. Indica-
tive of the trend is the recurring statement that the court "will
overturn the district court's interpretations of [state] law only
if we find them 'fundamentally deficient in analysis, without a
reasonable basis, or contrary to a reported state-court opin-
ion."'620 Although the Eighth Circuit recently has used more
zen v. Pasley, 768 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1985); Kizzier Chevrolet Co. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 705 F.2d 322, 326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983);
Red Lobster Inns of Am., Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 656 F.2d 381, 387 n.7
(8th Cir. 1981); Bazzano v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir.
1978); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1976); Drotzmanns,
Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 1974); Owens v. Childrens
Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1973).
619. Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1972),
aff'd en banc, 746 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
620. Collum v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 840 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added) (quoting McCarthy Bros. Constr. Co. v. Pierce, 832 F.2d 463,
467 (8th Cir. 1987)); accord Zenco Dev. Corp. v. City of Overland, 843 F.2d
1117, 1119 (8th Cir. 1988); Pony Express Cab & Bus, Inc. v. Ward, 841 F.2d 207,
209 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); McCarthy Bros. Constr. Co. v. Pierce, 832 F.2d
463, 467 (8th Cir. 1987); Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 827
F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast,
Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988) (using "fundamentally deficient in analy-
sis or otherwise lacking in reasoned authority" standard); Sparks v. Shelter
Life Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Pershern v. Fiatallis N.
Am., Inc., 834 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v.
Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 171 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Fiedler
v. Reliance Elec. Co., 823 F.2d 269, 270 n.1 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Perkins v.
Clark Equip. Co., Melrose Div., 823 F.2d 207, 208 (8th Cir. 1987); Barber-
Greene Co. v. National City Bank, 816 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1987) (same);
Sterling v. Forney, 813 F.2d 191, 192 (8th Cir. 1987) (same).
Consider also Judge Arnold's dissent in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856
F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988):
The panel's almost casual rejection of the District Court's view of
Arkansas law also disturbs me. We normally defer to district judges'
interpretations of the law of their own states. My own attitude when
hearing appeals on such questions is roughly akin to the posture of
appellate judges when reviewing question of fact. That is, I am in-
clined to reverse on state-law questions only when the decision below
is clearly erroneous. Such a use of a question-of-fact standard is not
so strange as it may first appear. Questions of foreign law are tradi-
tionally treated as questions of fact. And, while the law of a state is
obviously not "foreign" to us in the same way as, say, the law of Af-
ghanistan, a judge of a federal appellate court whose legal upbringing
was in Arkansas cannot be expected to have the same instinctive feel
for the law of North Dakota as a judge of that State. One can look at
all the law books in print and still not have the same degree of relia-
ble judgment on legal questions as a lawyer who has lived and prac-
ticed for years in the jurisdiction. There is such a thing as what Dean
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typical post-Luke formulations of the rule,621 and has continued
on occasion to overturn state law rulings, 622 most recent cases
indicate that a district court ruling will stand if logically ex-
plained and reasonable in result.623
Pound called "law in action," as opposed to "law in the books." Each
State has its own distinct legal ethos which informs and qualifies how
lawyers and judges understand what is written in the law books. So
when we defer to the opinions of district courts on the law of their
states, we are not shirking our responsibilities. We are simply using
common sense.
Id at 56 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
621. See Phenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc.,
856 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (referring to "the degree of deference [rul-
ings] deserve"); Freeze v. American Home Prods. Corp., 839 F.2d 415, 417 (8th
Cir. 1988) (affording "great weight"); Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d
817, 823 (8th Cir. 1988) (affording "deference"); National Corp. for Hous. Part-
nership v. Liberty State Bank, 836 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1988) (affording "sub-
stantial deference"); Goellner v. Butler, 836 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir- 1988)
(affording "great weight"); Stevens v. Pike County Bank (In re Stevens), 829
F.2d 693, 695 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (distinguishing "deference" from de
novo review); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 828 F.2d
465, 473 (8th Cir. 1987) (affording "substantial deference"); Anderson v. Em-
ployers Ins., 826 F.2d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1987) (affording "special weight");
Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Eng'g Co., 813 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1987) (af-
fording "great weight").
622. See Drovers Bank v. National Bank & Trust Co., 829 F.2d 20, 23 (8th
Cir. 1987) (stating that court will "usually defer"); Norwest Capital Manage-
ment & Trust Co. v. United States, 828 F.2d 1330, 1344 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing
to uphold district court because ruling "overlooks the overwhelming case
law"); Benedictine Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 815 F.2d :1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting "substantial deference" stan-
dard, but reversing); Prestidge v. Prestidge, 810 F.2d 159, 161 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987)
(noting "generally defer" standard, but reversing because "our study of the
precedents leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that the District
Court was mistaken"); see aso Chandler v. Presiding Judge, Callaway County,
838 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that court is "not bound by [district
court] interpretation, and 'must reverse if we find that the district court has
not correctly applied local law' ").
623. See Brown v. First Nat'! Bank, 844 F.2d 580, 581 (8th Cir.) (noting
court's "normal practice of deferring"), cert dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 20 (1988);
Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating
that court "accords great deference.. . and we have no adequate reason to re-
ject [the district court's] judgment"); Bridgman v. Cornwell Quality Tools Co.,
831 F.2d 174, 175 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (rejecting statutory interpreta-
tion that "is not... impossible" because "district judge's conclusion... is en-
tirely reasonable"); LaRo Corp. v. Big D Oil Co., 824 F.2d 689, 690 (8th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (affirming where court can "find no [state] authority which
suggests that the [district] court's instruction is in error"); Barta v. Crow, 823
F.2d 251, 253 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that "we normally defer...
and we follow that practice here"); Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 818 F.2d 1405,
1410 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that "because there is no reported [state] deci-
sion casting doubt on the Court's view, we defer"); Hegg v. United States, 817
F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that task is "not to adopt the construc-
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A few Eighth Circuit decisions suggest that the rule may
be more important in some cases than in others. In a recent
case, the court noted that the "court accords substantial defer-
ence to the district court's interpretation of state law, particu-
larly 'when considering a state statute not yet construed by the
state court."'- 624 Applying the rule in other cases, the court has
highlighted the experience of the district court judge,6 25 the
judge's prior service as a justice of the state supreme court,6 26
the "painstaking consideration" given the case by the district
court,6 27 and even the fact that the trial judge "had the benefit
of the parties' briefs."628
The Eighth Circuit has issued other noteworthy decisions
applying the rule of deference. The court has held, for exam-
ple, that the rule is applicable to decisions by United States
magistrates6 29 and in cases decided first by bankruptcy
courts.630 In at least two cases, the court has emphasized that
the appellant could have litigated the case in state court,631 not-
ing that if the appellant had "desired a definitive ruling," she
should have brought the action in a state court and appealed to
the state supreme court.6 32 Another interesting application of
tion we think most reasonable, but'simply to review the district court's deter-
mination"); see also Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 F.2d 1108, 1111 (8th
Cir. 1984) (stating that "we will defer to a reasonable interpretation"); c f
Thompkins v. Stuttgart School Dist. No. 22, 858 F.2d 1317, 1324 n.2 (8th Cir.
1988) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (stating concern "that the majority while giving
lip service to [the 'great weight'] standard, here, in effect, is going back to the
['permissible conclusion'] standard rejected by this Court en banc in Luke").
624. National Corp. for Hous. Partnership v. Liberty State Bank, 836 F.2d
433, 436 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting G.A. Imports, Inc. v. Subaru Mid-America,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1200, 1205 (8th Cir. 1986)).
625. See, eg., H. K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp. of Am., 367 F.2d 653, 663
(8th Cir. 1966); Wolters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 296 F.2d 140, 141 (8th
Cir. 1961); Homolla v. Gluck, 248 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 1957).
626. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Bateman, 184 F.2d 1002, 1011 (8th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 942 (1951).
627. Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir. 1950).
628. Manning v. Jones, 349 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1965).
629. See Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate & Ins., Inc., 755 F.2d 135, 137 (8th
Cir. 1985).
630. See id.; Grenz Super Valu v. Fix, 566 F.2d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); see also Stevens v. Pike County Bank (In re Stevens), 829 F.2d 693,
696 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Arnold, J., concurring) (stating that "defer-
ence is enhanced by the fact that the Bankruptcy Court reached the same con-
clusion as the District Court").
631. See Citizens Ins. Co. v. Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1955);
Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett, 221 F.2d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1955).
632. Citizens Ins., 226 F.2d at 643; Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 221 F.2d at
697.
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the rule surfaced in Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing
Co.,6 33 in which then-Judge Blackmun, for the court, wrote that
deference to a ruling of a district court judge assigned outside
his home state was appropriate.634 More recent cases seem to
reject this approach, however, by referring to the deference due
local judges. 636 "
Particularly since Luke, the Eighth Circuit has stated that
it is not bound by the lower court rulings and is free to reverse
if its review shows that the lower court applied local law incor-
rectly.636 The court often has said that it will not apply the
rule of deference to a state law ruling that is "fundamentally
deficient in analysis or otherwise lacking in reasoned author-
ity."6 37  In In re O'Neill's Shannon Village,638 the court
633. 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961).
634. 1d. at 288-89; accord St. Paul Hosp. & Casualty Co. v. Helsby, 304 F.2d
758, 759 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
635. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Heggen, 705 F.2d 10O1, 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); Berg-
strom v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 687 F.2d 1250, 1255 (8th Cir. 1982); Sperry
Corp. v. City of Minneapolis, 680 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir. 1982); Hunter v.
United States, 624 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1980); Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor
Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); McPherson v. Sun-
set Speedway, Inc., 594 F.2d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 1979); Bergstreser v. Mitchell,
577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978); Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. American Beef
Packers, Inc. (In re American Beef Packers, Inc.), 548 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir.
1977); Lienemann v. State Farm Mut. Auto Fire & Casualty Co., 540 F.2d 333,
342 (8th Cir. 1976); Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507, 510 (8th Cir.
1975); H. K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp. of Am., 367 F.2d 653, 663 (8th Cir.
1966); Manning v. Jones, 349 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1965); Wash v. Western
Empire Life Ins. Co., 298 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1962).
636. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rock-Tenn Co., 787 F.2d
340, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); Hazen v. Pasley, 768 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1985); Kan-
sas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir. 1984); Executive
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Garrison, 722 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam);
Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1197 (8th Cir. 1983); Hollman v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1983); Stratioti v. Bick, 704
F.2d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1983); Kotval v. Gridley, 698 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir.
1983); Red Lobster Inns of Am., Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 656 F.2d 381,
387 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981); Bazzano v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 465, 469 (8th
Cir. 1978).
637. Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1987); accord
Bridgman v. Cornwell Quality Tools Co., 831 F.2d 174, 175 (8th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam); Sterling v. Forney, 813 F.2d 191, 192 (8th Cir. 1987); Prestidge v. Pres-
tidge, 810 F.2d 159, 161 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987); Nelson v. Platte Valley State Bank
& Trust Co., 805 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1986); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
777 F.2d 1325, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985); Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin
Power, Inc., 773 F.2d 960, 972 (8th Cir. 1985); W.B. Farms v. Fremont Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 765 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1985); Leslie v. Bolen, 762 F.2d
663, 664 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761
F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985); Slaaten v. Cliff's
Drilling Co., 748 F.2d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Kansas City
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explained:
In this case,... we believe that deference to the District Court's
reading of state law is inappropriate. We reach this conclusion for
several reasons. First, there do not appear to be any decisions from
the state courts of South Dakota addressing the issue of whether a
valid security interest can be created in a liquor license. Second, the
District Court's opinion is contrary to most of the cases decided since
the enactment of the UCC by the various states; these cases appear to
have been overlooked. Third, the District Court's opinion does not
contain any reference to the UCC, nor does it indicate that the possi-
ble effect of the UCC was examined. Finally, we believe that the Dis-
trict Court's reliance on [an earlier district court decision] was
misplaced. For these reasons, we decline to defer to the District
Court's determination of the controlling question of South Dakota
law. Instead, we make our own determination of what we believe the
Supreme Court of South Dakota would hold if presented with the
question now before us.
639
Indeed, even before Luke the court noted that it could reverse
if convinced that the state law was other than what the district
court had held.640 In a more recent case, the Eighth Circuit
said that it "must independently assess the basis for [the dis-
trict court's] interpretation."64'
The circuit has recognized exceptions to the rule of defer-
ence.642 In keeping with its view of state law decisions "funda-
mentally deficient in analysis or otherwise lacking in reasoned
authority,"643 the Eighth Circuit did not defer where the "dis-
trict court gave no reason whatsoever for its conclusion."6 44
Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 707 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th Cir. 1983);
Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351, 353 (8th Cir. 1983);
R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1983);
Sperry Corp. v. City of Minneapolis, 680 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir. 1982);
Ancom, Inc. v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 658 F.2d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1981).
638. 750 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1984).
639. Id. at 681; see also Russell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 303 F.2d
674, 680 (8th Cir. 1962) (stating that while "reluctant to interfere... we are
persuaded on the facts presented and the teachings of the Supreme Court of
the United States, the courts of many jurisdictions and the other authorities
above referred to, that the order of dismissal was erroneous").
640. Russell, 303 F.2d at 680; Scullen v. Braunberger, 225 F.2d 10, 14 (8th
Cir. 1955); Nelson v. Westland Oil Co., 181 F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1950).
641. Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986).
642. See Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 189 F.2d 130, 134
(8th Cir.) (noting that rule is "rationally and flexibly administered"), cert de-
nied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951).
643. See Parkerson, 782 F.2d at 1451; supra note 637 and accompanying
text.
644. Dakota Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 554
F.2d 345, 354 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977). This holding also
comports with the Eighth Circuit's frequent statement that it will defer to the
"considered views" of the local district court on state law. See, e.g., Weiby v.
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The court also has said that deference is inappropriate when a
district court's state law ruling is based on an opinion that is
not a "clear and persuasive indication" that a state supreme
court has overruled its earlier holdings.6 5 Finally, the Eighth
Circuit has held that less deference is due to a decision made in
the heat of trial than a ruling made in a studied fashion.646
NINTH CIRCUIT
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that expressly has re-
jected the rule of deference. In the 1984 case, In re McLinn,647
a 6-5 majority of the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc overruled all
earlier cases recognizing the rule of deference. The court
adopted de novo review as the governing standard for appeals
involving state law.68
Prior to McLinn, the Ninth Circuit had issued at least 115
decisions referring in some fashion to the rule of deference. In
most of those cases, the court said it would not reverse district
court rulings on state law unless "clearly wrong"649 or "clearly
erroneous."650 In other cases, Ninth Circuit panels used less
deferential terminology, according state law rulings "substan-
tial deference, '651 "great weight," 652 or merely "deference. 653
Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1960); W. Hodgman &
Sons, Inc. v. Motis, 268 F.2d 82, 86 (8th Cir. 1959) (quoting National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 933
(1952)); Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1957).
645. Aguilar v. Flores, 549 F.2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940)).
646. Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1985).
647. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
648. Id. at 1403.
649. See, ag., Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir.
1975); Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1969); Bower v.
Bower, 255 F.2d 618, 619 (9th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); see also Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Schwab, 739 F.2d 431, 433 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (referring to "clearly
wrong" as proper standard during pendency of rehearing in McLinn).
650. See, e.g., Knaefler v. Mack, 680 F.2d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1982); Salmon
River Canal Co. v. Bell Brand Ranches, Inc., 564 F.2d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330
F.2d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 832 U.S. 54 (1965).
651. See, e-g., City of S. Pasadena v. Goldschmidt, 637 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir.
1981); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449
U.S. 869 (1980); Hunt v. Sun Valley Co., 561 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); United States v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 524 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1975).
652. See, eg., United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 1001 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979);
Ford v. International Harvester Co., 399 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1968); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 372 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1967); Ed-
wards v. American Home Assurance Co., 361 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1966).
653. See, ag, Vu v. Singer Co., 706 F.2d 1027, 1030 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert de-
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In one noteworthy case, the court endorsed "clearly wrong" re-
view, but said that "less deference" was warranted when two
members of the appellate panel came from the same state as
the district court judge.6 54
In some state law cases prior to 1984, the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to apply the rule of deference at all. The court did not
defer, for example, to the rulings of a district court judge sit-
ting by designation outside his home state.655 The court also
did not defer to the decision of a resident judge applying the
law of a different state pursuant to governing choice of law
rules.655 In Lara & Zager v. Lara,657 the court chose not to de-
fer to the district court's decision because state law changed af-
ter the district court had ruled.658 The Ninth Circuit also did
not defer to a district court's ruling when a separate federal
bankruptcy judge, "equally versed in state law," earlier had
reached the opposite conclusion on the same state law ques-
tion.6 5 9 Finally, some Ninth Circuit decisions state that little or
no deference is warranted if the district court "relies on state
law which offers only general guidance."660
McLinn swept aside these expressions of and exceptions to
the rule of deference. Since 1984, the Ninth Circuit has reaf-
firmed on several occasions the propriety of reviewing state law
questions de novo, citing McLinn.6 6'
nied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); Kovacs v. Sun Valley Co., 499 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Klingebiel v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 494 F.2d 345,
347 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 656 F.2d 418, 421, 422
(9th Cir. 1981) (noting "deference" standard but not applying it).
654. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kase, 718 F.2d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1983).
655. See Yamaguchi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 706 F.2d 940, 946 n.5
(9th Cir. 1983).
656. See Henry Hope X-Ray Prods., Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d
1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1982).
657. 731 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir. 1984).
658. Id. at 1458.
659. Anderson Land Co. v. Small Business Admin. (In re Big River Grain,
Inc.), 718 F.2d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
660. McKesson Drug Co. v. Marcus (In re Mistura, Inc.), 705 F.2d 1496,
1497-98 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1983); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Howard, 679 F.2d 147,
150 (9th Cir. 1982); see Bank of Cal. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981).
661. See, e.g., S & R Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 859 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir.
1988); Doggett v. United States, 858 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1988); Torres v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 857 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn
and superseded by 867 F.2d 1234; Manzanita Park, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N.
A., 857 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1988); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Jenner,
856 F.2d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988); Bulgo v. Munoz, 853 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir.
1988); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir.
1988); Hutchinson v. United States, 841 F.2d 966, 967 (9th Cir. 1988); City of
Angoon v. Hodel, 836 F.2d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1988); Nevada VTN v. General
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Nevertheless, one exception to the de novo standard of re-
view initially appeared to survive McLinn. In Gumataotao v.
Government of Guam,662 the Ninth Circuit held that "decisions
of local courts of United States territories on matters of purely
local law will not be reversed unless clear and manifest error is
shown."663 Prior to McLinn, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all rul-
ings on territorial law originating in Guam, including those in
which the district court sat as a trial court of first instance, if
"based upon a tenable theory and.., not manifestly errone-
ous."664 Early post-McLinn cases suggested that deference to
the District Court of Guam did survive McLinn to some ex-
tent.66 5 In these cases, the Ninth Circuit indicated that at least
when the District Court of Guam was acting as a territorial ap-
pellate court, deferential review remained appropriate.66 6 The
court suggested that this result was proper for the same reason
that federal appeals courts defer to a state court's interpreta-
tion of state law667 and because the three-member Appellate
Division of the District Court could engage in the "collabora-
tive, deliberative process of appellate courts. '668
In 1988, however, People v. Yang 669 created another change
in Ninth Circuit law. The three-judge Appellate Division of the
District Court of Guam affirmed the defendant's conviction in
the Superior Court of Guam. Asserting error in the application
of territorial law, the defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
which agreed to consider en banc "the appropriate standard of
review for interpretations of Guam law made by the Appellate
Ins. Co. of Am., 834 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1987); Sax v. World Wide Press, Inc.,
809 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1987); Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 1423
(9th Cir. 1986); Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 695 n.1 (9th Cir.
1984); see also Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 644-45 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying de novo review to preliminary injunction order). But cf First
Idaho Corp. v. Davis, 867 F.2d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating "[this court
gives great weight to a district court's determination of state law but reviews
the decision as any other issue of law" and citing 1978 pre-McLinn authority).
662. 322 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963).
663. Id- at 582.
664. Laguana v. Guam Visitors Bureau, 725 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1984); see
also Schenck v. Government of Guam, 609 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1979) (up-
holding decision based on tenable theory).
665. Aguon v. Calvo, 829 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 818 F.2d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 1987); Hair v. Pangilinan, 816 F.2d 1341,
1342 (9th Cir. 1987); Electrical Constr. & Maintenance Co. v. Maeda Pac. Corp.,
764 F.2d 619, 620 (9th Cir. 1985).
666. See, eg., Aguon, 829 F.2d at 847.
667. See Maeda Pacific, 764 F.2d at 620 n.1.
668. Brown, 818 F.2d at 708.
669. 850 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
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Division. 6 70 The en banc court found appropriate the "adop-
tion of a strict de novo standard of review."67 ' In doing so, the
court relied heavily on McLinn.6 7 2
Yang thus clarified what standard of review applies to ap-
peals taken from territorial multi-judge appellate division deci-
sions. Yang does not necessarily dictate, however, the standard
of review that will apply to decisions by a single judge district
court. Because of the peculiar territorial judicial structure, two
of the three appellate division judges may not be from the local
district at all. The Ninth Circuit specifically relied on this fact
in declining to afford deference to the Appellate Division deci-
sion in Yang.6 73 Whether the Ninth Circuit would distinguish,
and afford deference in, appeals from a decision by a single dis-
trict court judge, who in fact resides in Guam, thus remains an
open question.
The Yang opinion provides room to argue for deference to
territorial law rulings by a district court judge, particularly be-
cause the Ninth Circuit did not disparage the First Circuit's
practice of deferring to local district court interpretations of
Puerto Rican law.6 7 4 The Ninth Circuit, however, might distin-
guish the two territories on the basis that "Puerto Rico has an
independent judicial system with a body of 'state' law deter-
mined by its own appellate and supreme courts,"67 5 whereas
Guam does not. In the end, resolution of this question should
depend on studied application of the considerations developed
in this Article, together with the informed sense of Ninth Cir-
cuit judges as to the relative abilities of district court judges
and circuit court panels as finders of local law in this special
context.
TENTH CIRCUIT
The Tenth Circuit has applied the rule of deference often
and in the strongest terms. This study uncovered 141 cases in
the circuit applying some version of the rule.
In more than half of these cases the court refused to over-
turn state law rulings of district courts unless the ruling was
670. lI at 510.
671. ri
672. rd-
673. Id
674. i at 510 n.7; see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
675. Yang, 850 F.2d at 510 n.7.
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"clear error,"67 6 "clearly erroneous, '677 or "clearly wrong,"678
676. See, e.g., Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 614 F.2d 720, 722
(10th Cir. 1980); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359
(10th Cir. 1971); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); see also
Wilke v. Winters (In re Winters), 586 F.2d 1363, 1366 (10th Cir. 1978) (stating
"demonstrably in error" standard); Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 453 F.2d
1192, 1195 (10th Cir. 1971) (stating "clearly in error" standard), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 958 (1972).
677. See, e.g., Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.
1987); Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); Mullan v.
Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th Cir. 1986); Herndon v. Seven
Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466
U.S. 958 (1984); King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983);
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982); Obieli v. Campbell
Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1980); Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
547 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 136 (10th
Cir. 1975); Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 501 F.2d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir.
1974); Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839, 844 (10th Cir. 1973); Gabaldon
v. Westland Dev. Co., 485 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1973); Wells v. Colorado Col-
lege, 478 F.2d 158, 161 (10th Cir. 1973); Binkley v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.,
471 F.2d 889, 891 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973); Wyoming Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 990, 993 (10th
Cir. 1972); Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1971);
Traders State Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 280, 282 (10th Cir. 1971);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 447 F.2d 635, 638 (10th Cir. 1971); Mc-
Connico v. Privett (In -re Privett), 435 F.2d 261, 262 (10th Cir. 1970); Machinery
Center, Inc. v. Anchor Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 434 F.2d 1, 7 (10th Cir. 1970); Nevin
v. Hoffman, 431 F.2d 43, 46 (10th Cir. 1970); Freeman v. Heiman, 426 F.2d 1050,
1053 (10th Cir. 1970); Kasishke v. United States, 426 F.2d 429, 435 (10th Cir.
1970); Teague v. Grand River Dam Auth., 425 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir. 1970);
Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 104 (10th Cir. 1970); Equitable
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allied Steel Constr. Co., 421 F.2d 512, 514 (10th Cir.
1970); Independent School Dist. 93 v. Western Sur. Co., 419 F.2d 78, 82 (10th
Cir. 1969); Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank v. Hartmeister, 411 F.2d 173, 176 (10th
Cir. 1969); Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. Levy, 382 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th
Cir. 1967); Smith v. Greyhound Lines, 382 F.2d 190, 192 (10th Cir. 1967); Scott
v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 126 (10th Cir. 1967); First Sec. Bank v. Crouse, 374
F.2d 17, 20 (10th Cir. 1967); Bushman Constr. Co. v. Conner, 351 F.2d 681, 684
(10th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Bledsoe v. United States, 349
F.2d 605, 606 (10th Cir. 1965); Loye v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 341
F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1965); McCallister v. M-A-C Fin. Co., 332 F.2d 633, 636
(10th Cir. 1964); Bartch v. United States, 330 F.2d 466, 467 (10th Cir. 1964);
Kirby v. United States, 329 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1964); Missouri Pac. R.R. v:
American Refrigerator Transit Co., 328 F.2d 569, 569 (10th Cir. 1964); Mitton v.
Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 196 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1952).
678. See, eg., Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1978);
Vallejos v. C. E. Glass Co., 583 F.2d 507, 512 (10th Cir. 1978); Chafin v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 550 F.2d 575, 577 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Sloan v. Peabody Coal
Co., 547 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Whitfield v. Gangas, 507
F.2d 880, 883 (10th Cir. 1974); American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Romero, 428 F.2d 870,
874 (10th Cir. 1970); In re Lehner, 427 F.2d 357, 358 (10th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam); In re Cummings, 413 F.2d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1969), ce t denied, 397
U.S. 915 (1970); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351,
354 (10th Cir. 1968); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 243 (10th Cir. 1968);
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or unless the appellate panel was "clearly convinced to the con-
trary."6 79 A recent case flatly stated that "[i]n reviewing the in-
terpretation and application of state law by a resident federal
judge sitting in a diversity action, we are governed by the
clearly erroneous standard. ' 680 The panel added that "[u]nder
the clearly erroneous standard, reversal is required only if our
review of the record leaves us with a definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been made. ' 68 1 In at least three cases
employing the "clearly erroneous" test, moreover, concurring
judges have pointedly but unsuccessfully criticized the applica-
tion of such sweeping deference. 68 2
Other cases use terminology similarly highlighting the
Tenth Circuit's highly deferential approach. Some cases speak
of the "extraordinary force"6 83 or "extraordinary persuasive
Industrial Indem. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 375 F.2d 183, 185 (0th Cir.
1967); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 347
F.2d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1965); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Foster, 346 F.2d
49, 51 (10th Cir. 1965); Pendergraft v. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine
Co., 342 F.2d 427,429 (10th Cir. 1965); Glenn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
341 F.2d 5, 9 (10th Cir. 1965); see also Denning v. Bolin Oil Co., 422 F.2d 55, 58
(10th Cir. 1970) (stating "clearly wrong" standard).
679. See, ag., Sutton v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 448 F.2d 293, 297 (10th
Cir. 1971); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Russell, 402 F.2d 339, 344 n.14 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969); Adams v. Erickson, 394 F.2d 171,
173 (10th Cir. 1968); Stubblefield v. Johnson-Fagg, Inc., 379 F.2d, 270, 273 (10th
Cir. 1967); Jamaica Time Petroleum, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 366 F.2d 156, 159
(1oth Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1024 (1967); Cliborn v. Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 332 F.2d 645, 648 (1oth Cir. 1964); United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v.
Lembke, 328 F.2d 569, 572 (10th Cir. 1964); F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322
F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1963); Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 321 F.2d 468, 470
(10th Cir. 1963); Criqui v. Blaw-Knox Corp., 318 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 1963);
Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1962).
680. Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th Cir. 1986); ac-
cord Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 820 F.2d 338, 342
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 347 (1987); King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d
1313, 1315 (1oth Cir. 1983).
681. Mullan, 797 F.2d at 850. But cf. Binkley v. Manufacturers Life Ins.
Co., 471 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973) (Lewis, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "clearly erroneous" test should not be confused with
language of Rule 52, but instead should be "words of convenience... subject
to flexible application").
682. See Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 881 (10th Cir. 1986) (Sey-
mour, J., concurring); Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 256-57 (10th Cir.
1985) (Seymour, J., concurring); Binkley, 471 F.2d at 893 (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring).
683. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Business Credit v. American Bank of Commerce,
780 F.2d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1985); McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422,
1424 (10th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir.
1983); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 261, 264 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakke, 619 F.2d
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force"68 4 of district court state law rulings. Others say such rul-
ings are "persuasive and ordinarily accepted."685 The Tenth
Circuit has said that state law determinations are "presumed to
be correct"6 6 and that it will affirm if "the district court
merely reached a permissible conclusion." 6 7
In other cases the court has afforded "great deference," 688
"great weight, '68 9 "substantial weight,"690 "particular force,16 91
"some deference," 69? or "deference" 693 to the trial court's con-
885, 888 (10th Cir. 1980); Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569
(10th Cir. 1980); Lyles v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 614 F.2d 691, 694
(10th Cir. 1980); City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir.
1979); Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144,
1148 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); R. J. Enstrom Corp. v. Inter-
ceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277, 282 (10th Cir. 1977); Volis v. Puritan Life Ins. Co.,
548 F.2d 895, 901 (10th Cir. 1977); Joyce v. Davis, 539 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir.
1976).
684. See, e.g., Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 287 (10th Cir. 1977); DeBoer Con-
str. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 486, 492 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516
F.2d 33, 40 (10th Cir. 1975); Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir.
1975); Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68, 72 (10th Cir. 1974);
Smith v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 488 F.2d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1973);
Marken v. Goodall, 478 F.2d 1052, 1054 (10th Cir. 1973); Stafos v. Jarvis, 477
F.2d 369, 373 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 944 (1973); Hardberger & Smylie
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 444 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 1971); Hamblin
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 271 F.2d 562, 564 n.1 (10th Cir. 1959); see
also Port City State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196, 200 (10th Cir.
1973) (affording "extraordinary persuasive weight").
685. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson, 769 F.2d 1471, 1484
(10th Cir. 1985); Matthews v. IMC Mint Corp., 542 F.2d 544, 546 n.5 (10th Cir.
1976); Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1163 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Casper v. Neubert, 489 F.2d 543, 547
(10th Cir. 1973); Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25, 27 (10th Cir. 1973); Jor-
gensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir. 1973).
686. See, e.g., Symons v. Mueller Co., 493 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1974).
687. See, e.g., State Distribs., Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 738 F.2d 405,
415 (10th Cir. 1984).
688. See, e.g., Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th
Cir. 1985); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202,
204 (10th Cir. 1977).
689. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox (In re Cox), 543 F.2d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 1976);
Dell v. Heard, 532 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1976); Land v. Roper Corp., 531
F.2d 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1976); Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033,
1036 (10th Cir. 1975); Warde v. Davis, 494 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1974); Wes-
tric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307, 1313 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1973).
690. See, eg., Glenn Justice Mortage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567,
571 (10th Cir. 1979).
691. See, e.g., An-son Corp. v. Holland-America Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 700, 704
(10th Cir. 1985).
692. See, e.g., Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985); Co-
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clusions. The Tenth Circuit also sometimes has indicated that
it will "accept" 694 or "follow" 695 the district court's rulings or
that it finds such rulings "persuasive."6 96
In a few cases, the Tenth Circuit has expressed the rule of
deference in a more individualized fashion. In one case, for ex-
ample, the court stated that "[w]hile the question is not free
from doubt.., we are constrained to leave undisturbed an in-
terpretation... by an able [district judge] who from long expe-
rience is 'familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law
and practice.' "697 Another panel stated that "the trial judge,
having been a member of the [state] Bar and a practitioner, is
presumed to be in a superior position to predict" what the state
court would decide.698 The court also has noted the district
court judge's prior work as a state court judge699 and the lack of
panel members from the forum state.70° In a more unusual
case, the court said it could not substitute its judgment "for
that of the resident federal district judge who has given so
much of his time, conscience and effort to this on-going
case."701- The court has applied the rule in interpreting a state
statute, "particularly a statute pertaining to such local matters
lonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Panama-Williams, Inc., 597 F.2d 702, 704 (1Oth Cir. 1979).
693. See, eg., Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-
La Plata Water Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984); Auber-
tin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 588 F.2d 781, 785 (10th Cir. 1978); Moomey v.
Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 1970).
694. See, e.g., Fulton v. Coppco, Inc., 407 F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1969);
Gates v. Willford, 406 F.2d 890, 893 n.6 (10th Cir. 1969); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 403 F.2d 291, 336 (10th Cir. 1968); Foundation
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 388 F.2d 528, 531 n.4 (10th Cir. 1968); Employers
Mut. Casualty Co. v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 111, 115 (10th Cir. 1967); Sol-
omon v. Downtowner of Tulsa, Inc., 357 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1966); Coe v.
Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 348 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1964), cet denied, 382 U.S.
980 (1966); Robert Porter & Sons v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 324 F.2d
202, 205 (10th Cir. 1963).
695. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Sur. Co., 365
F.2d 412, 416 (10th Cir. 1966).
696. See, e.g., United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068
(10th Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); see also Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1232 (10th
Cir. 1971) (stating '"hghly persuasive" standard).
697. Cranford v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8, 10 (10th Cir.
1958).
698. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 783 (10th Cir. 1978).
699. See Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir.
1962).
700. See Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985).
701. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 400 (10th Cir. 1977).
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as guard rails on bridges and traffic control signals. '70 2 One
panel applying the rule noted that the appellant "chose to file
its case in federal court, and hence is in a somewhat awkward
position to now claim that the federal judge misunderstood
[state] law."70 3
The Tenth Circuit has applied the rule of deference in
cases raising a variety of legal questions. The court has cited
the rule in cases involving tort claims, including wrongful
death,70 4 products liability,70 5 personal injury,706 loss of consor-
tium,7 0 7 and tortious interference with a contractual relation-
ship.708 It also has applied the rule in cases involving contract
issues;70 9 breaches of warranty;710 fraud;711 bankruptcy;712 in-
702. Aubertin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 588 F.2d 781, 785 (10th Cir.
1978).
703. Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th
Cir. 1984).
704. E.g., Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); Fox
v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 783 (10th Cir. 1978); Sutton v. Anderson, Clay-
ton & Co., 448 F.2d 293, 297 (10th Cir. 1971); Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228,
1232 (10th Cir. 1971); Barteh v. United States, 330 F.2d 466, 467 (10th Cir.
1964).
705. See, e.g., Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425,
1429 (10th Cir. 1984); Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir.
1980); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 40
(10th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 488 F.2d 1345, 1349
(10th Cir. 1973); Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839, 844 (10th Cir. 1973);
Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
857 (1971).
706. See, e.g., Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th Cir.
1986); Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 287 (10th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Erickson, 394
F.2d 171, 173 (10th Cir. 1968); Stubblefield v. Johnson-Fagg, Inc., 379 F.2d 270,
273 (10th Cir. 1967); Coe v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 348 F.2d 1, 14 (10th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966); Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313
F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1962).
707. See, e.g., Criqui v. Blaw-Knox Corp., 318 F.2d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 1963).
708. See, e.g., Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985).
709. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson, 769 F.2d 1471, 1484
(10th Cir. 1985); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982);
Warde v. Davis, 494 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1974); Fulton v. Coppco, Inc., 407
F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1969); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. American Refrigerator
Transit Co., 328 F.2d 569, 569 (10th Cir. 1964); Robert Porter & Sons v. Na-
tional Distillers Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 202, 205 (10th Cir. 1963).
710. See, e.g., Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir.
1980); F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1963).
711. See, e.g., Matthews v. IMC Mint Corp., 542 F.2d 544, 546 (10th Cir.
1976); Denning v. Bolin Oil Co., 422 F.2d 55, 58 (10th Cir. 1970).
712. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox (In re Cox), 543 F.2d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 1976);
Stafos v. Jarvis (In re Stafos), 477 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 944 (1973); Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 126 (10th Cir. 1967); Savage v.
McNeany, 372 F.2d 199, 202 (10th Cir. 1967); Loye v. Denver United States
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surance;713 estate taxes; 714 property law, including eminent do-
main,715 landlord/tenant law,716 and actions to quiet title,717
corporate law;718 civil rights;719 workers compensation; 720 ap-
pealability;721 injunctive relief;72 2 and banking law.723 Applica-
tion of the rule has resolved important cases involving
recurring issues724 and the court has relied on the rule to re-
mand a state law issue to the trial judge rather than address it
Nat'l Bank, 341 F.2d 402, 405 (1oth Cir. 1965); Kirby v. United States, 329 F.2d
735, 737 (10th Cir. 1964).
713. See, e.g., Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th
Cir. 1985); Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakke, 619 F.2d 885, 888 (1oth
Cir. 1980); DeBoer Constr., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 486, 492 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 1972);
Hardberger & Smylie v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 444 F.2d 1318, 1320
(10th Cir. 1971); Equitable Fi-e & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allied Steel Constr. Co.,
421 F.2d 512, 514 (loth Cir. 1970); Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. MFA Mut.
Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 111, 115 (10th Cir. 1967); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 375 F.2d 183, 185 (1oth Cir. 1967).
714. See, ag., Estate of Selby v. United States, 726 F.2d 643, 645 (loth Cir.
1984); United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 138 (10th Cir. 1975); Kasishke v.
United States, 426 F.2d 429, 436 (10th Cir. 1970); Estate of Darby v. Wiseman,
323 F.2d 792, 795-96 (10th Cir. 1963).
715. See, e.g., W. S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 260 (10th
Cir. 1967), revid on other grounds, 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
716. See, e.g., Joyce v. Davis, 539 F.2d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 1976); Bledsoe v.
United States, 349 F.2d 605, 606 (10th Cir. 1965).
717. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 261, 264 (10th Cir.
1980), cea, denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-Mc-
Gee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (1oth Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 862
(1978).
718. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969).
719. See, e.g., Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985);
Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1978); Battle v. Ander-
son, 564 F.2d 388, 403 (1oth Cir. 1977).
720. See, e.g., Lyles v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 614 F.2d 691, 694
(10th Cir. 1980); Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541, 543 (10th
Cir. 1977); Cranford v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8, 10 (10th Cir.
1958).
721. See, e.g., Matthews v. IMC Mint Corp., 542 F.2d 544, 546 (l0th Cir.
1976).
722. See, e.g., Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156,
1163 (1oth Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
723. See, e.g., Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567,
571 (10th Cir. 1979); Port City State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d
196, 199 (10th Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 347 F.2d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1965).
724. See, e.g., Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 782-83 (10th Cir. 1978)
(deferring, in case involving crashworthiness doctrine, to district court
"whether Wyoming would follow the majority or minority doctrine"); Smith v.
Greyhound Lines, 382 F.2d 190, 192 (10th Cir. 1967) (deferring on issue of duty
of care owed by common carrier to passenger).
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in the first instance.725
Despite its strong expressions of the rule of deference, the
Tenth Circuit has recognized limits to the rule.726 One court,
affirming the district court, stated that the ruling of the lower
court must be "within the general authorities on the point."727
Moreover, in Estate of Darby v. Wiseman,728 the court said it
would accept the view of the district court judge only if "con-
vinced that it is right."729 The court then reversed because it
was "convinced that the trial judge was wrong."730 Such ambiv-
alent expressions of the rule of deference are, however, rare in
the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit also has recognized exceptions to the
rule. In at least two cases, the court has refused to defer be-
cause the lower court failed to cite any authority or set out its
analysis of state law.731 In another, related case, the appellate
panel refused to defer because the district judge himself had
deferred entirely to a state trial judge's determination in a case
that involved significant federal tax consequences.732 The cir-
cuit has declined to defer to district court dictum 733 and has
downplayed the significance of the rule of deference when
"lower state courts have issued an array of decisions subsequent
to the [district court's] decision" concerning the issue at
hand.734 In addition, the court has recognized that the rule of
deference does not apply when there is a disagreement among
district judges within the circuit about the proper interpreta-
tion of state law.735
725. See Glenn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 5, 9 (10th Cir.
1965).
726. See, e.g., Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir.
1980) (noting that rule of deference applies "where there are no controlling
state decisions"); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561
F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
727. Robert Porter & Sons v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 202,
205 (10th Cir. 1963).
728. 323 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1963).
729. Id. at 796.
730. Id.
731. See Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th Cir. 1986); see also
Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1985) (overturning district
court despite rule, noting that no state "law was cited or relied upon by the
district court" in unique case).
732. Estate of Selby v. United States, 726 F.2d 643, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1984).
733. Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985).
734. Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 911-12 nn.6-7 (10th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 699 (1988).
735. McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422, 1424 (10th Cir. 1984); see
Rawson, 822 F.2d at 911 n.7; Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1384 n.2.
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Finally, in Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc.,736 a Tenth Circuit
panel added a new wrinkle to Tenth Circuit law concerning the
rule of deference. The court wrote that "[t]he issue for our
consideration is the trial judge's legal interpretation of state
law to which we give some deference, but ultimately review de
novo."7 37 The Court's opinion contained no discussion whatso-
ever of earlier Tenth Circuit law, which repeatedly endorsed
the "clearly erroneous" standard.7 38 Moreover, two judges on
the panel earlier had voiced dissatisfaction with the "clear er-
ror" review applied by other Tenth Circuit judges.7 3 9 The im-
pact of Wilson therefore is likely to be limited. At the least,
however, the Wilson decision reinforces the need for focused
en banc consideration of the rule of deference in the Tenth
Circuit.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes the rule of deference.
Thus, in Alabama Electric Cooperative v. First National
Bank,7 40 the court stated that "[i]n the absence of guiding [state
court] decisions, we are bound to follow the principle... that
the interpretation of state law by a federal district judge sitting
in that state is entitled to deference."74 ' Consistent with its
general practice, the court adopted this principle by following
earlier Fifth Circuit precedent.74 2 Moreover, the court has
agreed with the Fifth Circuit that:
This policy is grounded in the rationale that a federal trial judge who
sits in a particular state and has practiced before its courts is "better
able to resolve certain questions about the law of that state than is
some other federal judge who has no such personal acquaintance with
the law of the state."74
3
Despite its reliance on Fifth Circuit precedent, the Elev-
enth Circuit's statement of the rule of deference generally has
been less emphatic than the Fifth Circuit's. In only one of the
Eleventh Circuit decisions identified in this study did the court
apply the "great weight" formulation typically used by the
736. 858 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1988).
737. 1&l at 1473.
738. See supra notes 677-81.
739. See supra note 682.
740. 684 F.2d 789 (11th Cir. 1982).
741. .- at 792 (applying rule with little additional analysis).
742. I&
743. Gregory v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11th
Cir. 1985).
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Fifth Circuit. 44 Most often, as in Alabama Electric Coopera-
tive, the Eleventh Circuit has spoken only in terms of "defer-
ence."745 In a recent statement on the subject, however, the
Eleventh Circuit cited Fifth Circuit authority in affording "sub-
stantial weight" to the district court's ruling.746 In two earlier
decisions, the court also used somewhat broader language, stat-
ing: "We generally defer to an interpretation of state law by a
federal district judge sitting in that state, provided his interpre-
tation appears to be reasonable and consistent with the state's
law."747
Notwithstanding its recognition of the rule of deference, in
one case the Eleventh Circuit asserted, without more, that a
state law question "is a question of law subject to de novo re-
view by this court.'' 748 This study revealed no Eleventh Circuit
cases recognizing exceptions to the rule of deference.
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND
FEDERAL CIRCUITS
The District of Columbia Circuit sometimes encounters
questions of local District of Columbia law. In Hull v. Eaton
Corp.,749 for example, the court had to predict what test the
District of Columbia courts would adopt for liability in product
design-defect cases. 50 The circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling, quoting with approval a Tenth Circuit opinion sug-
gesting that the local district judge's views on local law "carry
extraordinary force on appeal."751 The court went on to say
that "[a]pplication of this principle seems particularly appropri-
744. Id at 1441 (stating "we are influenced by 'the great weight to be given
the determination of local law by the district court in diversity cases"').
745. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Housing Dev. Co., 827 F.2d 1475, 1480 (11th
Cir. 1987); Steele v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 783 F.2d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1986);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1985);
Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 958 (11th Cir. 1985); Brown-Marx Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Emigrant Savings Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1371 (11th Cir. 1983); Burger
King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1491 n.6 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 465 U.S.
1102 (1983).
746. Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1988).
747. King v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 686 F.2d 894, 899 (11th Cir.
1982) (quoting Faser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 674 F.2d 856, 859 (31th Cir.
1982)).
748. Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987).
749. 825 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
750. Id. at 453-54.
751. Id. at 454 n.9. Indeed, the court also cited, with seeming approval, a
case endorsing review of such rulings pursuant to the "clearly erroneous"
standard. See id,
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ate here, where the district judge spent many years as a judge
in the District of Columbia court system and therefore has
added expertise in local law."7,52 Hull does not stand alone. At
least one other case from the circuit has cited the rule of defer-
ence and its rationale.7 53
This study revealed no cases in the Federal Circuit discuss-
ing the rule of deference, even though the rule of deference
may be especially appropriate in this circuit of unlimited geo-
graphic jurisdiction. The Supreme Court recently adverted to
the rule of deference in discussing Federal Circuit review of
state law issues, 54 a reference that may be cited to support ap-
pellee arguments that the Federal Circuit should apply the rule
of deference in its future state law cases.7 5
APPENDIX II
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF DEFERENCE
This Appendix provides information otherwise unavailable
in the legal literature, by collecting in one place all the excep-
tions to the rule of deference recognized in the circuits and the
case authority supporting those exceptions. It also sets forth in
brief fashion the justifications for these exceptions and consid-
ers whether the justifications are persuasive.
The simplest exceptions to the rule of deference arise
when district court judges apply local law while sitting by
designation outside their home states,756 or when resident
judges apply nonlocal law under governing choice of law
rules.7 5 7 In such cases, the rule's underlying rationale of local
law expertise is inapposite; applying the rule therefore makes
no sense. Nevertheless, in Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Pack-
ing Co.,758 the Eighth Circuit afforded "great reliance" in such
752. Id.
753. See Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 125 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); cf. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States R.R. Retire-
ment Bd., 749 F.2d 856, 860 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing district court
cases applying foreign law). The District of Columbia Circuit's deference to
federal district courts is, of course, to be distinguished from the Court's well-
established "deference on matters of local law" to the local District of Colum-
bia courts. Keener v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 800 F.2d 1173,
1178 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1375 (1987).
754. United States v. Hohri, 107 S. Ct. 2246, 2253 n.6 (1987).
755. But see supra note 102 (discussing Hohni).
756. See supra note 655 and accompanying text.
757. See supra notes 561, 635, 656 and accompanying text.
758. 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961).
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a case.759 Given the presumed expertise justification for the
rule, this decision is incorrect. Courts facing similar cases in
the future should not, and undoubtedly will not, follow Village
of Brooten.760
Circuit courts citing the rule of deference also have de-
clined to defer to local judges' rulings on their own states' la~v
in at least seven separate instances. First, circuit court panels
properly have refused to defer to district court decisions fol-
lowed by significant changes in state law.76 1 Deference in such
cases is inappropriate because even if district court judges are
viewed as state law experts, they have not focused their exper-
tise on the relevant legal materials. Second, a number of courts
have declined to apply deferential review in the face of a "a
sharp conflict among the judges of [the] district."7 62 This ex-
ception to the rule also is sound. Even assuming that special
district court expertise justifies the rule of deference, when a
conflict arises between experts only the appellate court can re-
solve the conflict. In addition, it would be unseemly and unfair
for the result in such cases to rest solely on which district court
judge is assigned to the case.763
Third. in Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.,764
the Fourth Circuit refused to apply the rule of deference be-
cause a panel member residing in the same state as the district
court judge disagreed with that judge's reading of local law.7 65
This situation is analogous to a disagreement among district
759. Id at 288-89.
760. See supra note 635 and accompanying text.
761. See supra notes 562, 658, 734 and accompanying text.
762. Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 319 (1st
Cir. 1978). For cases in accord, see supra notes 562-63, 659, 735 and accompany-
ing text.
763. See Thompson & Oakley, supra note 122, at 12. (stating that "[t]he
justice system suffers when results turn too much upon the luck of the
draw").
764. 707 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1983).
765. Id- at 788 n.5; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kase, 718 F.2d 306,
307 (9th Cir. 1983) (affording less deference when two appeals court judges
came from same state as district court judge); cf. supra text accompanying
note 359. A "same state panel member" exception may find support in the
specific rationale for the rule articulated by some circuits. These courts em-
phasize the expertise of local district court judges when compared to federal
appeals court judges who have "no such personal acquaintance with the law of
the state." See supra notes 401, 418, 743 and accompanying text. An appeals
court judge from the same state as the district court judge surely does have a
"personal acquaintance" with his or her own state's law. Thus, under this for-
mulation of the expertise rationale, the rule of deference should not apply if
one panel member is from the district court judge's state.
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court judges. The court in Caspary thus properly reasoned that
the opposing view of the "in-state" panel member "neutral-
ize[d]" any special district court competence.766
Fourth, a Second Circuit panel chose not to apply the rule
of deference when nothing suggested the local district judge
"was applying any special [state law] rule different from that
prevailing elsewhere." 76 7 In a similar vein, the First Circuit did
not apply the rule when the district court's state law ruling
rested primarily on a misreading of earlier First Circuit author-
ities.768 These holdings, although debatable, represent the bet-
ter application of the rule's underlying rationale. The district
court judge who simply applies the "general rule," or purports
to follow some earlier federal court precedent, has not called
on any special knowledge about his or her own state's law 69
Fifth, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that "less than the
usual deference may be due" when a district court "confesse[s]
its own uncertainty" by certifying an interlocutory appeal of
the state law issue.770 This exception seems to run counter to
the rule's rationale because even expert analysis can produce
equivocal conclusions. This exception, however, does not rest
on a perceived lack of expertise. Rather, deference is reduced
precisely because the "expert" decisionmaker found the deci-
sion a close one; it makes no sense to let an evenly balanced
judgment push hard on either side of the appellate court's deci-
sional scales.
Sixth, courts in a few cases have mitigated the effect of the
rule of deference where special facts suggest the lower court's
reasoning may have been faulty or incomplete. One panel, for
766. See Caspary, 707 F.2d at 788 n.5. Notably, the Court in Caspary did
not apply the rule of deference even though the appellate panel included a sec-
ond judge from the same state who agreed with the district court's conclusion.
See id. If the Caspary exception takes hold, it follows a fortiori that the rule
of deference is inapplicable when a single "in state" judge sits on the appeals
panel and disagrees with the district court's view of state law.
767. Ryan v. St. Johnsbury & Lamoille County R.R, 290 F.2d 350, 352 (2d
Cir. 1961).
768. See supra note 342 and accompanying text; see also supra note 639 and
accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit's refusal to follow rule).
769. It is noteworthy in regard to this "general law" exception that courts
have applied the rule of deference in cases involving interpretation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. See supra notes 440, 507, 571, 710 and accompanying
text. Such cases concern application of a "quasi-national" body of law effective
in nearly identical form throughout each circuit. It thus seems inappropriate
in such cases for circuit courts to defer on the basis of the district court's sup-
posed local law expertise.
770. See supra note 565 and accompanying text.
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example, refused to defer to a ruling set forth in dictum. 71 In
other cases, courts have declined to defer to district court deci-
sions made in a hurried or unstudied fashion or without the
help of briefing by counsel.7 72 These panels have been percep-
tive in taking a broad view of district court "expertise."773 In
the future, courts should emulate this approach.
Finally, appeals court panels have declined to defer to dis-
trict court rulings unsupported by meaningful reasoning.7 74 A
Tenth Circuit panel, for example, refused to defer to the dispo-
sition of a "novel question" of state law where the district court
"neither cited [state law] authority nor engaged in any analy-
sis." 77 5 Decisions in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have gone
even further, indicating that little or no deference is warranted
when the district court judge relies on state law offering only
general guidance 7 6
These cases are the most difficult to reconcile with the
logic of the rule of deference. The rule exists, after all, because
of the "presumption that a district court judge is especially fa-
miliar with the law of the state,"7 77 particularly the "trends" in
that law.778 Nevertheless, it is plausible for a circuit panel to
assume that a judge who provides no significant "proof" of spe-
cial expertise had no such expertise to draw upon. Particularly
in light of the broader weaknesses of the rule of deference,
771. See supra note 733 and accompanying text.
772. See supra notes 517, 639, 646 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes
551, 627-28 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which district court's
ruling was particularly careful). In a similar vein, the Fifth Circuit has re-
fused to defer whenever the lower court's conclusion is "against the more co-
gent reasoning of the best and most widespread authority ' Stool v. J. C.
Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1968).
773. See generally supra text following note 128.
774. See supra notes 347, 411-13, 469-71, 637, 644, 731 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 732 and accompanying text (discussing circuit refusal
to defer because district court did not cite 'authority or analyze state law). In
addition, the Eighth Circuit has stated broadly and often that it will not defer
to a state law ruling if "it is 'fundamentally deficient in analysis or otherwise
lacking in reasoned authority."' Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Burlington
N. R.R., 707 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting An con, Inc. v. E. R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1981)).
775. Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th Cir. 1986).
776. See McKesson Drug Co. v. Mareus (In re Mistura, Inc.), 705 F.2d 1496,
1497 (9th Cir. 1983); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Howard, 679 F.2d 147, 150 (9th
Cir. 1982); Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 582 F.2d 984, 987
(5th Cir. 1978).
777. Beard v. J. I. Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1097 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (empha-
sis added).
778.. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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courts that continue to apply the rule of deference should de-
cline to defer to unexplained or vaguely explained decisions
that give no signal that true expertise is at work.

